LAND RIGHTS IN CRISIS: RESTORING TENURE SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN by Wily, Liz Alden
March 2003
Funding for this study was provided by the
European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office
and the governments of Sweden and Switzerland.
Liz Alden Wily
Land Rights in Crisis:
Restoring Tenure Security in
Afghanistan
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
Issues Paper Series© 2003 The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). All rights reserved.
This issues paper was prepared by an independent consultant with no previous involvement in the activities
evaluated. The views and opinions expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the
AREU.Liz Alden Wily is an independent political economist and rural development strategist specialising
in land tenure. She gained her Ph.D. in the political economy of land tenure from the University of
East Anglia, UK in 1988. She has worked in Africa since 1972 with a number of governments on matters
of tenure, particularly in the structuring of tenure reforms. She has also worked in Indonesia, Nepal
and Pakistan. Her main field of expertise is in communal property development. Through this she
has also been closely involved in forestry sector developments over the last decade. She has published
extensively. Liz Alden Wily may be contacted at lizaldenwily@clara.co.uk.
About the Afghanistan Research and
Evaluation Unit (AREU)
The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) is an independent research institution that
conducts and facilitates quality, action-oriented research and analysis to inform policy, improve
practice and increase the impact of humanitarian and development programmes in Afghanistan. It
was established by the assistance community working in Afghanistan and has a management board
with representation from donors, UN agencies and NGOs.
Fundamental to the AREU's purpose is the belief that its work should make a difference in the lives
of Afghans. The AREU is the only humanitarian and development research centre headquartered in
Afghanistan. This unique vantage point allows the unit to produce valuable research, and ensure that
its findings become integrated into the process of change taking place on the ground.
Funding for this study was provided by the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) and
the governments of Switzerland and Sweden.
About the Author
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) iI sincerely thank all those who kindly provided time, information and guidance. Though all are listed
in Appendix B, I would like to single out several people for special thanks. These include Carol le Duc
of UNHCR, the senior staff of the Geodesy & Cadastre Department, Ghulam Jelani of the Afghanistan
Information Management Service (AIMS) and Ferozi Mohammed Akbar of the Legal Unit of UNAMA. I
am especially indebted to Gul Ahmad Madadzai, Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Interior, who gave
much time in the first week of the study to helping me identify relevant land legislation. I am also
very grateful to Saduddin Safi of the Afghan Development Association (ADA) who made it possible for
me to meet with people in the field.
I would also like to acknowledge the practical assistance given by Mir Ahmad Joyenda of AREU and
to express my deep appreciation for his support. I am also extremely grateful for the editorial
contributions of Christina Bennett, the Communications Manager of AREU.
Finally, these persons took the time to read the draft and offer comments in their personal capacity:
Nassim Jawad, Senior Policy Adviser, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Peter
Middlebrook, Public Administration Reform Adviser, European Commission, Ms. Reem Al-Salem,
Associate Protection Officer, UNHCR, Andrew Wilder, Director of AREU Christina Bennett, Communications
Manager, AREU, Robin Palmer, Land Tenure Adviser of Oxfam UK and Professor Patrick McAuslan,
Professor of Law, Birkberk College, University of London. The comments provided by these readers
were immensely helpful and I thank them all most sincerely.
Acknowledgements
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) iiGLOSSARY .....................................................................................vii
Land Ownership Terms.....................................................................................vii








CHAPTER ONE:  LAND OWNERSHIP IN AFGHANISTAN, PAST AND PRESENT.......17
The physical setting.....................................................................................17
Land Rights Distribution ...................................................................................18
Many surveys, little useful data ......................................................................18
Land Holding Norms ........................................................................................21
Few owners, many tenants ............................................................................21
Acquisition and transfer ...............................................................................21
Tenure uncertainty .....................................................................................22
The Legal Framework for Landholding .................................................................24





Public vs. private property ............................................................................27
Private rights in land ...................................................................................29
Common property rights ...............................................................................29
Domestic land relations ................................................................................31
Tenure Management........................................................................................32
Evidencing ownership and transactions..............................................................33
Resolving disputes.......................................................................................37
CHAPTER TWO:  LAND TENURE POLICY AND LAW, PAST AND PRESENT ..........39
Evolving Tenure Strategies of the Past:  1880-2001.................................................40
Laying the foundation for tenure disorder 1880-1919 ............................................40
Provisional reform1919-1929..........................................................................41
Greening the desert 1929-1963 .......................................................................42
Bringing land under state control 1963-1973.......................................................42
Tackling inequities: the land reforms 1973-1979 ..................................................43
Retrenchment 1979-1985 ..............................................................................48
Table of Contents
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) iiiThe end of reform 1986-1989 .........................................................................49
Collapsing land relations 1990-2000 .................................................................50
Current Tenure Policy and Legal Frameworks........................................................51
Absence of guiding policy..............................................................................51
Policy through law ......................................................................................52
CHAPTER Three:  DISCUSSION.............................................................62
Current Land Relations: An Overview ..................................................................62
A casualty of mismanaged state-making ............................................................62
A bedrock of inequitable relations...................................................................63
Continuing polarisation ................................................................................63
Adaption and change ...................................................................................64
Dependency, debt and destitution ...................................................................65
Instability and ambiguity ..............................................................................66
Challenges ....................................................................................................67
Putting land relations on the agenda ................................................................67
Developing a sound legal basis for land rights management.....................................68
Identifying institutional responsibility ..............................................................69
Learning from international experience ............................................................69
Moving beyond the farm ...............................................................................70
Taking community-based approaches seriously ....................................................71
Keeping equity on the rural land agenda............................................................72
Learning from the past.................................................................................72
Equity for growth, not instead of growth...........................................................73
Keeping an eye on the land security needs of women ............................................74
Putting registration in perspective...................................................................74
Principles For Moving Forward...........................................................................78
The Role of Research.......................................................................................79
APPENDICES
Appendix A: Terms of Reference .........................................................................81
Appendix B: List of Interviewees .........................................................................82
Appendix C: Land Types and Classification of Arable Land...........................................84
Appendix D: An Overview of Rural Landholding Data..................................................87
Appendix E: Land Cases in the Supreme Court.........................................................92
Appendix F: Afghan State Land Laws ....................................................................93
Appendix G: Property Clauses in Afghan Constitutions................................................96
Appendix H: Note on Land Tenure Issues in Kabul City ..............................................101
Appendix I: Registered Farmland in Afghanistan.....................................................103
Appendix J: Selected Past Land Laws in Translation ................................................105




Box 1: Examples of Land Provisions in the Civil Law 1974...........................................24
Box 2:  The Meeting of Public and Private Lands:  Upland Pasture and Rain-Fed Lands ........28
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) ivBox 3:  Cultivating the Pastures In Altamur, Logar....................................................29
Box 4:   Facing the Agricultural Squeeze ................................................................30
Box 5:   A Customary Land Transfer Document .........................................................33
Box 6:  Information in a Shariat Transfer Deed ........................................................34
Box 7:   Documents Evidencing Legal Rights of Ownership as Defined by State Law .............35
Box 8:  Information on Landholdings/Owners in Books of Ownership and Taxation..............36
Box 9:   Dispute Resolution in Khuwaja Omari District in Ghazni Province.........................37
Box 10: Periods of the Modern Afghan State............................................................40
Box 11: Land Survey & Statistics Law 1965..............................................................43
Box 12: President Daoud's Land Reform .................................................................44
Box 13: The Revolutionary Land Decree of 1978 .......................................................45
Box 14: Examples of Land Loss............................................................................53
Box 15: The Current Legal Basis of Retrieving Land ...................................................55
Box 16: The Current Legal Definition of Government Land...........................................56
Box 17: Changing Land Relations in the Village ........................................................65
Box 18 Disturbed Land Relations in Villages ...........................................................66
TABLES
Table 1:   Current Land Classes ............................................................................84
MAPS
Map 1:  Provincial Maps of Afghanistan....................................................................vi
Map 2:  Afghanistan Land Classes, 1993 ..................................................................86
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) vAfghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) viCadastre a listing of properties based on surveys and mapping; includes the coordinates
of each property which are therefore able to be identified on associated
maps;
Common property land that is owned jointly by all members of a specific community; usually
used with respect to pasture, swamps and forests;
Customary land law rules relating to how land is owned and transacted that have been established
through practice and by adherence by members of the group; these rules
are rarely codified and may change with time;
Eligible applicant a term used in Afghanistan to define those persons who are eligible to
receive land from the state; this has generally included landless farmers,
those with very little land, landless nomads and sometimes, retired civil
servants;
Entitlement state law recognition of specific land ownership, usually through the
registration of the owner and the land owned, and the issue of a certificate
of some kind;
Excess land a term used in Afghanistan to describe areas of land above the land ceiling;
Foreclosure the process whereby the lender becomes the owner of the mortgaged
property when the borrower defaults on repayment of the loan; many
countries have banned foreclosure because the value of the property is
often greater than the value of the debt. Alternative remedies are provided
to help the creditor get his money back including the forced sale of the
land by an appointed third party and repayment of the amount due to the
lender;
Land ceiling the maximum area of land that may legally be owned by a single owner;
Land document title deeds, a bill of sale or other documents that the law permits to be
used as evidence of ownership of the land;
Land holding covers both the owning of land itself or the rights associated with the land
(such as a usufruct - the right to use the land);
Land tenure the arrangements through which land (or rights in land) is owned and
transacted (gifted, sold, inherited, lent, etc.). These systems may be based
upon state law (statutory tenure), customary law (customary land tenure)
or religious law (Shariat);
Lease a right to use a property for a specified time; a lease may be arranged
customarily or under the terms of state laws. The Civil Code (which is based
mainly on Shariat) provides for leases;
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Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) viiMortgage an interest over a property that is created as security against a loan or a
debt, and which ceases once the loan or debt has been paid;
Mortgagee the lender who provides the loan and who thereby gains an interest in the
property that may only be activated under certain conditions; 
Mortgagor the borrower who uses his property as security for a loan;
Public interest the grounds upon which a national government is permitted to take private
property for national benefit (such as for building dams, schools or roads);
Public land land that is either owned by all citizens together or that is held to be un-
owned and/or un-ownable;
Private land land that may be owned by individuals or other legal bodies or persons;
Registration a formal process of recording land rights or land ownership in a land register
that then becomes the primary legal source of determining who is the
owner of a certain plot of land;
Sharecropper usually a landless farmer who pays for the use of a plot by giving the
landowner a share of the crop as agreed between them. Sometimes a
sharecropper owns the land but shares the crop with the person providing
inputs to enable him to farm it. Or a farmer may mortgage his farm and
pay back the debt through giving the creditor a share of the crop;
Statutory land law state laws, laws made by national governments. A law that is an "act" is a
law passed by an elected body like a parliament. "Edicts" or "decrees" are
laws issued by leaders on their own authority, usually with the endorsement
of advisory bodies like cabinets;
Tenant although used often to mean a person who is renting in land, "tenant" may
also refer to any land occupant, including a landowner or sharecropper;
Title deed a certificate that indicates the owner of a described and mapped plot of
land according to official registers.
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) viiiAdat custom, customary law
Alaqadar sub-district (local) administrator
Alem (see also mujtabid) a (Sunni) legal expert, able to exercise and interpret
Shariat
Amlaki shakhsi private land
Amlaki dawlati government land
Aryat (see also jaizi, rahn)  pledge, mortgage
Baayer virgin land, wasteland
Badar (see also mazdoor, noker) landlord
Bazgar farmer, sharecropper
Chaduri (see also pardah, hijab) a head-to toe veil worn by women
Charagha (see also malchar) pasture land
Firman decree
Gayrawi mortgage, temporary selling
Hakem (see also woluswal) district governor
Hamsaya neibhbour
Hanafi one of four legal interpretations of the Sunni
  sect of Islam. The others are Maliki, Hanabali and Shafi’i)
Haq-oba water right
Hijab (see also pardah, chaduri)  women's dress code in Islam
Hoquq law, rights
Hudood summer grazing territory




Jaizi (see also aryat, rahn) mortgage
Jirga tribal council
Joi water channel
Karez traditional underground water tunnel
Khairat alms, given by wealthier households to poor
Khan prominent family
Khawanin-i-mulk (see also malekeen) feudal lord, landed gentry
Lalmi un-irrigated land; can produce crops in a wet year
Malekeen (see also khawanin-i-mulk) land owner
Mulchar (see also charagha) pasture land
Malik (see also qaryadar) representative of a village or local community to the
government, appointed by the village
Manteqa local domain, area, territory
Maraa variously public land, common land, local public land
Mawaat barren land or wasteland
Mazdoor (see also bazgar) day labourer
Mir-ob water manager
Meeras inheritance
Maoqofa (see also waqf) common land often used for religious purposes
(e.g. mosques, shrines)
Maqarara regulations
Mullah traditional prayer leaders
Dari/Pashto Land Tenure Terms
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) ixMujtahid a legal expert, one qualified to exercise ijtahad, which
is to render interpretations of the Sunna (Islamic sources
of Shariat)
Mulk-i-Khalisa Customarily joint or shared ownership
Mushtarak  common land
Mufti legal expert, one qualified to issue fetwa, official
rulings based on Shariat
Nizamnama (see also ossulnama) royal ordinance
Noker (see also bazgar) serf, servant
Ossulnama (see also nizamnama) royal ordinance
Pulghu shared oxen system
Pardah (see also hijab, chadri) curtain, seclusion
Pashtunwali Pashtun customary law
Qabala-i-urfi customary title deed
Qabala-i-sharayee official title deed
Qanoon law, code of regulations
Qanoon madani Civil Code
Qanoon jauza Penal Code
Qaryadar (see also malik) village leader
Qazi judge
Raees-i-makamah chief judge
Rahn (see also jaizi, aryat) pledge, mortgage
Raiot dependent, client serf




Shar'ia, or Shariat the sacred law of Islam
Shura, majlis council, committee
Urfee traditional agreement/sale
Waqf (see also moquofa) common land, usually used for religious purposes
(e.g. mosques, shrines)
Wakaalat acting on another's behalf, acting by proxy
Wakil attorney, representative
Wikalatnama power of attorney
Woluswal (see also hakem) district head
Zamin land
Zoliad rights of possession
NOTES
Afghani: The Afghan currency, also known as "afs"; The Afghani figures quoted in this report use
the "old Afghani," the currency in circulation prior to October 2002 for which one
Afghani= US $0.00002.  On October 6, 2002, the government introduced the "new Afghani,"
which trades at one Afghani=US $0.0222.
Jerib: The common measure of land; five jeribs comprise one hectare (2000 sq. metres).
Dates: Laws are indicated by their Afghan date. Excepting the Taliban regime, which used the
Arabic lunar calendar, Afghanistan follows a solar calendar beginning in 622 AD, the
year of the Hijrat. The first day of the year coincides with the first day of spring. The
approximate corresponding western date is derived by adding 621 years, two months
and 21 days to the Afghan date.
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Land tenure insecurity has many faces — from
the returning refugee widow who is unable to
wrest her husband’s land from his family, to the
community evicted by a land-hungry warlord, to
the drought-defeated smallholder who has sold
his last plot for food and cannot find a landlord
willing to enter a sharecrop arrangement. It may
also be a case of clan heads carving up local
pasture for new cultivation, land that poorer
villagers thought was theirs to share, that the
government thought was its own to distribute,
that visiting nomads thought was theirs to graze
— and often have documents to “prove” it —
documents that may conflict with others issued
at different times, with the law, or with human
rights and justice norms. At this point in time,
multiple claims, each with its own historical
legitimacy, may exist over the same land. The
law, and the documents or testimony it generates,
is plural, complex, uncertain, incomplete and
currently unenforceable. At every turn, there is
a need to rethink norms for a sustainable future
while reconciling with the past.
Until recently, land tenure - the holding and
transacting of land — has not been more than
peripherally on Afghanistan’s planning agenda.
This is not surprising. The Afghanistan Transitional
Administration (ATA) is new, is only just beginning
to function as a government and has limited
authority over the country. Though it is a marvel
that any substantive land planning has taken place
at all, what has been thought through is driven
by the limited objective of helping foreign
investors secure land.  A more poverty-focused
approach to reconstruction, within which land
tenure conflicts are most visible, has been slow
to emerge, which has meant that issues of land
access and the concerns of the majority remain
a low priority.
The new administration has also not been
particularly well served by the assistance
community in this area. Though a range of policy
advisories have been issued and agrarian surveys
conducted over the last year, they have failed to
focus on basic land access, rights as a factor of
production, recovery or conflict resolution.
Structural analysis about the drivers of conflict
and poverty has been limited. By failing to
recognise the centrality of land rights to the
peace and reconstruction process and by failing
to provide the ATA with valuable lessons learned
from experience in other contexts, the aid
community has tended to reinforce the perception
that land ownership problems are too complex,
bewildering or sensitive to address at this time.
Unfortunately, such a risk-avoidance strategy is
a — historical and imprudent, and may temporarily
suppress chronic grievances. It fails to consider
the role that conflict over space — and particularly
rural space — has played in driving and sustaining
the internal conflict in Afghanistan over the last
quarter century. As a result, current approaches
to land tenure matters tend to be superficial and
ad hoc. The concern of the ATA is, however, very
real. While caution is indisputably in order, it
makes sense that the assistance community
facilitate the ATA’s efforts to understand and
deal with the land rights crises that currently
beset the nation. It is hoped that, sooner rather
than later, this will be expressed in a
comprehensive strategy, implemented with its
own set of workable legal instruments and local
level arrangements.
Four basic strategies will be helpful in shaping
this strategy:
• Adopting an incremental and learning by
doing approach to the issues, to be able to
move forward.  Invoke support where it is
needed (at the local level) to make practical
progress and to establish workable new norms;
• Recognising that land rights management
is a cornerstone of social management in
agrarian states. Dealing with land ownership
issues will not only aid productive
development, but will also open avenues
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Executive Summary*
* Editor’s note:  Because of the breadth and quantity of information contained in this paper, we felt the executive summary
should be as inclusive and comprehensive as possible.  This summary, therefore, is longer than most.through which wider concerns of governance,
particularly inclusive, local-level governance,
may be practically addressed;
• Making sustainability a primary objective
of restitution policies and action. This means
that classical approaches to restoring order
in land ownership should go beyond simply
returning land to pre-war owners, as many
aspects of that pattern of ownership remain
contested;
• Ensuring that the law upon which decisions
of tenure are based is comprehensive and
straightforward in its prescriptions, and
transparent and consistent in its use.  These
are attributes that do not currently exist;
and
• Recognising that no top-down dictate, in
the form of laws, reforms or enforcement
will be lasting without local
ownership/popular support. If there is a
single, principle suggestion arising from this
short review, it is that treatment of land
ownership issues requires rigorous adherence
to sound development process in general and
the adoption of localised and participatory
community-based approaches in particular.
Before discussing how such strategies might be
achieved, some general background findings to
the land tenure sector should be considered.
I.  LAND OWNERSHIP
Characteristics
Data on rural land ownership is scanty, incomplete,
out of date or structured in ways that are hard
to compare.  With such limitations in mind, the
following observations on land ownership can be
made:
While most of the rural population depends
on arable agriculture, the amount of useable
farmland is limited, comprising only 12
percent of the land area. Irrigated agriculture
is extremely important to the rural economy,
in the form of vineyards, and orchards and
cereal farms. The greater productive area in
the country is pastureland, which covers 45
percent of the total land area. This supports
an immense livestock population owned by
both settled farmers and semi-nomadic and
nomadic populations. However, land tenure
arrangements are least well developed in
these areas and most subject to contention
and even armed conflict.
Outright landlessness is a very real feature
in Afghanistan.  A significant body of people
do not own farmland (the landless), or they
own farms too small for survival (near-
landless), yet together they provide a highly
significant part of production, as
sharecroppers, workers or tenants. While it
cannot be confirmed that landlessness or near
landlessness is rising, the signs are that this
is the case.
Though the range of holding sizes is
narrower than many other states in the
region, ownership is highly skewed.
Minorities at the upper end have traditionally
owned disproportionate areas of total land.
One recent survey finds that 2.2 percent own
19 percent of the total land area in 2002.
Regional differences of land distribution
are so strong that national farm size
averages are meaningless.  For example,
while “most” own their land in the
mountainous east and northeast, landlords,
sharecroppers and labourers are most common
in the southern fertile plains around Kandahar.
Land holding in Afghanistan is not a simple
question of owning or not owning. The most
striking aspect of rural Afghan tenure is the
high degree of uncertainty in land ownership,
primarily in the sharecropping sector and the
closely intertwined element of land
mortgaging.  This involves a web of
relationships in which it is difficult to
distinguish creditors/debtors from
owners/sharecroppers, or to know precisely
who is the legal or accepted right-holder over
the property.
Land Tenure Administration
An unusually strong history of land
ownership recordation exists in Afghanistan,
dating back to land grants issued in the 1880s
with documents relating to land transfer in
the customary, religious/civil and state law
land management sectors. The form of
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addition, a national land registration
programme conducted between1965-1978,
mapped and recorded 45 percent of arable
farms into 5,502 registers. However,
maintenance of these records has been
limited.
No clear regime for managing land rights
exists and by default many management
functions have fallen to the courts, which
also handle the bulk of land disputes. With
instability and coercion by warlords over the
last decade, land rights management and
dispute resolution has lost credibility in many
areas. Most rural Afghans regulate their land
ownership relations customarily, without using
officials or courts. Customary sector
management offers a strong foundation, but
is rife with practices that favour wealthier
elites, men and dominant ethnic groups.
The Legal Framework for Landholding
Land rights in Afghanistan are governed by more
than one legal regime, including customary law,
civil law, Islamic law and state law. While
important differences exist, there is also an
unusual degree of commonality among these in
their treatment of land rights.
Customary law (rawaj) This relates to how
land is owned and transacted as established
through community practice and adherence
by members to group norms. Customary rules
are rarely codified and appropriately change
with time. Pashtunwali (Pashtun customary
law) is one of the more elaborated operating
laws, and dominates the norms in many areas.
Shariat and custom often conjoin on land
matters, except with respect to usury,
women’s land rights and common property
rights. The former is more liberal — and
generally less adhered to because of this.
Civil law (qanoon madani) The Civil Code is
a written expression of mainly Islamic law
principles and includes more than 1,000
directives relating to property. The Code was
compiled in the 1970s building in large part
on historical treatments of the Hanafi school
of Islamic jurisprudence.
Religious law (Shariat or Shar’ia) in its
original rules as laid down in the Koran and
expressed in many scholarly treatises, may
be directly applied when the issue is not
covered in the Civil Code. Similarly, the Civil
Code is only applied if the issue is not covered
in state law.  Land cases are officially dealt
with in civil courts, which rule on the basis
of state, civil and religious law, in uncertain
mix and measure.
State law (statutory law or national law)
This comprises both supreme law (see below)
and sector law (i.e. agriculture, taxation,
housing). It has been executed through
statutes (qanoon), passed by Afghan kings
and presidents in the form of decrees or
edicts, and published in pamphlets and, since
1963, in an official gazette. Frequent regime
changes have had a confusing effect on formal
state law. Rather than sustaining existing
laws, new regimes have tended to repeal
previous laws and institute new ones, but in
a very uneven manner. In practice, there is
considerable continuity in the land sector
from the statutes of 1965 to those of 2000.
No single body of  land tenure law exists, but
land is significantly addressed by a number
of Taliban edicts of 1999 and 2000. These are
the law in force at this time, as they do not
contradict the (broad) terms of the 1964
Constitution.
Constitutional law The supreme law, which
has consistently included a limited set of
declamations on the right of the state to
appropriate property, the protection of private
rights, the right to travel and settle freely,
the definition of government land and the
rights of foreigners to own land. The modern
Afghan state has seen constitutional law
promulgated in 1923, 1931, 1964, 1977, 1979,
1980, 1987 and 1990 (and a draft in 1992).
The current constitution in force is that of
1964, which offers insufficient guidance on
land rights. However, it is notable for its
support against random foreclosure by
creditors, a prominent concern of poorer rural
Afghans, and a principle that does not seem
to be widely applied.
Land Classes
In terms of tenure, the land area of Afghanistan
falls within one or other of these classes:
Government land (amlaki dawlati) The
definition of government land has been altered
Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan
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defined in the 1965 Land Survey and Statistics
Law as “land registered as belonging to the
government,” this government land expanded
to include wasteland, forests and then
pastures through constitutional articles. These
definitions were subsequently abandoned and
the definition of government land is currently
uncertain beyond those properties already
registered and/or held as belonging to the
state.
Public land (maraa) Land, under the control
(not ownership) of the state, but held to be
either owned by the nation as a whole, or by
nature un-ownable (such as wasteland).
However, the government has always acted
as landlord and has, at times, made public
land available for lease or sale. Maraa also
includes land reserved for local community
use. The lack of a clear boundary between
national public land and local public land
reflects weak tenure development and
unresolved conflicts between state and
customary notions of tenure.
Private land (amlaki shakhsi) Conceptually,
private ownership is defined as individual
ownership of discrete estates and therefore
limited to farms, house plots, rather than
group-owned property. In practice, a
documented “individual” landholder often
conceals shared ownership by a larger number
of individuals — a family, clan or village.
Conversely, rights to land owned by a family
may be exercised by a single (male) head of
household.
Communal land (mushtarak) Commons are
non-farm properties including local open
spaces, dry uplands, pasture and swamps,
conventionally understood as owned by the
community members jointly. In practice, khan
families have superior rights.  They are able
to use these lands in ways that those without
draught power for dry-land cultivation or
livestock to pasture cannot. Disputes over
commons are legion and growing, especially
between seasonal pastoral and settled
cultivator interests, both of which have
different historical and customary claim.
Religious land (waqf) Held originally by
religious institutions, much of this land is now
under the control of the state as government
land or public land, with the remainder held
by local mosques for the common good. This
land may not be bought or sold.
Distinctions among classes are uncertain, with
overlapping interests between public and
communal lands, private and communal lands,
and government and public property. A main
structural problem is the uneven acknowledgement
of common rights in land as private property
rights, a problem that encompasses competing
interests over pasture.
II.  LAND POLICY AND LAW
Formal land policy has only sporadically been
declaimed over the years, and is still not in place
today. Policy is discernible however both through
the terms of state law and, more generally, in
tenure-related strategies that have been adopted
over the last century.
Tenure Strategies: 1880-2001
Four dominant strategies have been the following:
Pashtunisation policies that saw leader after
leader empower loyal Pashtuns to colonise
the territories of minority and potentially
rebellious ethnic groups. This began with the
efforts of King Abdur Rahman in the 1880s to
secure the borders of the new state, using
this means with brutal efficacy. This laid the
foundation for ethnic land contestation in
Hazarajat and in the north, conflict that has
intensified over the last decade.
Settlement policies associated with large
dam and irrigation developments during the
reign of Zahir Shah (1933-1973), which
routinely replaced local occupancy with
selected settlers; often these “eligible
applicants” were Pashtun nomads (Kuchi),
who were to prove less than dedicated to the
settled farming lifestyle, but who have
retained substantial interests in many areas,
often as creditors of heavily indebted tenants.
Recordation policies designed to clarify and
order land ownership and to bring land
relations under state control. This was
undertaken by Zahir Shah in the 1960s and
1970s as a mass survey and registration
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of all farmers and farms were registered and
not a single title deed was issued but a basis
for ownership documentation was widely
entrenched. The process also saw a massive
expansion of government land, including the
bringing of some 2.6 million hectares of
pasture under state control.
Distributive reform designed to bring more
equity to grossly inequitable land ownership.
This began with President Daoud’s moderate
reforms during the 1970s that placed a ceiling
on private landowning, required the
compulsory sale of the excess to the state,
and instituted progressive taxation on the
basis of holdings’ size. This was followed by
a more extreme, well-meaning but brutally
implemented reform by the People’s
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) led
by Presidents Taraki and Amin (1978-1979).
This dramatically reduced the land ceiling,
redistributed the excess without payment of
compensation and cancelled standing debts
of more than five years relating to mortgaging.
The rebellion that ensued from these and
concurrent radical educational reforms, led
to Soviet invasion and occupation (1979-1989).
All four strategies were implemented in the service
of state building and modernisation. All four failed
in their objectives. Untangling the conflicts that
resulted is a main task facing the current
administration.
Key Drivers of Tenure Insecurity
The current situation of widespread insecurity of
tenure appears to be driven by these main
conditions:
A history of rural production that builds on
deeply inequitable relations within the
community with regard to access to and
rights over land and water. Symptoms include
crushing indebtedness, landlessness and, more
recently, destitution, all of which carry
abundant seeds for sustaining conflict. This
is decreasingly being relieved by traditional
social reciprocity, which shows signs of being
in demise. The majority poor may decreasingly
rely on the rich to keep them housed, fed or
landed. Plans to increase agricultural
productivity ignore the fact that most farmers
are landless and without the resources to re-
start farming.
Multiple and unresolved interests over the
same land. This stems mainly from the
inglorious history of translocation outlined
above, which has generated increasingly
violent ethnic land disputes. The appropriation
of lands by warlords is a more recent (1990s)
but equally unsettling phenomenon.
Failure to develop land ownership norms
beyond the farm. This is a problem that is
shared by many governments around the world
and is only now beginning to see creative
resolution. It refers to the fact that while
most of Afghanistan is land suitable for
pastoral rather than arable development,
tenure norms are least well developed in the
pastureland sector. A related shortfall has
been the tendency of state builders to co-
opt as much land as possible to state coffers,
or at least to its control, which has directly
affected customary forest and pastureland
rights.
Continuing disorder that helps to sustain
tenure insecurity in many rural areas. While
this is most visible in the existence of an
enormous number of displaced persons, well-
settled communities are also affected.
Uncontrolled poppy production, warlordism,
land invasions and ethnic and intra-community
disputes are all generating insecurity at a
time when stability of occupancy is essential.
The outstanding question is whether matters
of land security may be tackled before peace
and stability are restored. While in theory
the answer may be no, in practice, sustained
order is unlikely to be achieved without
addressing land conflicts.
III.  CHALLENGES
This study concludes that long years of misdirected
policy have entrenched, rather than improved,
deeply inequitable and often unjust land ownership
relations among tribes, between agricultural and
pastoral systems and among feudally-arranged
classes of society. Attempts to remedy these have
been poorly executed. Violence, insecurity,
anarchy and land grabbing compound these
problems. The question facing the new
administration is whether to ignore disturbed land
Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 5relations and hope that they will resolve
themselves, or to deal with the issues directly.
And if the latter, then how?
1. Putting land relations on the agenda. There
are signs that both the ATA and the
international community are recognising that
disorder in land relations cannot be ignored
if peace and stability — let alone socio-
economic transformation — are to come about.
 It is both timely and necessary to formulate
a more explicit and comprehensive strategic
commitment to tackle land ownership matters
in a manner that goes beyond ad hoc fire
fighting of occasional or prominent land
disputes.
2. Focusing on sound development processes.
Commitment and action to develop a
comprehensive land policy will be critical.
The current constitution-making process offers
a broad and inclusive environment through
which this could be pursued. Production of a
substantial chapter on land rights and
administration would represent a major
achievement contributing to nation building
and reconciliation. This will require careful
facilitation. At the same time, it will be
helpful to promptly launch support for local-
level land dispute resolution initiatives out
of which important guiding new norms may
be offered to national-level planning.
3. Identifying institutional responsibility.  The
building blocks of such decision-making are
still to be put in place. No single ministry has
taken on land tenure issues or offered a
concrete institutional framework through
which multi-sectoral tenure concerns may be
addressed. What currently exists as different
agendas between the executive and judiciary
branches of government need integration into
a single and consistent strategic vision as to
how land rights should be ordered, governed
and sustained.
4. Taking community-based approaches
seriously. It is important that land policy
development not be confined to the corridors
of central government.  Rather, it should be
informed by practical efforts of land conflict
resolution in strategically selected rural areas.
This will allow the ATA to focus on priority
disputes locally in situations where it cannot
deal with such issues nationally, to enable
the evolution of an inclusive and practical
approach and to lay the foundation for local-
level land governance systems. What is
required at this stage is a process that avoids
top-down approaches and instead promotes
efforts that can be sustained at the periphery
in the hands of ordinary Afghans, operating
within local and community-level contexts.
5. Developing a sound legal basis for land rights
management. The legal issues facing
Afghanistan are immense and go beyond the
difficulties the administration currently has
in enforcing the (state) law that exists. What
constitutes the law is itself a matter of debate.
A main problem is the uncertainty of
boundaries and roles among religious, civil,
custom and state law. Clarification and
coordination, if not total integration, are
urgent. Even within religious law, there must
be questions raised and addressed as to the
legitimacy of limiting guidance to sources,
such as Hanafi,  not observed by all Afghans.
While an initiative to improve state land law
is underway, land law remains a loose
compilation of provisions with vast gaps and
loopholes. The scope of legal instruction upon
which judges will, for example, rule on
restitution disputes is insufficient to meet
the demands of current circumstances. The
development of a national land policy will
guide the development of new legal provisions.
Ideally, these will include a comprehensive
and integrated basic new land law, which
takes account of majority customary and
religious directives that are consistent with
constitutional principles. An absence of court
reporting also poses problems. This has
prevented the evolution of legal precedent
on the one hand, and limits consistency among
rulings, or the accountability and transparency
of the courts, on the other. This is going to
be particularly important in the upcoming
work on the Special Land Court, mandated
with hearing what will be thousands of land
disputes relating mainly to land claim cases.
Interest within the Ministry of Justice to adopt
a fresh and more comprehensive approach to
developing new law deserves immediate
encouragement and practical support. Acting
towards this specifically in the land tenure
sector will be a manageable and concrete
way forward.
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 6. Learning from international experience.
Land tenure problems plague many other
agrarian states and there is much to be learned
from the growing body of land tenure reform
underway in more than fifty countries. Many
of these reforms directly address issues of
similar concern to Afghanistan, such as how
customary and statutory land tenure regimes
may be integrated, how cheap, decentralised
and sustainable tenure administration may
be established at the community level, the
proper role of the state in land administration
and land ownership and the kind of norms
that may be developed to support stable
common property systems. Novel approaches
to land dispute resolution, with a particular
emphasis on non-court based dispute
resolution, are also being developed and
tested. Making such experience available to
the ATA is an obvious responsibility of the
assistance community. Lessons from Kosovo,
Bosnia and East Timor may be particularly
instructive for Afghanistan with respect to
post-conflict restitution management. These
experiences illustrate that the unravelling of
what is an often ethnically discriminatory
history is a messy but ultimately essential
element of effective restitution. In the
process, new administrations are forced to
make fundamental decisions as to what
constitutes “equity” and whose rights or
interests are to be “more equal” than others.
7. Locating restitution within reconciliation.
Matters of land restitution cannot be
satisfactorily separated from the demands of
reconstruction. This is a realisation that many
post-conflict administrations arrive at
belatedly and at a cost. Optimism that land
interests may quickly be restored in
accordance with a chosen dateline avoids the
reality that many of these properties are
subject to multiple claims, each with an
historical or social legitimacy that cannot be
dismissed by invoking the law. Unpacking
rights, identifying “owners” as defined by a
certain time period and declaring this the
legal norm, may not be enough and may
exacerbate contestation. There is both need
and opportunity in Afghanistan to adopt a
reconciliation approach. Practically, this
needs to be implemented at the local level
and on a case-by-case basis.
8. Clarifying tenure norms. A related issue is
the need to clarify the distinction between
local-public and national-public properties,
particularly as they affect the interface of
land rights of settled and mobile peoples. As
in Afghanistan, many countries have seen
local commons appropriated by national
governments because they are perceived as
un-owned or too broadly owned to be viewed
as private property. Today, however, there
is a declining emphasis in other countries on
individualisation as the only route through
which private property may be expressed.
Two main results have been the provision of
new tenure norms to allow for group-owned
private property, and clearer and more formal
arrangements to allow different (e.g. seasonal)
interests in the same land to co-exist.
9. Keeping equity on the rural land agenda.
How people order their land relations and
the manner in which local and national
governments provide regulatory guidance, is
central to the governance of agrarian society.
Failure to attend to the sound ordering of
land relations and the fair distribution of
arable land will impact adversely on rural
livelihoods as a whole.  The fact that drought
has tied landlessness more tightly to
destitution adds to the urgency for governance
systems to address, rather than avoid, the
situation.
10. Learning from the past.  History does matter,
not only in terms of the changing land relations
inherent in modernisation and conflict, but
also in terms of the crucial history of state
intervention. The Afghan experience tells us
that one critical lesson of this history needs
to be learned:  that the forced redistribution
of land is unlikely to be a lasting solution and
could contribute to war and instability, even
where the beneficiaries are the majority. At
the same time, matters of distribution and
associated practices through which land is
voluntarily or involuntarily transferred from
the poor — such as through unfair land
mortgaging and sharecropping regimes — are
pressing concerns that need to be addressed.
Adopting exploratory and more participatory
and local decision-making on such matters
will be necessary; law or top-down reform
on its own, will be ineffective.Issues Paper Series
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11. Equity for growth, not instead of growth.
Within the civil administration, what is driving
current planning is the determination to make
land more easily and securely available to
investors. While this is an an important
objective, it presents too narrow a basis on
which land tenure planning and management
systems need to be developed.
12. Keeping an eye on the land security needs
of women.  It is too early to suggest direct
reforms in rural gender land relations.
Nonetheless, the new administration should
be aware that improvement in the land
security of women will be an important route
towards improved land relations overall within
the local rural community.  The ATA should
support this area as needs arise.
13. Putting registration in perspective.
Registration and entitlement have been the
most concrete tenure development strategies
yet offered by the ATA, as expressed within
the Draft National Development Framework
(NDF), including the establishment of a
“nationwide registry” to “allow for the use
of land as collateral for entrepreneurial
activities” recommended by the Asian
Development Bank.  The feasibility of using
peasant farmland as collateral should be
reconsidered and safer (for both creditor and
debtor) means for accessing credit explored.
The ATA should also question the utility and
cost-effectiveness of registration as a route
to tenure security.  The strategic lessons to
be learned here seem to be that recordation
procedures need to be kept simple, cheap
and above all, locally controlled and
administered. Accessibility and accountability
to owners themselves is paramount and
arguably a sure way to ensure integrity in
land records. Community-based tenure
management and administration deserves
early exploration.
14. Investing in Research.  There is still far too
much about land tenure in Afghanistan that
is not known.  A deeper examination of land
relations, particularly of sharecropping and
land mortgaging in strategically selected
communities, would add to an understanding
of these shifting power dynamics.  The
problems being faced by returning refugees
deserves close examination, as do those being
experienced specifically in the north and
Hazarajat where land relations are particularly
tense. The territorial history and character
of pastoral hudood (summer grazing zones)
also deserves closer examination towards
resolving pasture disputes. A better
understanding of the land rights, interests
and needs of rural women also needs
attention. There is also a range of simpler
and more concrete tasks, such as
computerising the information contained in
the 5,502 registers as quickly as possible.
Even if the existing registers are discarded
altogether, the information these and the
background files contain on landholding in
1965-1978 represent a very important
historical record against which current day
tenure changes may be assessed. Two
principles of process should guide all research
conducted: first, that each task is undertaken
in conjunction with the ATA and other
appropriate operational agencies; and second,
that participatory processes be adopted as
much as possible, in frameworks which work
with Afghans at the local level to help them
explore and act upon tenure problems.
IV.  CONCLUSION
Taking steps along the path to improved land
relations will not be easy. The temptation to
address problems only through new law, new
policy or periodic coercion cannot have much
success in the often lawless and disturbed
conditions that operate beyond the reach of the
current administration. Such strategies would
also be a replay of the top-down approaches of
the past, approaches that have only helped to
provoke conflict. Adopting localised and
participatory approaches is urgent, relevant and
desirable in Afghanistan. The main conclusion of
this short review is that land relations and security
can only be improved with genuine and practical
efforts that arrive at change with and through
ordinary Afghans at the local level.Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan
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SUMMARY OF PRINCIPLE FINDINGS
• Stark inequities in land ownership, ethnic conflict over land access, and mismanaged land
reform efforts by the state have all played a role in generating and sustaining conflict,
including Soviet occupation, over the last quarter century.
• Conflict has seriously disturbed land relations, de-securing farm and pasture rights in some
areas, jeopardising the ability of administrators or courts to manage or uphold rights fairly,
and threatening confidence in the capacity of the constitution or other state law to protect
existing land rights.
• Landlessness and indebtedness in the farming sector have always been features of Afghan
agriculture and are likely to involve a greater proportion of farmers than 25 years ago.
Population growth and land shortage, opium poppy production, ethnic tension, insecurity,
and more recently, drought, remain potent drivers to land grabbing, landlessness and
destitution.
• Knowledge about how rural land is distributed and under what conditions is incomplete and
characterised by strong regional differences. Disturbed settlement and tenure insecurity
render information unreliable beyond the short-term. High rates of sharecropping by both
landowners and landless and the ambivalent status of mortgaged plots make precise definition
of owners difficult.
• Today, the poor constitute the majority of rural populations.  However, customary, religious
and state law regimes share starkly inadequate provisions supporting the land rights or
interests of the poor. Many current land practices result in homelessness and rural landlessness,
yet there exist insufficient means — beyond charity — to impede or remedy these effects.
• Pasture land is a principle source of conflict. Competition over this valuable resource
engenders conflict among settled and nomadic land users and ethnic and territorial concerns.
It also brings to light conceptual differences about if, how, and in what situations, people
may own land in common and have those rights upheld as private property. It also highlights
the conflicting positions as to rightful reach of government land and government powers over
property.
• A plural legal basis to land rights exists, in the form of customary, religious and state law,
and with a great deal of overlap, some inconsistency and much uncertainty as to norms in
each body of law. Landowners variously use custom, Shariat or evidence from the land register
to demonstrate their rights. The documentation of transactions is widely practised in all
three regimes.
• A clear system for land tenure administration does not exist. Administration (such as the
formalisation of routine transfer of rights) falls, by default, to judges.
• There is currently no institutional focus for dealing with tenure. Attention to tenure problems
has so far been ad hoc. The administration's main effort to date has been to create a special
court to hear land claims. However, the legal basis on which this court will rule seems
inadequate for the challenges involved, as do the systems for ensuring decisions are consistent,
publicly recorded and accountable.
• The main discernible land policy of the ATA is to restore land to those who owned the land
in 1978, including those lands that belonged to government at that time. Adoption of this
strategy without addressing underlying grievances associated with how land was acquired,
will not provide a lasting resolution.
• A second main policy of the ATA is to pursue registration and entitlement, mainly to encourage
investment. This deserves more thought in light of the failures of classical registration to
deliver tenure security.Issues Paper Series
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MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS
• Establish order in land relations to help end civil strife. However, order cannot be easily
achieved without peace. To avoid being paralysed by this conundrum, the ATA needs to
develop a comprehensive set of principles and intentions with respect to land rights and land
policy, and through participatory means to ensure as much support as possible.
• Inform policy and law through practical lessons of localised progress. At the same time
action on the ground is essential in order to build a tangible basis of progress and experience.
An incremental approach is necessary. Action at the periphery may begin in only a limited
number of areas. A gradual body of improved practice may accrue and prove important in
guiding evolving policies and law.
• Focus on the Land Claims Court as a first venue for developing clear policies, law and
procedure. This court urgently needs support with clear and detailed procedures, process
and especially principles upon which rulings will be made. Many wider concerns of legal
process could be helpfully explored through the tangible issues presented by land ownership
matters.
• Adopt a reconciliation approach to restoring order to land relations. Pursuit of the
traditional restitution approach of reverting land to owners of a certain date needs to be
retained as an objective in principle, but couched within a reconciliation context that seeks
to explore and resolve conflicting claims as well. To be effective, reconciliation and related
restitution will need to operate in a localised manner and involve local level leaders and
representatives of the concerned parties.
• Pilot district or community-based land administration in stable areas.  This is likely to be
the only practical and cost-effective means for administering land tenure in the short or
longer term. Adopting decentralised and participatory approaches from the outset will be
sound.
• Minimise land loss by improving the operations and impact of land mortgaging and
sharecropping on land security. Finding workable ways forward will be best achieved through
involving sharecroppers and those mortgaging their land in discussions.
• Support the ATA's efforts to restore land tenure stability with international assistance.
The reach, manpower, technical and financial capacity of the ATA to deal with land ownership
problems is limited. Help is needed and deserved.
• Establish an institutional focal point for taking action and responsibility. Given that a
number of ministries have interests, it may be necessary to establish a special inter-ministerial
commission for this purpose.  To be effective, this commission should be charged with devising
practical pilot developments, as well as guiding new national land policy and law development.
The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and Ministry for Rural Reconstruction and Development (MRRD)
should be key actors; either could host the commission.
• Support ATA decision making with accurate information and analysis to inform decisions
is also pressing. Organisations should be encouraged and assisted to research key issues.
Priority areas for research include:
1. investigating the operations and impact of land mortgaging and sharecropping on land
security in order to devise protective measures;
2. gaining a thorough understanding of the nature of land conflicts in the north;
3. exploring with pastoral and settled peoples the way to workable norms to limit and
control conflict over pasture;
4. identifying current distribution of rural land ownership and land access in different
farming zones; and
5.  examining the difficulties being faced by returnees in accessing past or new rural land.
These and other investigations should be carried out in conjunction with the ATA and agencies
with special responsibilities in these areas.the administration. As this paper will attest, there
is little doubt that conflict over land rights and
its treatment by successive administrations is one
of the causes of turmoil during the last 25 years.
Where struggles over land and water have not
been a primary driver to conflict, they have served
as a tipping point to conflict. Dissatisfaction with
state policies or longstanding inequities in land
access has been a frequent driver to conflict. It
is evident that lasting recovery cannot be found
without restoring stability in land relations.
Perhaps the most important question that needs
exploration - and which this short review hopes
to help prompt - is whether the resolution of
tenure issues can help provide a path to stability.
The tentative conclusion drawn is that it can,
and it must.
A Scoping Study
This paper summarises the findings of a short
exercise to identify land issues in present-day
Afghanistan, carried out for the Afghanistan
Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) in accordance
with terms of reference provided as Appendix A.
Tenure Insecurity
In agrarian societies, production and livelihood,
economic growth and social stability depend
heavily upon orderly and accepted land access
and ownership systems. When the way in which
land rights are ordered is contested, peace and
security are difficult to attain or sustain. Disorder
in land relations reigns in Afghanistan at this
time. Tenure insecurity is rife. Many Afghan
farmers own no land or too little to live on. Many
access land under unstable or unjust conditions.
Many owners hold land that is claimed by others.
Many have lost their land to others. Different
claims present different versions of what is
legitimate. Customary, religious and state laws
governing land ownership are under challenge,
difficult to enforce and in any event, insufficiently
developed to meet the demands of the present
situation. At every turn, there is a need to rethink
norms for a sustainable future while reconciling
with the past.
How far the past can provide a workable
foundation is just one of the challenges facing
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tThe review was conducted in October 2002 and
this paper drafted in November 2002.
AREU's desire to learn more
about land tenure issues
stemmed from its interest in
tracking shifts in the ownership
of assets within especially poor
populations. "Land" was to prove a large subject,
so this short study should be viewed as only a
first step in what will almost certainly need to
be a series of explorations of increasing range
and depth and involving a widening set of actors.
These will need to be conducted in partnership
with the ATA itself; concerns surrounding land
ownership are of such importance that they are
necessarily first and foremost the business of
state.
This review is not about land in general but about
land tenure, the way in which rights in land are
distributed, secured, transacted and governed
and the problems that surround these processes.
Though water and land rights go together in
Afghanistan, the former is not directly addressed
here. In addition, the paper focuses upon the
rural, rather than the urban, economy. Urban
tenure problems are no less acute, certainly more
visible to planners and present challenges that
are similar to those confronting rural communities.
However, while urbanisation is clearly accelerating
and private sector investment could eventually
reorient parts of the economy, there is no
expectation that Afghanistan will move from an
agrarian to an industrial state. As in the past, the
majority of Afghans will need to survive through
agriculture (arable and pastoral) and/or the
processing and marketing of agricultural products.
The recovery and development of agriculture and
achievement of a healthy and stable rural society
remain key reconstruction challenges.
Just how land relations are ordered (or not
ordered) among members of the rural population
and between state and people are generically
critical concerns for such objectives. Security of
tenure is, in the best of times, a top consideration
for rural planning and for social management. In
situations of conflict, stability in land rights is
characteris-tically a first casualty. This is
demonstrably the case in Afghanistan where all
levels of land tenure - territorial, ethnic/tribal,
community, class and domestic land relations -
have been affected. Land relations between state
and people, and among farming systems have
been recurrent points of conflict. Even where
order exists, the intervention
of un-elected, un-appointed
and usually unwanted warlords
in many parts of the country
disturb land relations. Coerced
or semi-coerced land theft in
response to still-lucrative opium poppy production
exacerbates insecurity of tenure.
The need to attend to issues of land rights becomes
clearer as public planning commits to a poverty-
focused approach to social change, such as is
beginning to emerge in Afghanistan.  Landlessness
and near-landlessness (not owning enough land
on which to live on) plagues rural society in
Afghanistan today in much the same way it did
in the past. As demonstrated over the last several
years, drought may tip thousands into irreparable
forms of destitution. Encouraging development
programming to be more thoroughly underwritten
with attention to the structural drivers of poverty,
inequity and unsustainable livelihoods, is an
objective of this short review. The fact that
possibly most rural dwellers can be categorised
as poor and very poor makes such objectives more
pressing.
Methodology
This exercise has been carried out through
consultations with more than 50 individuals in 20
or so government, non-government and
international institutions; and through the
examination of more than 70 publications and 18
laws in English translation (and the frustrated
pondering of the contents of more than 60 other
un-translated ones). Only four provinces were
visited, all in the central part of the country
(Logar, Parwan, Wardak and Ghazni). Visits were
made to only two villages and one pastoral camp
(respectively, Qalai-Pingrom in Charkh district
(Logar province), Bidmoskh in Hujamari district
(Ghazni province) and the Niazi Kuchi Camp in
Jaghato district (Ghazni)).
Given the extreme brevity of the field research,
the findings presented here are at best provisional
and imperfect in understanding the immense
complexities in the tenure sector. Nonetheless,
it is hoped that what is presented will serve as
a platform for identifying where to focus more
rigorous study, prompt discussion among policy
makers and supporting agencies and help focus
attention on land ownership concerns.
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Land tenure: the way in which
rights in land are distributed,
secured transacted and governed.Sources
As writers have remarked before, the retrieval
of crucial historical records and information is
difficult in this early "post-conflict" period in
Afghanistan. Critical sources have been lost,
destroyed or removed, or jealously guarded after
years of feared (or real) misuse.1  Still others are
only available in Dari or Pashto (and sometimes
Russian), a chastening reminder for English-
speakers of the limits of their linguistic hegemony.
Figures on land use and distribution do exist,
ranging from the important Afghanistan Agriculture
in Figures (1978) and the Agricultural Survey of
Afghanistan (1988-1990), to more recent attempts
to capture the state of rural production
nationwide.2 Most have grave shortcomings as
will become apparent in this paper. The growing
number of village studies, frequently conducted
by NGOs to guide their interventions,3 helps to
fill in the gaps but can often not be used to
extrapolate to such a diverse country. Rising
interest in the coping strategies of millions of
returning refugees, displaced persons and the
rural poor, now doubly afflicted by drought, is
also producing a range of interesting
commentaries.4 Still, as Pain and Goodhand
plaintively observe, the rural economy in 2002
remains statistically unknown.
Examination of land law has also been important,
though practice has been severely handicapped
by difficulties in accessing these laws (and
translating them) and in understanding the serial
repeal, reissue and amendment of them. As noted
under the Acknowledgements, the author was
greatly assisted in the first stage of this task by
the legal adviser of the Ministry of Interior.
Regrettably, time did not allow comprehensive
examination of these sources, especially of the
abundant civil law provisions relating to land
tenure regulation.
It is also the case that Afghan institutional and
personal memories are substantial, demonstrating
the importance of bridging the knowledge and
operational gap between the assistance community
and the government. The last two decades of
conflict are also recorded in a growing body of
reportage, both popular and academic.
Understanding the changing social and political
environment is essential for pinpointing land
relations, and in order to do so, this author has
drawn on a host of excellent, topical and lively
writings, some simple first-hand accounts.5
Meanwhile, new and more carefully structured
studies are underway.6  Ensuring that these include
land relations is one of the intended outcomes
of this review. For example, one cannot help but
read with concern a detailed study of feed,
livestock and rangeland requirements in 183
villages undertaken for the International Centre
for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA)
in 2002 that fails to address the fact that massive
contestation over pasture rights contributes to a
significant portion of the problems being faced
— or likely to be faced — in the sector once stocks
recover. It is also troubling to find a yet more
promising crop and food supply assessment
undertaken for FAO/WFP in 2002 based on
interviews with 5,000 farmers in 540 villages that
seems to assume that the farmer owns both land
and product. By failing to consider the reality of
1 For example, most of the copies of maps and land registers held by provincial cadastre offices have been destroyed, and
the law library of the University of Kabul was allegedly burned for heating fuel by Taliban guards. It would seem that some
important development records and data that is no longer available locally has found its way to Moscow (see Emadi 2001).
Having endured being forcibly required in 1978-1979 to provide information as to who owned large farms, and having seen
copies of its maps and registers destroyed, the government Cadastral Department maintains a fiercely protected archive
of information on land ownership, information that in many first world states is considered a matter of public record and
accessible on the internet.
2 See UNDP 1993, Maletta 2002, FAO 2002. WFP studies focusing on food security have been helpful; e.g. Clarke & Seaman
1998, de Weijer 2002. Results of a vulnerability assessment of 1,884 households in which tenure issues are directly covered,
are expected shortly.
3 The author has found survey work conducted under the Danish NGO DACAAR particularly helpful; see Klinnert 1997a, 1997b,
Allen 2000 and Klijn 2002.
4 Although published documents still have a noticeably narrow authorship at this point: Pain 2001, Lautze et al. 2002, Pain
& Goodhand 2002, Pain & Lautze 2002, Bhatia & Goodhand et al. forthcoming.
5 Including both personal and more academic accounts. Main sources have been Olesen 1995, Rubin passim, Nojumi 2002,
Farr & Merriam (eds). 1988, Anwar 1988, Majrooh & Elmi 1986, Gohari 2000, Marsden 2002, Rashid 2000 and Magnus & Naby
2002.
6 For example, AREU is conducting a substantial study into the rural livelihoods of some 600 households, and UNIFEM is planning
a gender-focused study of the same subject. UNCHS (Habitat) is investigating urban tenure matters. These should add to
the limited information presented in this report.
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findings and suggests concrete ways forward. The
overall suggestion made by the author is that real
progress in improving land relations and tenure
security will almost certainly be achievable only
through adopting of decentralised, participatory
and localised processes. Top-down directives, or
law and regulation on its own is unlikely to be
useful, and will in any event, be poorly structured
without an evolutionary and participatory basis.
Finally, several important comments of the peer
reviewers of the first draft of this paper deserve
recording. One of the issues
raised concerns presentation.
Land tenure matters are
complex and often difficult to
understand. This, combined
with language difficulties,
means that this paper may not
be widely read by those for whom it holds most
relevance: Afghan administrators and decision-
makers.  To this end, the author and AREU will
in due course prepare a short policy brief in both
English and Dari for widespread circulation. A
second set of comments requested that the author
and readers appreciate the very real difficulties
being faced by the government in its limited
capacity to plan, act and enforce policies and
laws in a country where "security" is sustained in
only a small part of the country and at the hands
of a largely international force. "Remember," one
reviewer writes, "that all civil service employees
(janitors and ministers) are currently paid US $30
per calendar month plus food aid provided by
WFP." A third set of comments emphasises the
importance of international support and the need
for modest and practical interventions. These
comments reinforce the arguments made in
Chapter Three on behalf of incremental
approaches on the one hand, and promotion of
community-based and sustained tenure decision
making and management on the other. There
seems little reason for nationwide land
programmes (titling or reforms) that have been
attempted in the past, or which are fairly routinely
being financed in many other parts of the world.
Any attempt by an over-anxious international
community to coerce reforms may also jeopardise
the need for local ownership of decision-making
in this difficult sphere.
how farm products are distributed among tenants,
sharecroppers, landless workers and clients, the
study's predictions of food supply hold little value.
It is equally clear that "development" is proceeding
with inadvertent inattention to land relations.
Some NGOs and bilateral aid programmes, for
example, limit the distribution of building
materials and agricultural inputs to those who
are able to demonstrate that they own the land
they use.  This excludes the poorer farmers who
live on and farm land that is not their own. In
the immediate past, there have been good excuses
for overlooking such details in
the drive to get the aid out
and bring the information in.
However, as post-drought,
post-conflict recovery begins
to allow for an extended time
horizon, it will be necessary
to adopt a more analytical approach to social
change and development aid — one that will
certainly come face-to-face with the seriousness
of current tenure insecurity.
Presentation
This paper is presented in three chapters.
Chapter One provides background information
on how rural land rights have been distributed in
the past and present. The lack of useable,
comparable and up-to-date data is declaimed,
but nonetheless provides enough evidence to
suggest that landlessness and near-landlessness
are significant and possibly increasing phenomena.
Customary, religious/civil and state law tenure
regimes are examined and found to have important
commonalities in how they indicate and govern
land relations. This chapter also notes and
describes the unusual and well-entrenched role
of the courts in tenure administration as well as
in land dispute resolution.
Chapter Two traces the history of land tenure
policy in Afghanistan in order to better understand
the present. Because national land policy was not
often explicitly articulated in the past, the paper
resorts to examining state law as a way of
understanding past and present "policy." This has
proved rewarding. Several key land decrees are
provided in translation in Appendices J & K.
It is clear that “development” is
currently proceeding in
Afghanistan with dangerous
inattention to land relations,
reinforcing unsatisfactory norms.
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attributing the historical importance of land in
conflict in Afghanistan, particularly in light of
the role played by international foreign policy in
contributing to the failed Afghan state. The latter
is a thoroughly documented thesis that dominates
the literature and is not reiterated here, though
it is referred to as appropriate. In seeking to
redress the continued neglect of land as an
important driver and sustaining force of
underdevelopment and conflict, a degree of over-
emphasis as to the functionality of land rights in
rural security may have resulted.
At this point I would like to close with reiterated
thanks to all those many people who provided
information and documents, from ministers to
villagers. It must be emphasised that AREU
publishes this report in the spirit of its mandate
to promote attention to difficult or troubling
policy areas, to share what is known and to prompt
further investigation, action and knowledge
sharing. The inevitable lacunae and inaccuracies
of this report are solely the responsibility of the
author.
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Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 15This introductory chapter has two main objectives:
first, to describe the pattern of land ownership
distribution in rural Afghanistan in the past and
present, and second, to lay out the legal and
structural foundations on which ownership of
rights are based.
In practice, neither task is simple. Data on rural
land tenure is scanty, structured in ways that are
difficult to compare, incomplete (particularly in
their inclusion of the landless) or simply out-of-
date. The highly unpredictable character of land
relations in the current context throws traditional
patterns into doubt. Many Afghans are not living
in their homes and/or are occupying land that
may not legally be theirs. To complicate the
picture further, landholding data almost
exclusively refers to ownership of arable farmland.
Properties held in common and non-arable lands,
such as pastures, are generally excluded from
consideration as privately owned lands, a clear
indication of the biases of current norms toward
farmers and individual ownership.
Even within those norms, landholding is not a
simple matter of either owning or not owning
land. Many people use land — sometimes for
generations as tenants, sharecroppers and
mortgagors — that does not belong to them. Or
many farm both their own land and land belonging
to others. Still others farm land that belongs to
their family but that they do not own themselves.
This is frequently the case with sons, wives and
daughters.
Written recording of land ownership and other
land interests or rights (e.g. the rights of family
members, seasonal access rights) generally
provides clarity. Afghanistan enjoys a long history
of land rights recordation. These records are
rarely in the form of modern title deeds, such as
those produced on the basis of precise mapping
of properties. Nonetheless, all legal systems at
play in Afghanistan — customary, religious/civil
and state law systems — have generated
documentation for land ownership and transactions
(sales, gifts, loans, lease, mortgaging and pledges).
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Map of Afghanistan Land Classes
and Table 2 in Appendix C).
2.   The greater productive area
in the country is pastureland,
that covers 45 percent of the
total land area. This supports an
immense livestock population
owned by both settled farmers and
semi-nomadic and nomadic
populations. Nomads ("Kuchis")
number about 1.5 million people
in a rural population estimated to
be around 18 million.9  Kuchis
traditionally possess the greater
share of livestock, especially sheep and goats.
They are believed to have lost up to 90 percent
of these animals during the drought of 1998-
2000, in the form of distress sales (e.g., to
purchase food).10 Livestock assets, overall,
run at around 60 percent of pre-drought
levels, but show signs of recovery.11  Even
post-drought, around 70 percent of settled
farmers possess cattle.12
Nomads adopt varying degrees of mobility to
maximise productivity.13 The resulting norms
are different from those adopted by settled
livestock farmers.  Issues of control over
pastureland and shifting official positions as
to what constitutes pasture and how it should
be owned or used will emerge as critical
issues in this paper, particularly as they
intersect with inter-ethnic land concerns. At
present, conflict most visibly (and sometimes
violently) erupts on
summer pastures in the
central Hazarajat zone of
the country between the
Pashtun Kuchi and settled
farmers. This is a dispute
steeped in history and freshly reactivated
through Taliban manipulation.
The body of recorded land interests is surprisingly
rich. Helpfully, there is also commonality in the
kind of information that is recorded under these
systems. The linking factor, in most cases, is the
court. Judges in Afghanistan have played a long
and unusual role in the governance of land
relations, serving as both decision makers in
disputes and as officers of land administration.
The Physical Setting
The physical setting in which land rights exist in
Afghanistan needs brief account (see the tables
and map in Appendix C for details).
1. While most of the rural population depends
on arable agriculture, the amount of useable
farmland is limited, comprising only 12 percent
of the land area. Most of this is rain-fed in a
country where highly localised patterns of rainfall
may be as low as 100 mm
a year.7 Irrigated
agriculture is therefore
extremely important to the
rural economy, in the form
of vineyards, orchards and
cereal farms, and where wheat production is
dominant.8 For many decades, arable land has
been classified in accordance with its productivity,
7 GoA 1978.
8 In 1978 wheat was by far and away the dominant crop grown [GoA 1978] and remains so today. This last season it absorbed
80 percent of the farmed area, followed by maize (8 percent), barley (6 percent) and rice (4 percent). These crops covered
2.2 million ha., bringing this year’s crop almost back to pre-drought levels of 1998 [Maletta 2002].
9 FAO/WFP 2002.
10 Maletta op. cit., de Weijer op. cit.
11 FAO/WFP op. cit.
12 And 64 percent possess poultry, 40 percent own sheep and 32 percent own goats [Maletta op. cit.].
13 De Weijer 2002 groups pastoralists as nomadic, semi-nomadic, semi-sedentary and sedentary. Glatzer 1981 demonstrated
that  (re-) nomadisation in times of need may be as important as sedentisation.
Most of the land area of Afghanistan is
only suitable for pasture but pasture
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Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan3. Owning farmland is not on its own a
sufficient basis for arable production in
acutely dry Afghanistan.  Corollary water
rights are critical. Although not explored in
this paper, water tenure is consistent with
patterns of land ownership. In addition, access
to improved seed, fertilizer, manure, draught
power and labour is critically uneven, driven
both by competition over scarce resources
and longstanding inequities in Afghan
society.14 Together, these drive high rates
of tenancy and sharecropping, land mortgaging
and indebtedness.
LAND RIGHTS DISTRIBUTION
Many Surveys, Little Useful Data
Information as to how land ownership is distributed
in the rural community may be gleaned from a
rather large number of surveys that have been
conducted in Afghanistan over the last forty or
so years. Appendix D brings together the main
findings of these surveys. As noted above, much
of the data is not reliable or is difficult to compare.
Inconsistencies are exacerbated by diverse sample
sizes, strong regional differences, differing extents
to which rain-fed as well as irrigated land were
included in the sample, frequent omission of
information on the landless and frequent failure
to distinguish between tenants and sharecroppers
who own land and those who do not. The notion
of “near-landlessness,”
where households own
some land but not
enough on which to
survive, is not well
developed. In some
surveys, ownership of a
house plot includes
farmers as landowners. In others, it appears to
be the case that anyone who borrows, rents or
sharecrops land is considered landless, even
though they may own a garden and house plot.
Proportions of landless accordingly diverge widely.
Up-to-date data is scarce and questionable in its
conclusions. A recent study of food crop farming,
14 It would be churlish not to note Dupree’s much quoted simple analysis, that basically, agricultural production in Afghanistan
“involves five elements: land, water, seed, animal or mechanical power, and human labour. Theoretically whoever contributes
one of the elements receives one-fifth of the resulting crop” [1979].
15 Maletta op. cit. This figure, it is noted, was not used in the final report for the study (FAO/WFP 2002). Remedy may be
forthcoming with the 1,885 sample of the WFP Vulnerability and Analysis Mapping (VAM) study, data that was not available
for this study.
for example, seemed to assume all farmers own
their land and documented an extraordinarily
high mean holding size of 6.7 ha.15 Very substantial
older data is available from the 1960s land mapping
and registration process described later, but the
information has never been fully analysed, and
is now 40 years out of date. Another reliable
source was the Agricultural Survey of Afghanistan
conducted by the Swedish Committee of
Afghanistan (SCA) in 1988/92. This presents an
excellent picture of production at the time, but
is internally inconsistent in its categorisation of
landholding (see Appendix D). The end results
are starkly diverse pictures of distribution in
which landless may encompass anywhere from
zero to 88 percent of farmers.
With such limitations in mind, the following
general conclusions on the current pattern of
arable land ownership may be drawn (see Appendix
D for sources).
• Outright landlessness is a very real feature
of Afghan rural livelihoods, though it cannot
be stated whether the proportion is rising
or falling. Ballpark conclusions from different
clusters of surveys suggest that the landless
may have numbered around 43 percent in the
1960s, around 35 percent in the 1970s, around
18-30 percent in the 1980s and around 30
percent in the 1990s. No
data for the present is
available. However
exact or inexact in
figures, it is clear that
a significant body of
people do not own
farmland and yet provide
an important part of overall production. Most
are in the farming sector as workers, tenants
or sharecroppers, with variable levels of
remuneration or crop shares. While data on
cash or in-kind remuneration is not available,
the historical value of compensation to
landless farmers shows that crop share
payments have been often worth less than
Though a large number of surveys on land
holding have been conducted since the 1960s,
the results do not easily compare because of
the different ways ownership has been
assessed.
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17 This is partly because of less certainty in a harvest or share being delivered, partly because they are themselves less able
to provide loans for inputs and in need of cash themselves, partly because of insecurity and partly because of changing




21 For example, GoA 1978, SCA passim.
22 It should be noted for example that even in 1988, the Swedish survey found that cultivation of rain-fed areas in particular
had steeply declined by some 29 percent as a result of abandonment or inadequacy of farm power [SCA 1988]. A reduction
in irrigated area was also apparent mainly due to destruction of irrigation systems. Even more destruction of assets and
irrigation occurred in the 1990s. The effect is seen in the FAO’s finding that only one third of farmland was cropped in 2001-
2002 [Maletta op cit.].
the value of their labour. The proportion of
persons living by sharecropping is particularly
significant. Many sharecroppers are among
the landless farmers described above, or can
be catagorised as they near-landless. Across
large surveys, sharecroppers represented 22
percent of farmers in 1970, 19 percent in
1978 and 17 percent in 1988 (see Appendix
D for sources). Findings from the 1988/89
Survey of Agriculture suggested a rise in the
number of people sharecropping.16 This is a
trend that researchers, such as Clarke &
Seaman (1998), conclude is continuing,
particularly with respect to the north and
northeast. At the same time, both anecdotal
and survey findings suggest that in some areas
landowners are decreasingly willing to invest
in sharecropping arrangements, preferring
cash rent.17 Historically, outright land renting
has been less common than sharecropping
(see Appendix D for figures).
 • Although the range of holding sizes is much
narrower than in many states (e.g. Iran
before the White Revolution of the 1960s
or present-day India), ownership is highly
skewed. Minorities at the upper end have
traditionally owned disproportionate areas
of total land. As the record of survey findings
in Appendix D shows, this has ranged from
2.2 percent of farmers owning 42 percent of
the land in 1967, to 6 percent owning 10
percent of the land in 1978, to 16 percent
owning 60 percent of the land in 1997 and
2.2 percent owning nearly 19 percent of the
total area in 2002.
• Provincial and even district differences are
so strong that national averages such as
above may be meaningless. Within
Badakhshan province, for example, the
proportion of landless range from 2 percent
of households in Shar-i-Buzurg to 59 percent
of households in neighbouring Keshem.18 In
1971, landlords renting out their land
constituted only one percent of farmers in
Parwan but 23 percent in Nangarhar.19 Using
mainly French sources, Rubin identifies the
strongest differences in ownership patterns
between the mountainous east and northeast
and the fertile plains around Kandahar. While
"most" own their own land in the former areas,
large landlords, landless, sharecroppers and
labourers are "most" common in the latter.20
The findings of larger scale studies confirm
this trend.21 The extent to which
sharecroppers are clients or serfs also varies
by region. In the north, for example,
landlordism is frequently described as a form
of ethnic rule over conquered non-Pashtun
populations, whereas around Kandahar client
groups tend to be people who have sought
refuge in the area and are generally of the
same tribe.
• The determination of mean farm size at a
national level also has limited meaning,
illustrated by the fact that three large
national sample studies have found quite
different results.  In 1978, the government
estimated an overall average holding was 3.5
ha, based on a mapped survey of more than
500,000 holdings.  In 1988, a survey conducted
by the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan of
30,000 families produced a national average
of 5 ha. The UN's Food and Agriculture
Organisation (FAO) survey of 5,000 farms in
2002, (the least reliable on matters of
ownership), gives a national average arable
holding of 6.8 ha. Smaller surveys generally
offer much smaller averages, most commonly
around 1.4 ha. (see Appendix D for details).
In these uncertain times in which many people
have not yet returned to their homes, are
not farming to previous levels, or are
borrowing land of others, it would be
premature to conclude that landholdings are
increasing in size.22
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24 Allen 1999.
25 Whiting & Hughes 1971.
26 Strictly speaking, this is not the case, especially given that English freehold does not include ownership of the soil, but
tenants conventionally behave as if this is so, especially as they possess all the rights to use the estate.
27 Development conditions are a fairly routine imposition in agrarian societies to help limit land hoarding and speculation in
conditions of land shortage.
28 A legal adviser to the Ministry of Justice observed that the very notion of European law leasehold is alien in Afghanistan.
Shopkeepers paying rent to building landlords for example, refuse to leave the premises on the grounds that they have been
paying rent; i.e. they treat rent payment as more or less part-payment toward property ownership instead of a right to
use the premises only. The shop keepers, in turn, have difficulty evicting sub-tenants who make payments to them.
 • What is clear, however, is the
correlation of farm size with
overall wealth of the
household. This may be
demonstrated in a uniformly
high correlation of water rights
with land rights, and with land
area owned with livestock units
owned and farm tools
owned.23 Allen describes the
inequities thus for a village in
Wardak:
"In general ... the more land
there is available, the more
water there is available, the
higher the per-hectare yield and the larger
the herd of animals, the higher the agricultural
income; the higher the agricultural income,
the wider the range of other income sources,
the more that is earned from these, the more
that is spent on everything, the more families
there are in the house, the more literate the
householder and the greater their educational
expectations." 24
Much earlier, Whiting and Hughes had confirmed
the equally predictable correlation of land size
with power in the community:
"Landlords tended to be more advantaged on
all variables both economic and non-
economic... they were two and half times
more influential in decision making than
owner-operators and nearly five times more
influential than sharecroppers."25
LAND HOLDING NORMS
Few Owners, Many Tenants
The meaning of land ownership varies from country
to country. In Afghanistan, private land ownership
implies full ownership of the soil (but not the
minerals found in or under the soil) and all that
lies upon it. This is a form of tenure that writers
have compared to the English concept of "fee
simple" or "freehold."26  As elaborated in Chapter
Two, while policies have sometimes restricted
the amount of farmland that may be owned by
an individual farmer, no conditions to ownership
appear to apply, save erratically imposed
conditions requiring new landowners to build on
the plot or start farming within a specified
period.27 Part-ownership or shared ownership
also exists at household, clan and community
levels, with respect to both arable and non-arable
pastureland. The civil code provides for land
leases, but formal leases seem rare (and apart
from a mention of "leasing" in land laws, there
does not appear to be any statutory framework
for this).28 Although no land ownership is implied,
tenancy, in the form of renting, crop-sharing
and/or mortgaging, is such an important aspect
of rural land access in Afghanistan that "tenancy"
is often described as a dominant "landholding"
norm. The distinction between owning land and
























Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 20owner/sharecropper. With respect to mortgaging,
there is inconsistency in the literature and probably
also in practice in identifying the rights of the
borrower. Sometimes the borrower (mortgagor)
is referred to as the owner and sometimes the
lender (mortgagee) is referred to as the owner.
Sometimes the lender indeed behaves as the new
owner, even though the borrower continues to
repay the loan. On giving the loan, the lender
may take over the property outright on a
temporary basis, rather than reserving this right
to be activated only when the borrower defaults
in repaying the loan. Despite being discouraged
in civil/Shariat law, foreclosure is routinely
practised, that is, direct
appropriation of the property
when a loan is not paid. There
is no requirement to force the
sale of the property and
retrieve only the outstanding
debt. Therefore, the creditor
often gains a property of much higher value than
the value of the loan originally made to the
mortgagor. This injustice is doubled where the
debtor has already repaid some of the loan in the
form of labour and crops. While under Shariat
and civil code, creditors may not easily sell the
land appropriated on to another buyer, they are
in a strong practical position to do so.
Most of those who mortgage their land have very
small farms.31 Often interest on loans is paid in
cash, along with providing a share of the crop
and various tribute payments or services to the
lender.32 The debtor/mortgagor also provides
the labour for production. Both labour and the
value of the crop share have been historically
undervalued and lead the borrower frequently
into deeper and deeper debt in order to sustain
farming.
Sharecropping is easier to understand where the
sharecropper is already a landless person. There
is an assumption in many of the surveys described
Acquisition and Transfer
Land is acquired predominately through
inheritance. Land is also frequently gifted (mainly
to heirs prior to the owner's death). Land purchase
is fully permissible, provided for in customary,
religious/civil and state law, and is widely
practised. The urban market in land, such as in
Kabul, is highly active, particularly at present
with an influx of foreigners looking for properties
to rent. Increases in property prices are steep,
to the extent that officials have complained that
ordinary urban dwellers are now unable to afford
housing [see Appendix I]. There is also anecdotal
evidence that peri-urban
villagers are being offered
incentives to sell for the
construction of urban houses.
It is unclear how far this
activity is mirrored in farmland
markets. The suggestion that
the market is vibrant may be detected in the
routine nature of land sales, complaints of high
and still rising prices and corollary complaints of
there not being any land to buy in rural areas.29
The fact that a main task of district and provincial
judges is the endorsement of land sales and
purchases,30 and that 56 percent of land disputes
relate to sales and purchases, supports this
impression (see Appendix E).
Tenure Uncertainty
The most striking aspect of rural Afghan tenure
however is the high degree of "uncertainty" in
land ownership. This occurs prominently in the
sharecropping sector, which has been noted above
as very substantial in terms of proportions of rural
families involved. Often, farmers take up
sharecropping as a corollary to mortgaging their
land to the lender. This produces a complicated
picture in which it is often difficult to identify
the relationship between the parties involved as
being either that of creditor/debtor or
29 In the few villages visited during this short review, the high price of land was a voiced complaint. In Pingrom village in Logar
province, prices were said to have risen from 300,000 to one million Pakistani Rupees per jerib since 1999. The price rise
in Bemoskh in Jaghato district in Ghazni  was higher.
30 Pers comm. Judge of Chaharikar Provincial Court.
31 “Wealthy” farmers may also mortgage part of their land to raise cash. This review encountered one such case in Qalai village
of Charkh district, in Logar province, where an elderly large landholder had just mortgaged one-tenth of his land for 500,000
Pakistani Rupees in order to buy a car for his third wife (a condition of marrying him).
32 Klijn op cit., for example describes the wide range of household and related service tasks (such as carrying water, preparing
food, collecting firewood, cleaning ditches, repairing roads) performed by clients and sharecroppers to those whose land
they use or to whom they are in debt.
Indebtedness, sharecropping and
land mortgaging are closely
related phenomena in rural
Afghanistan.
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Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistanin Appendix D that sharecroppers are automatically
landless. This is almost certainly the majority
case. However, there are cases where a farmer
owns a small plot that is insufficient for his
livelihood and sharecrops additional land owned
by others. Those who pledge or mortgage what
land they have may also be considered as
landowners, although oftentimes, creditors
consider themselves to be the owner of the
mortgaged land until such time as the debt is
fully paid.
Most of the literature focuses on the proportion
of crop paid to the creditor or to the owner,
depending upon the relationship. Historically,
and still today, the proportion rises with the
number of types of assistance provided; cash,
seeds, oxen, plough, fertilizer, etc. Repayment
may constitute as much as four-fifths of the output
where the owner has supplied equipment, animals
and seed grain. In Balkh province, for example
landowners in rain-fed areas usually provide all
the inputs (seed, fertiliser) and farm power (oxen
or tractor). The sharecropper contributes his
labour and keeps only one-fifth
of the crop. On the other hand,
in irrigated areas, if the
sharecropper provides one fifth
of the fertiliser, he receives
one-fifth of the crop. Without
fertilizer he receives only one-
sixth. When the sharecropper
provides oxen and the
landowner provides seed and
fertilizer, the sharecropper keeps only one-third
of the crop. Only if the sharecropper provides
the oxen and most of the seed and fertilizer will
he be permitted to retain 50 percent of the
crop.33  Again, the value of the crop is generally
undervalued and the costs of labour often excluded
so that the sharecropper is usually disadvantaged
and will rarely be in a position to purchase the
land and become independent.
The level of borrowing for farming is very high.
In 1963-64, the Ministry of Agriculture reported
that 45 percent of farmers were borrowing money
and paying an average of 33 percent interest
annually.34 During the 1960s and 1970s, the
Agricultural Development Bank of Afghanistan
was very active in lending money with land as
collateral. But, as with many banks, they found
it difficult to collect on land when borrowers
defaulted, with sales of land obstructed.35
Informal borrowing remains dominant. In Faryab
in 2001, 50 percent of farmers were borrowing
money or inputs to farm.36  Sometimes most of
the rural population is in debt to one degree or
another, and often to the same few persons in
the community. Shopkeepers are a key source37
along with landlords. Sample surveys in Paktya
and Bagdhis in 2000 showed that, aside from
farm-related borrowing, 47 percent and 70 percent
of the population, respectively, were borrowing
money, mainly for food.38  While shopkeepers
may not charge interest, they raised prices to
cover inflation prior to repayment and to earn
interest. Poorer households experience more
difficulties in securing loans.39
A survey in Hilmand found that
current borrowing in opium
production areas was applied




seed, hired labour and
investment).40  Nearly 30
percent of producers were landless sharecroppers,
receiving a small share of the profits of the crop
from landlords and not enough to purchase land
themselves.
There are signs that indebtedness is increasing,
or is at least widespread at this time.  In Zebak
district in Badakhshan, the Strategic Monitoring
Unit (SMU - now the AREU) reported in 2001 that
33 SCA 1992.
34 GoA 1978. Unfortunately, the data does not show whether this is formal bank borrowing or informal sector borrowing, such
as farmer to farmer.
35 Nathan & Berger op cit.
36 Pain 2001.
37 Fifty-nine percent of all loans in Badghis, but only 21 percent in Paktya [Allen op. cit.].
38 Allen op. cit.
39 Wealthier households in Badghis borrow almost as often from friends (33 percent) as from relatives (25 percent) and
shopkeepers (42 percent), while poor households rarely borrow from friends (4 percent) who are probably equally poor
[Allen op. cit.]. Loans from relatives may be a form of charity (khirat) and interest free. Although not permitted in Islam,
loans with fixed interest rates are very common (qarz-e-soud).
40 ACBAR 2000.
One report claims that not only
have people mortgaged their land,
sold their jewellery, household
goods and even sold their clothes,
some have sold their children “to
keep themselves out of debtors’
prison.”
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the land area, and that the vast majority of
farmers are tenants, workers or sharecroppers,
often on land that they originally owned. Most
had mortgaged their land and were unable to get
out of debt.41 Although less pronounced, the
trend is similar throughout the province.
"As there are few opportunities to earn money,
even land temporarily mortgaged tends to
become a permanent sale. The number of
landless is therefore growing. This process
has been exacerbated by the drought, which
has increased the tendency to sell the land
and to use the money for securing food. If
forced to sell, landowners prefer to lose their
rain-fed lands rather than irrigated ones, both
because they are less productive and because
strong ownership documents are often not in
existence for these lands. Most rain-fed lands
were former pastures, and the right to
cultivate them has, at times, been disputed,
with money collected as fines for cultivating
pasture." 42
As observed, drought increases these disparities.43
One report claims that not only have people
mortgaged their land, sold
their jewellery, household
goods and even sold their
clothes, some have sold their
children "to keep themselves
out of debtors' prison." 44
The Legal Framework for
Landholding
Like most countries, land
rights arise from more than
one legal regime. In
Afghanistan these include
customary law [rawaj] Islamic
law [Shariat], civil law, state
law and constitutional law.
Islamic and Civil Law
In practice, Shariat (of the Hanafi school)45 is
largely embodied in civil law, or specifically, in
the Civil Code.46 This is a volume comprising a
series of books and chapters of selected Islamic
jurisprudence compiled during the First Republic
in the 1970s. It remains the main handbook of all
courts (along with a similarly compiled Penal
Code). The Civil Code is comprised of 2,416
articles. As many as 1,000 of these articles are
directly relevant to land matters.  These range
from guidance on the handling of contracts and
mortgages, to rights of possession, severing of
joint rights, inheritance and procedures for
purchase and sale. Leasing and renting is also
addressed. In content, the provisions are largely
common sense. Box 1 provides sample of these
articles.
The Civil Code does not completely replace
Shariat. Reference to original doctrines upon
which the code was based is considered necessary
from time to time. Much use of this was made by
the Taliban, which often built state law directly
41 SMU 2001 op. cit.
42 SMU op.  cit.
43 Commented upon by most authors in recent years; see Lautze et al. 2002, Pain & Lautze 2002,WFP 2000, Allen op. cit.,
Clarke & Seaman 1998, Asian Development Bank 2002, GoA 2002c, Pain & Goodhand (forthcoming).
44 Lautze et al. 2002.
45 Hanafi jurisprudence (of the Sunni sect of Islam) is one of four elaborated doctrines of legal interpretation, each available
in a series of historical “books.” The other three schools are Maliki, Hanabali and Shafi’i.
46 The Civil Code of Afghanistan is a compilation of a host of books of Islamic law that have been written over the centuries,
which frequently overlapped by subject and were contradictory in some of their directives. The effort it took to harmonise
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Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan47 Decrees issued by Mullah Omar during the 1998-2001 period were often prefaced with a note about how intensively scholars
of religious jurisprudence had been consulted. Rashid (2000) reminds us not to confuse the devoutness of the Taliban with
Islamic scholarship of which they allegedly knew little more than what they learned at the primary and secondary school-
level madrassa.
48 Article One.
49 For example, the 1923 Constitution ambivalently ruled that litigation would be adjudicated “with the principles of Shariat
and the general Civil and Criminal Courts” [Article 21], and only slightly modified under pressure in 1925. The 1931
Constitution only mentioned Shariat [Articles 87-88]. The 1964 Constitution ruled that state law would have precedence
where provisions existed [Article 102], sustained in Daoud’s Constitution of 1977 [Article 99] and in a modified form in the
Constitutions of 1979, 1980, 1987 and 1990 [Article 112]. In contrast, the Taliban ruled that only Shariat would apply.
from review of Shariat.47 The Civil Code rules,
however, that religious jurisprudence may not be
applied when the issue in question is covered in
the Code. Only where there is no provision in the
civil law, then "the court shall issue a verdict in
accordance with the fundamental principles of
Hanafi jurisprudence of Islamic Shariat to secure
justice in the best possible way." 48
Customary Law
How far the Civil Code embraces customary law
is moot. In many respects, Shariat and custom
conjoin. In others, Shariat departs. This is the
case for example with respect to Shariat rejection
of usury (receiving interest on loans), with respect
to women's land rights and norms relating to
commonage — all areas where what is customary
strongly dominates. The Civil Code itself provides
for custom to be considered. "In regard to rights
of possession and ownership and other objective
rights, the law of the locality shall be applicable
where the property is located..." [Article 26].
Defining the law of the locality is generally up to
those affected, given that customary law as a
whole remains unwritten and various in the fixity
of its principles. Pashtunwali, or Pashtun
customary law, tends to be precise and, to an
extent, institutionalised.
State Law
The status of civil law with respect to state law
is also clear, though with a less stable history.49
Civil and Shariat law are to be applied only where
the subject is not covered by state law. State
law (or statutory law, or national law) comprises
both supreme law - national constitutions - and
sector law, such as pertaining to land, agriculture,
environmental management, housing, taxation
Box 1: Examples of Land Provisions in The Civil Law, 1974
Article 1416:  The tenant is bound to be as conscientious in farming and preserving the crops as he would
be with regard to his own property. The tenant is responsible for damage to the land during the period of
use, except when he proves that he has exerted the effort of a normal person in protection and preservation.
Article 1430:  Whenever the tenancy contract is repealed or considered null, the crops shall belong to the
person who has provided seeds, and the opposite party shall be entitled to rent in kind except when it is
otherwise agreed upon.
Article 2000:  The right of inheritance does not exist between Muslim and non-Muslim but non-Muslims may
inherit from one another.
Article 2008:  One daughter shall be entitled to half of the patrimony; two or more shall be entitled to
two thirds.
Article 2198:  In case new land comes into being from over-flooding of the river, the new land shall be
considered property of the state.
Article 2268:  Where a person loses the possession of real estate, he can demand its return in one year
after the loss of possession. In cases where lack of possession has happened secretly, the year shall start
from the day of discovery of lack of possession.
Source: The Civil Code
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These statutes ("qanoon" or
"canun"), which are also known
as acts when passed by elected
parliaments, have largely been
promulgated by kings and
presidents as decrees or
edicts.50
The development of statutory law is integral to
the making of a state. Given debate as to the
origins of the modern Afghanistan state (most
commonly fixed as around 1880),51 it is interesting
to note that state laws go as far back as Ahmad
Shah's Empire of the 18th century, when the
foundation of today's court system was
instituted.52  Abdur Rahman, the founder of the
modern state who ruled from 1880-1901,
developed the system further and produced a
Code of Procedure for the courts. His son,
Habibullah, who reigned from 1901-1919,
consolidated the system. It was under his regime
that the statutes known today in Afghanistan
began to appear.53 Habibullah's successor
Amanullah, who was king from 1919-1929 and a
prolific lawmaker, produced a Guide Book for
Judges. Afghanistan law has no substantive body
of received law from foreign countries (such as
the case with ex-colonial states), but the form
and treatment of Afghan national law has much
in common with European law. This stems from
the assistance given to King Amanullah by French
and Turkish jurists in the drafting of Afghanistan's
first constitution in 1923, and the more than 63
statutes promulgated by Amanullah during the
1920s (the first of which
typically concerned the
collection of taxes).
Passage of these laws was
through ratification by a
council of ministers and
approval by the king followed
by a public announcement of
the new law. This procedure
is more or less followed today.
Prior to 1963, laws were
announced publicly and
published in pamphlet form.
Records of these announce-
ments and pamphlets are,
unfortunately, incomplete. A more orderly official
gazette system was established in 1963, which
has been maintained; issue 800 is about to be
published. Each issue contains a varying number
of decrees, amendments to decrees or regulations
issued under a decree, though it is often difficult
to distinguish between the three.54
The remaking of state laws
Frequently changing regimes in Afghanistan this
last century has had a confusing effect upon
formal state law. Rather than sustaining existing
laws, new regimes have tended to annul those of
the previous regime and to make new laws, but
in a very uneven manner. New laws have rarely
simply been reissued under the name of the new
administration. Usually some changes are made.55
These may be minor or quite significant, such as
in regulating the amount of permitted farmland
each owner may hold discussed in the following
chapter. In addition, the extent to which the laws
of the previous regime are repealed in practice
has been uneven.
Appendix F lists 60 or so different land laws and
key amendments to laws identified. The content
of land laws is, in fact, quite
limited; most refer to matters
of land survey and registration,
land distribution, land based
taxation, acquisition and sale
of lands, settlement and
cooperatives, and in later
years, laws relating to the
50 “Firman,” the exception being the parliament of King Zahir Shah from 1964-1973.
51 See Dupree 1980, Olesen 1995 and Chrishti 1998 for different views.
52 See Christi 1998.
53 Known as “nizamnamah.” Subjects included a Statute Relating to Garments, a Statute on Educational Affairs, a Statute
Relating to Identity Cards.
54 It is therefore unclear, for example, how many of the Dari laws listed in Appendix F are original decrees or additions or
changes to decrees. This may be determined only be reading their substance, which has not been possible.
55 For example, Order No. 237 dated 24.2.1367 of the Afghan President Concerning The Cadastral Survey published in Official
Gazette Serial No. 674 in 1367 (1988) is a re-issue of the earlier Survey law No. 346 dated 31.6.1355 (1976), issued by Daoud.
Daoud’s law, in turn, repealed the 1965 law on Survey and Statistics but kept most of its clauses. Gul Ahmad Madadzai, a
lawyer with the current government, estimates that the total change to land laws issued since the 1930s may not exceed
substantive changes to more than five percent of their articles.
Afghanistan law has no
substantive body of received law
from foreign countries, such as
the case with ex-colonial states,
but Afghan state law has much in
common with European law.
Rather than sustaining existing
laws, new regimes have tended
to annul those of the previous
regime and to make new laws,
but in a very uneven manner.
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Significant omissions in state laws
relate to leasing, mortgaging and
regularisation of squatter
occupation in towns and systems
of land tenure administration.
Constitutional Law
As supreme law, constitutions have
had something to say on land
rights.56 Appendix G lists the
relevant clauses. The range of
topics on land is limited,
prominently addressing the right
of the state to appropriate
property, the protection of private rights, the
right to travel and settle freely in the country
and the definition of the rights of foreigners to
land in Afghanistan. These are topics common to
most modern national constitutions; they exhibit
the clear origins of the first constitution as
borrowed from European law. A less typical article
concerns the control of usury with probable
intentions to abolish foreclosure.57
The most significant land matter changes across
the eight formal constitutions have related to
shifts in the meaning of "government land" and
the extent to which the state may appropriate
private land. From the outset, the 1923
Constitution adopted the European (and indeed,
now worldwide) habit of declaring the protection
of private property in one breath, then in the
next, circumscribing this declaration by reserving
the right of the state to compulsorily acquire land
in the "public interest." In 1923, the duty of the
state to pay for this land was declared. Not
surprisingly, alterations in the terms of this clause
appeared with the land reform movements
described in the next chapter, which relieved the
state of any obligation to compensate owners,
an obligation not restored until 1987.58
Integral to the above have been significant changes
in the meaning of "public interest." This term has
been both precisely defined as, "the construction
of dams, government offices and military
installations," and more loosely defined as, "all
developments that benefit the public in general."59
The latter has left a characteristic loophole for
government to determine what was good for the
people. Presidents Daoud (1973-78) and especially
Taraki, Amin and Karmal (1979-86) were to make
it clear that redistribution of private property,
rather than protection of private property, was
"in the public interest."
LAND CLASSES
Public vs. Private Property
Broadly, landowners in Afghanistan may be divided
into four groups: the state, the private person
56 Arguably, constitution making has an unusually long history in Afghanistan through the declamations made by gatherings
of representatives (loya jirgas). Certainly the decisions made during these gatherings may be held as core constitutional
processes. Olesen (1995) traces jirgas back 5,000 years to the Bokhdi Civilisation. The modern constitution-making process
(“mashrootiat”), of course, has its origins in Amanullah’s reign in his introduction of the first national constitution (1923).
57 The 1964 Constitution hinted that laws would limit private money lending that dispossessed debtors [Article 26]. This article
was elaborated by the subsequent Constitution of 1977 [Article 41] and then abandoned in the revolutionary Constitution
of 1980 after informal money lending had been banned (1978) and lending declared the sole prerogative of state [Article
19].
58 Changes to the classical protection of property clauses began with the First Republican Constitution of President Daoud in
1977, where he reserved the right “to make changes in the interests of the majority” [Article 7], “to eliminate exploitation”
[Article 8] and “to place limits on agricultural property” [Article 14]. Babrak Karmal, following close on the heels of Taraki
and Amin, in whose 1979 regime the radical land reforms were launched, took this a step further and removed any duty
of the state to compensate owners whose land was taken [1980 Article 22]. Najibullah restored a commitment to pay for
appropriated land in 1987.
59 [Article 2.] This was not in the 1923 or 1931 Constitutions, but expressed in the Law for Appropriation of Property for the
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legal persons), the public body in general and the
local public, or more precisely, communities of
persons, such as the members of a clan or village.
Public lands have often been defined by their
perceived lack of ownership. There is much room
for contestation as to how far "un-owned" lands
are in reality un-owned, and by whose terms.
State capture of such lands during modernisation
has been a feature of social transformation all
around the world, and is no less the case in
Afghanistan, focusing in particular on the status
of pastureland. Related is the question as to
where national public property extends and where
local public property, such as commons, begins.
This too has been a source of conflict in
Afghanistan, particularly among settled and
pastoral peoples. Additional uncertainty surrounds
the distinction between land over which the state
is an undisputed owner, and land over which it
is only trustee and/or administrator on behalf of
the real owners, the members of the nation.
Many of these complexities are embodied in the
concept of government land, a construct that
arises out of state-making. Given the chequered
history of state formation in Afghanistan this last
century, it is not surprising that the definition of
what constitutes government land has altered
and still lacks clarity. The constitutions of 1923,
1931 and 1964 did not define government land.
Legal definition was first provided through the
1965 Land Survey and Statistics Law. The
description did not include either forests or
pastures as government property. Government
land was only to include land registered as
belonging to government and wastelands that
were not registered as belonging to anyone else.
President Daoud's 1977 Constitution was more
specific and added forests to the definition, but
continued to exclude mention of pastures. These
were finally added to the Constitution of 1987.60
This meant that irrespective of customary or even
documented private ownership, these lands
entered the state domain. Subsequent
abandonment of these claims this last decade
(and the Constitution of 1992 in particular),61
and current discussions about coming up with
workable definitions of both government and
public land, described later, need to be seen
against this backdrop.
In the meantime, there is a great deal of shifting
between classes of public and private land. A
clear example is Kabul City, where the municipality
now has less than 1000 ha. for private housing
development . This is out of some 16,830 ha. of
land it designated in its master plan for private
housing development (see Appendix H).
Meanwhile, the municipality retains around 13,000
ha. for roads, services, graveyards, recreation,
water, green belts etc. This is known as "public
Box 2:  The Meeting of Public and Private Lands:
Upland Pasture/Rain-Fed Lands
"Our land in the valley is divided up among the families. Our upland rain-fed land is not privately owned.
Anyone can help himself to as much land as they can plough if the rain comes. Most people take around
10-15 jeribs. These are people who have oxen. Each of the four villages has its own part of the uplands for
cultivation. Everyone knows the boundaries. We also use those areas for grazing. Villages go with the animals
in June-July. Other times the Kuchi are there. There is much fighting with the Kuchi. It is always about
where their animals go and the damage they cause to our crops. They are the same Kuchi coming every year
but they come at different times, not all together, just some families together. The agreement in the past
was that if they damage the crops, we get some animals. Now the Kuchi have no animals, but they have
still come to the area to keep their rights activated. They say this is their pasture. That land is registered
as government land; everything above the ridge always belongs to government."
Source: Elders of Pingrom village, Charkh district, Logar province
60 “Mineral resources, forests, pastures and other natural wealth, basic energy resources, historical relics, banks, insurance
institutions, means of communication, radio, television, major dams, ports (sic), main means of production in heavy industry,
transport ways and air transport” [Article 20, Constitution 1987].
61 Article 67 used the term “unclaimed pasture” to describe state land.
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a right given it by the national government.
Customarily-owned rangeland, brought under
irrigation and turned into government land for
disposal as private properties, is another common
example. Such a case is the 30,000 ha. estate of
Nada Jalalabad, held today by the parastatal,
Nangarhar Agricultural Development Authority.
This is on land once owned customarily by
pastoralists and appropriated by government. It
is now earmarked for return to private ownership,
but probably only on a leasehold basis and is
therefore unlikely to be granted to those who
consider themselves the original owners.62
Private Rights in Land
Notions of private property in Afghanistan follow
the classical route of defining mainly individual
owners of discrete estates in land.  In practice,
as observed earlier, the individual/individual
name - such as a clan or family name — usually
conceals either shared ownership by a larger
number of individuals (e.g. family members), or
layers of interest in the land, each carrying a
different weight (e.g. the rights of a brother,
son, wife or daughter). It may be more accurate
in rural Afghanistan to refer to private land
ownership as occurring at individual, joint, family,
clan, village and group levels. Recording of
ownership may have the same effect experienced
elsewhere of endowing the recorded owner with
a stronger right than really intended. How far
this is the case is not known.
Customarily joint or shared ownership (mulk-e-
khalisa) is widely acknowledged. Where the co-
owners constitute a whole clan or community,
their property may be defined as communal land,
though this appears not to have been developed
in civil law. This may be because while the
property may be used communally, the land is
considered owned by one leading family or khan,
in turn identified by the name of one man. While
residents in the community may assume a right
of access to those areas in principle, realising
that access may require negotiation and/or
payment of tribute in one or other form. This
need increases as kinship becomes more remote.
62 Pers. comm. D. Davis, FAO Jalalabad.
Box 3:  Cultivating the Pastures In Altamur, Logar
On a Friday in October 2002, 28 clan heads from the village of Altamur in Logar province met in a tent in
the middle of dry lands one mile from the village. Their purpose was to distribute 12,000 jeribs (2,400 ha.)
of pasture/rain-fed land. This was land that had been used in the past for pasture and intermittent cultivation.
Kuchi pastoralists also routinely used the area. The people of Altamur are semi-nomadic Pashtuns themselves.
They were given the area in the 1880s as part of Abdur Rahman's campaign to colonise Hazarajat. The village
leader still holds the land grant document. Most people evacuated Altamur around 1980 and went to Pakistan.
They began returning five years ago and have set about reclaiming and re-cultivating their lands.  They now
number 1,500 families.
In 2001, the Altamur farmers received assistance from the Ministry of Agriculture to survey and distribute
the rain-fed pasture. Many have returned with the wealth needed to sink deep boreholes in the land and
convert it to irrigated agriculture. A team comprised of representatives from Agriculture, Irrigation and
Power, the Law Department of Ministry of Justice and the Court Cadastral Survey, visited the area and
subdivided the land into 28 plots of between 160 -182 ha. Each plot will, in turn, be subdivided among
families. This could yield an average irrigated farm of 1.6 ha., but it is not clear that such parcels will be
equal. Several questions remain unanswered; 1) the likelihood of securing water through deep wells and if
so, the impact this will have on the local water table; 2) how the pasture rights of Kuchi, also well established
in the area, will be disposed of; 3) whether distribution of the land includes families outside of the dominant
28 clans, and in particular, how far the original Hazara occupants of the area have been involved in this
government assisted distribution of local resources.
Source: Field visit to Logar province
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core family, workers or client families appear
unable to assume commonage rights.63
Common Property Rights
The above may particularly affect non-farm
properties, such as pasture, local open spaces,
swamps etc. Description of these as "commons"
may be a misnomer. In many regions, these seem
to carry little notion of shared or equal rights
normally assumed in common property. In some
areas, this may be because landlord families do
own the entire area. In other cases, the common
property rights of poor households may dwindle
in practice through lack of use. This could be the
case for example where poorer farmers do not
use the commons for grazing, possessing no
livestock, or do not have the plough power needed
to cultivate uplands, held by the community as
being land open to all. Common rights are much
more visible in the hands of pastoralists who
routinely share rights over pastures.
Defining an area as "local common property" is
also difficult where the law defines this kind of
land as un-owned public property, or where the
state has treated this land as its own, converting
this into a class of government land.
Disputes over common property and pasture are
legion. In some areas, hardly an upland rangeland
Box 4:  Facing The Agricultural Squeeze:
The Case Of The Niazi Kuchis
Seven tents of Kuchis spent October 2002 on the rain-fed lands of Bidmoskh village in Hujamari district in
Ghazni province. This was not their normal summer grazing area, which was in Wardak, but they had been
refused entry to Wardak by the Hazara people living there. This was less problematic for them this year
because they lost 1,000 sheep in the drought of 1999-2002, and were left with only 40 sheep and a few
donkeys. When prohibited by Hazaras to use their traditional summer grazing land, they pleaded with the
village elder of Bidmoskh to allow them to stay on this ridge for two weeks before returning early to their
winter grazing area in Kandahar. They know the elder of Bidmoskh from long years of transiting through
this area on their way to and from the summer grazing in Jaghatu (also in Ghazni). A number of times, the
Bidmoskh elder had been helpful in mediating disputes with settled families when their sheep had damaged
crops. The Kuchi group expect to leave him several sheep as a gift.
These seven tents, each containing 3-4 families including relatives, generally remain together throughout
the year. In winter they join with some 50-60 other families of the same group or qawm on the Kandahar
sand plains. No one in this qawm cultivates. This qawm is known as Niazi, led by Khamran, the descendant
of Abdullah Khan. The Niazi qawm comprises 300 tents in all, or 1,200 family units. Most of these tents are
still in the Jaghatu area, begging assistance from mainly Pashtun occupants of the area. Around 170 tents
of the Niazi are still scattered in Jaghato, and it has been agreed that they should depart as soon as possible
to avoid conflicts with settled families.  Khamran informs us that Kuchis joined together in late 2002 to beg
President Karzai to force the Hazaras to allow them to use the summer pastures as they have for many
decades, but with no result.
Kuchi use of Hazarajat pastures probably does not extend further back than 100 years. Their access to
summer pastures was formalised in the 1950s through the issue of land documents to leaders of groups. Each
group was allocated a discrete and precisely described summer grazing territory (hudood). Because Kuchi
themselves drew up the boundaries, upon which these allocations are based, each territory is precisely
known and its boundaries respected by other Kuchi. Hudood were divided  by qawm. The hudood of the
Niazi is bounded on the west by the village of Sarkhai, on the east by Surbib Village, on the south by Momand
Village and the north by Paienda Khel Village. Winter areas are known as "sand areas" and are not divided
by Qawm. This hudood of the Niazi is joined on the west by the hudood of the Marioni qawm and on the
east by the Daftani qawm. The Niazi tend to move first to the summer pasture, followed in 10-15 days by
the Marioni, then the Daftani people. Intermarriage among these three qawm is practised. Today there are
130 separate land documents, each protectively held by the respective group leader. Each provides a general
description of the territory allocated.
63 This was indicated in the villages visited. Also see Klijn op. cit.
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main contestation is between seasonal pastoral
and settled cultivator interests, both of which
have different historical and customary claim.
There may also be disputes among members of
the settled community itself, which usually has
an ethnic dimension, especially where rulers of
the past have deliberately given their supporters
the land of rebellious peoples. Pashtun relations
with Uzbek and Tajiks in the north, and Hazaras
in the central zone are cases in point (see Chapter
Two). Where administrations have defined pastures
with rain-fed cultivation potential as their own,
or developed state farms, a further level of
conflict may result. Or, government may
encourage local occupants to develop such
commons through private farming, which has the
effect of extinguishing seasonal claims to these
same lands. Boxes 3 and 4 provide examples.
Domestic Land Relations
The dynamics of land ownership within the family
may be as complicated. As noted above, while
the family as a whole may be considered the
owner, rights over the farm may be exercised by
a single head of household, or by adult sons
borrowing some of the land until they receive it
formally in inheritance. Or conversely, tracts of
land owned by brothers may be farmed, and in
effect "owned" as joint property in order to
maximise production. Given that most households
comprise more than one male adult, entirely
discrete ownership by a male household head is
not necessarily the norm.64
Women, as a whole, have inferior land rights.
This is to such an extent that surveys in
Afghanistan, unlike in most countries, rarely note
the breakdown of landholding by gender (and
nearly as rarely address the role of women in
farm labour).65 In legal terms, constitutional and
state law may be interpreted as permitting women
to own land, and Shariat endorses this through
its provisions for widows and daughters to inherit
at least some share of land.66 Customary practice
64 Most farm households included eight to nine persons during the 1960s-1970s [GoA 1978], eight to 12 persons in 1988-1990
[SCA passim] and 10 to 11 persons today [Maletta op cit.]. While these averages do not suggest dominance of large multi-
generational units (known to exist), they do suggest more than two adults in the household at once, involving varying
arrangements of (not necessarily equitable) land sharing.
65 An exception is a report on six areas in Hilmand province, where at least the role of women in farm labour was noted (non-
existent in that case, dominated by opium poppy production) [ACBAR 2000]. An evident tendency is to under-record the
substantial role of women in orchard and garden weeding and harvesting and especially food processing; pers. comm. Carol
le Duc UNHCR. Also see Emadi 2002 and Azarbaijani-Moghaddam 2000.
66 The Koran instructs its followers that “… a son should have a share equivalent to two daughters.” Widows are also provided
for. “If the women left behind are more than two, then two-thirds of whatever he [the deceased husband] leaves behind,
belong to them”  (the division among them is not specified). Where there is only one widow, she will receive half of the
property that belonged to her husband. The Civil Code 1974 absorbs these principles; refer Civil Code Book Three, Title
One, Chapter Two, Part Two.
Summer hudoods have rain-fed farming potential and are increasingly claimed by local villagers as their
land. "During Zahir Shah and Daoud's time, farmers were not allowed to cultivate above the top water points,
dams and so on. The land above was reserved for Kuchis. Now, the Hazaras want to cultivate the uplands
too" (Khamran). This is the source of contention.
The elder of Bidmoskh says, "These Kuchis are just some who have looked to their Pashtun brothers to help
them. We are Pashtun, so we help them. Perhaps 300,000 Kuchis have been sent away from Hazarajat this
year. Many have been in this area since June or July, but most have now moved to Paktya, even though that
is not their normal place. They are being punished for the work of their Kuchi brothers, who were loyal to
the Taliban. These were mostly Kuchis moving from the east from Jalalabad. The Taliban encouraged them
to graze in the Shomali Plains and to take the lands of the Tajiks there. They promised the Kuchis they
would be given the land, so the Kuchis helped themselves, letting their camels go in the vineyards. They
crushed the houses and their animals destroyed the irrigation systems. Their animals died anyway in the
drought. God's vengeance."
According to the Hazaras in the area: "Our land was first taken by the settled Pashtun and now the Kuchis.
We are fighting to get our land back."
Source: Bidmoskh village and Niazi Kuchi camp, Hujamari and Jaghato districts
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rather than as a rule. While ownership of land by
widows does exist, daughters on the whole
surrender their rights to their brothers, particularly
when they marry. The objective is less to deprive
a sister than to prevent land being lost to another
family through her — a time-old concern of land-
poor peasant farmers.67 In day-to-day life, one
gender specialist argues, a rightful share to the
product of labour is a good deal more important
to rural Afghan women than owning the means
of production itself. Certain provisions for this
are allegedly also provided for in religious law.68
Religious law also disallows sale of houses or
farms without the support of all adult members
of the family.69
Setting aside the evident subordination of even
religious law to customary practice in this sphere,
it is of note that at no time during the now long
history of support for women's rights in
Afghanistan, has women's land rights been a
rallying point.70 This has been reserved, generally,
for the promotion of female access to education
and work opportunities, a development first
officially actively pursued by King Amanullah and
his wife, Queen Soraya in the 1920s, and variously
taken up since by Prime Minister Daoud during
the late 1950s and again with a vengeance by the
communist government of 1978-1979.71
In the interim, women are slowly beginning to
more forcefully activate the rights they posses
under religious law. Widows, in particular, are
most likely to be at the forefront of this effort.
They exist in very large numbers following years
of conflict.72 Some have shown they are not
content to accept landlessness.73 How far they
will be supported remains to be seen.74
While female-headed households are not
necessarily landless, this group represents another
body of women learning to live independently.75
How far they will succeed in securing land also
remains to be seen. Many such women now live
in urban areas and their main concern is shelter,
not farms.
67 For example, see Agarwal 1994 for India and Ovonji-Odida et al. 2000 for Uganda. Grace 2002 provides a case study among
32 women in one state in India. While 21 stated that they had the right to inherit land, all 32 insisted that this does not
occur in practice.
68 Pers comm. N. Zewari, UNIFEM.
69 This is a principle that women have frequently fought for but not always obtained; see Ovonji-Odida et al. op cit. for the
Uganda case where the impact of new legal prevention of sales without spousal consent showed early signs of indeed reducing
damaging sales by male household heads. The author was unable to identify the Shariat principle referred to, nor find its
reflection in the lengthy Civil Code. But it may exist.
70 For example, see Emadi’s review of gender policies (Emadi 2002).
71 Refer Emadi 2002.
72 A recent estimate is that there are currently 50,000 widows in Kabul and two million widows in the country overall
[Azarbaijani-Moghaddam op. cit.].
73 See UNHCR District Profiles 2002c. For example, in Mirawara District in Kandahar, it is recorded that “two widows and one
other woman complained about their land being occupied by their husband’s cousins.”
74 One provincial court judge observed that “Widows have always come looking for their land,” and ”Through Shariat and civil
law, I ensure they get the land due to them” [Charikahar].
75 Their husbands may be absent for purposes of temporary, seasonal or annual work. Husbands who have several wives, may
“have separated the family into smaller units in order to receive more aid” [Azarbaijani-Moghaddam op. cit.]. By no means
all female-headed households have enough to live on; a WFP report on Hazarajat reported that in Nawur there were at least
25 female-headed households who were landless, had no means to purchase wheat, sugar or meat and who lived on each
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Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistanif need be the village shura (traditional council),
to prepare and witness such a statement. This is
frequently carried out when land is subdivided
among heirs. The land shares allocated are
described, and agreement of all parties signed
and witnessed.  Payment for services is made to
those preparing, witnessing or endorsing the
statement. Transfers of land by sale, gift or when
placing a farm under mortgage, is also frequently
agreed and/or recorded in this manner. An
example of such a document (in translation) is
given in Box 5.
The civil law system
Civil law provides similar, if more detailed,
guidance. This requires the involvement of judges
at district or provincial levels to witness and
certify a sale. Other government offices are
involved. The seller presents himself to the Ministry
of Agriculture's land matters department, the
Ministry of Justice's law department or the district
or provincial judge. He usually brings an
application letter stating his
purpose and giving details of
the land to be sold. In addition,
he brings a signed statement
by the village leader,
supporting the requested
acquisition, transaction or
subdivision of the land.
TENURE MANAGEMENT
Land ownership does not exist in a vacuum, but
is governed (variously poorly or well). Each
landholding system has its own system for this
administration or management. This section looks
briefly at the operation of these systems.
Evidencing Ownership and Transactions
Customary systems
A primary function of any tenure regime is to
enable landholders to know that their tenure is
respected and will be sustained by society. The
norms for this tend to be activated when rights
are either challenged or transacted. Customary
practice in Afghanistan, as in most countries,
relies heavily upon being able to call upon
neighbours, leaders and elders to verbally testify
that a certain plot of land does indeed belong to
a certain person. Witnesses are also a crucial
element of confirmation that the plot in question
has been transferred by gift,
inheritance, loan or sale to
another.
For many decades now,
customary transactions have
often been recorded. If a
villager wants to have his land
ownership evidenced, he may
request the village leader, or
Box 5:  A Customary Land Transfer Document [qabala urfee]
This is a translation of a recent document prepared in Charkh villages in Logar province. It related to the
sale of land for the development of a communal water channel.
"The seller is F. Mohammed who sells around 1,500 sq. metres (less than one jerib) to the community shura
[names the members] (6). The plot of land under the Takhat channel which is bordered on the west by the
storage tank of MH Power, on the east is limited by the road from the south, on the west by the vineyard
of the seller and on the north by the common road.
"Invoice against 525,000 Pak Rupees (59 Pak Rupees to one dollar: $8,898).
"The shura represents these four villages [names the villages], and it is here certified that I have received
the full amount of the above-mentioned. The land may be used for any purpose which the buyer wishes.
My sons and relatives cannot claim or seek to reclaim this land.
"I sign this in the presence of the following persons: (14 persons signed). I am honest in the above declaration:
Date 1.5.1381 (10 August 2002)."
Source: Document provided in Charkh district in Logar province.
Customary practice in Afghanis-
tan, as in most countries, relies
heavily upon being able to call
upon neighbours, leaders and
elders to verbally testify that a
certain plot of land does indeed
belong to a certain person.
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exists, it will be used as the basis of sale. If not,
a joint team from the above departments will
visit the plot, speak with neighbours and confirm
that the proposed plot of land to be sold belongs
to the seller as he claims. The team will summon
the buyer and agree on a price. Finalisation of
the sale depends upon the payment of a tax to
the Central Bank of Afghanistan. Once the receipt
is handed over to the judge, the team will collect
the relevant records already in the court or in
the land register (see below). They will also
prepare a special form certifying the sale (transfer
deed).76 Box 6 lists the information needed for
the preparation of this deed; this prominently
includes names, signatures and photos of witnesses
and statements from the buyer, seller, inspection
committee and/or the judge. A copy of the land
document (qabala-i-sharayee) will remain with
the judge's office. As a consequence, this office
effectively runs as a land registry. Information
on changes of ownership are (or supposed to be)
reported monthly and quarterly to the governor
and to the central court administration (chief
justice).
Of course the process is not free, a main
disincentive for poorer persons to "legalise"
customary transactions, which themselves
generally need oiling with gifts. In the first
instance, the village leader needs to be paid for
writing the supporting letter. This can amount,
in some areas, to a surprising 30 percent of the
value of transaction,77 and is rarely less than five
percent. Then there are official fees for submitting
an application and for receiving the document,
(currently a token fee of 20,000 (old) Afghanis or
approximately US $0.44). To speed up the process,
76 Judges routinely issue 21 different documents, many of which relate to land matters, such as Document of Proof of Family
Ownership, Inheritance Document, Resolution of Dispute Certificate, Power of Attorney, Document of Temporary Ownership,
Division of Joint Property, Surrender of Property etc.
77 Pers. comm. G. Jelani, AIMS.
Date of Issue of Deed
• Seller's statement
• Names and photos of two
witnesses with signatures
and dates
• Team statement on validity
of sale
Box 6: Information In A Shariat Transfer Deed As Handled By Courts
Number of Deed (currently
20,000 “old” Afs)
• Description of the property
including - registration
number if the land was
registered
• Names of adjoining
neighbours
• Estimated size in jeribs
• Type of land
• Fixed infrastructure on land
• Other points of description
Number of Deed
• Seller's name, residence,
ethnicity
• Name of seller's father
• Name of seller's grandfather
• Photo of seller and signature
with date
• Buyer's name, residence,
ethnicity
• Name of buyer's father
• Name of buyer's grandfather
• Photo of buyer with
signature and date
Source: From documents provided by Judges and offices in Parwan and Logar Provinces.
• Judge's comment on validity
of sale and signature with
date
• Names and photos of two
witnesses with signatures
and dates
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the right result may also require additional
payment. Clerks in the courts generally consider
the task of digging out relevant old files worthy
of payment. Corruption in the process is considered
"routine," "rife," "serious" or "limited," depending
upon the personal experience of the farmer.78
There is also plenty of anecdotal evidence to
suggest that some warlords directly abuse the
system, ordering judges to produce a favourable
result.
The statutory system
Under state law, the same process may be
implemented to provide proof of ownership or to
record a land transaction. Box 7 lists the
documents that may be used as legal proof of
ownership. These derive from the current land
law, the terms of which in this respect are similar
to those listed as long ago as 1965 (in the Survey
and Statistics Land Law).
Box 7: Documents Evidencing Legal Right of Ownership As Defined By State Law
• Document in accordance with Shariat as issued by a court for the purchase, ownership, gift, distribution,
exchange of land, surrender letter, correction letter and the document of the final decision of a court
based on the issue of an ownership document;
• Purchase document, where the document has been issued by an authorised department and where the
land is registered with the tax department;
• Tax payment documents, where the land is recorded in the original book of registration and taxation;
• Water rights documents (haqaba), where there is no evidence against their legitimacy and where the
related land is registered in the book of ownership and taxation;
• Customary documents (urfee) prepared before the 15th of Asad 1354 [1975], where the buyer filled out
and filed a declaration form, which was witnessed by neighbouring landowners and submitted to the
concerned department before the year 1357 [1978];
• A declaration document will be accepted as valid where, 1) the documents have been destroyed; 2) there
is no dispute concerning the ownership of the land; and 3) the purchase and occupation of the land is
recognised as valid by the neighbours and the local land office;
• Statutory land documents (qabala Shariat) will be recognised where they have been prepared by the
appropriate court on completion of the legal registration process and where the ownership is reflected
in the Book of Ownership and Taxation;
• In order to make a document legal, it must be sent to the concerned authority after completing the
process and the document shown to be registered in the Book of Ownership and Taxation;
• There must be no contrary claim of ownership to the land; and
• A farmer who has no legal document for his land, and whose land is not registered in the ownership and
taxation book, may have a legitimate claim to the property recognised if,  1) no-one else claims the land;
2) there are signs of buildings and of farm activity by him; 3) neighbours testify that the land is his; and
3) local state authorities approve his occupation.
Source: Law on Land 2000 (Taliban)
78 Even during the very short period of this study, there was one case where the judge directly requested considerable payment
and another case where the judge specifically asked the applicant to report to him if a single attempt was made to extract
more than the official fee from him.
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Reference is made in both civil and state law to
the Government Books of Ownership and Taxation.
These books were prepared from 1966-1975 as a
main output of a costly USAID-funded programme
to survey, map, register and issue certificates of
title for all landholding in Afghanistan. Appendix
I provides details on this important initiative.
Ultimately only 584,816 holdings and owners were
registered, leaving at least another 720,000 other
landholdings/owners un-registered. Nonetheless,
more than 5,000 books of ownership were
produced in triplicate, listing such information
as is given in Box 8. Provision of information for
taxation purposes was a key objective from the
outset; more information relating to the taxable
status of the land is provided in subsequent books.
More than 30 years later, the number of
landholdings/owners may be expected to have
risen. This will have occurred through subdivision
of land to heirs, and the expansion of cultivation
areas through government or private schemes.
Changes in ownership of registered parcels will
also have occurred, through intra-family and
inter-family transfer and
through sale. Given the steady
workload of
witnessing/formalising sales
and other transactions that
have occurred since 1978 in
the district and provincial
courts, it is likely that a quite large number of
changes in ownership are indeed recorded. Some
court archives hold hundreds of kilos of paper
records. Judges and their staff have become
expert at retrieving the right information for the
right plot of land when a further transaction is
made. Copies of these records have only erratically
been sent to the two offices that maintain copies
of the Registers of Ownership and Taxation Books:
the land matters office of the ministry of
agriculture in each province and the cadastre,
located in 17 offices around the country. Many
records in these offices were destroyed over the
last decade.
Formal land ownership certificates
Although an early objective of the survey and
registration was to issue title deeds, not a single
certificate was in fact issued. The 1978 "Saur
Revolution" intervened. There had been some
confusion prior to this time as to which office
should issue the planned certificates. A senior
official of the government Geodesy and
Cartography Department says that the intention
to issue certificates was unofficially abandoned
in 1971, around the same time
that it was decided to abandon
cadastral titling.  Instead,
registration was to follow a
simple inventory system
recording owners without map
references in an attempt to
No. of Land Parcel
Map No. [kept blank after 1971]





Name of Forefather Who Has Paid Tax
Box 8:  Information on Landholdings/Owners in Books of Ownership and Taxation 1975
Classes of Land Owned by Area [jeribs]:
I   Garden
II  Two Crop Irrigated
III One Crop Irrigated
IV Irrigated Every Second Year
V Rain-fed Lands
Non-Agricultural Land by Jeribs
Notes (usually relating to land type)
Additional Information in "Books of Integrated Land Size and Progressive Taxes"
•  Amount of Tax Paid Under Previous System
•  Tax Payment Receipt Number
•  Amount of Progressive Taxes
•  Actual Taxes
•  Tax Free Area
•  The Amount To Be Paid
It is likely that a quite large
number of changes in ownership
are indeed recorded. Some court
archives hold hundreds of kilos of
paper records.
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I]. Still, documents that are not land titles in the
conventional sense, but that are statements of
evidence of ownership at the time of land
transaction (deeds) are common. Many owners
of houses and apartments in urban areas hold
these land deeds.
Land grant documents
In addition, there are a large number of traditional
documents and land grant deeds issued by kings
that may still be used as a basis for preparation
of a court-signed land document. Because land-
based taxation was levied at least once during
the late 1970s, and probably since, tax receipts
may also be used as land documents. Just how
many people possess tax receipts, a customary
document, a royal grant document or court-based
document testifying to land ownership (at time
of transfer or otherwise) is not known. Even
without these, state law provides for owners to
ask neighbours to affirm and witness that the plot
in question really does belong to them. It is the
carryover of this simple mechanism shared by
customary and civil land law into state law that
speaks to the relatively integrated nature of some
of the systems in the different land management
regimes.
Resolving Disputes
Procedures for resolving land disputes follow
similar routes described above. At the local and
customary level, disputants seek the aid of a
neighbour, a local notable (usually a khan or
shopkeeper), the village leader, the village shura
or the head of the wider community area
(manteqa), depending upon the nature and
seriousness of the dispute - and the means at
their disposal to cover the costs.79 These
mediators may involve others; individuals become
known for their negotiation skills or their
knowledge of certain types of cases, such as those
involving water tenure, pasture or mortgaging
problems. Each area follows its own norms, but
these broadly pursue similar courses.80 Disputes
that are unable to be resolved in the community
tend to end up in the office of the district
administrator, who may in turn involve the land
officer and law officer. Coercively or otherwise,
current warlords make use of existing leadership
regimes in the areas they control, as did the
Taliban and other regimes before them. Box 9
provides an account of such manipulation by one
such commander. Agencies like UNHCR as well as
NGOs periodically observe that district actors
often are unable to resolve the dispute and return
the matter to the community to resolve.81
79 Known as the malik or qaryadar, this person is chosen by the local population but given formal recognition by district and
provincial authorities as their representative. In the past and still in the present in many areas, the district shura comprise
such representatives.
80 Under Pashtunwali (Pashtun customary law), two levels of traditional court operate, involving different levels of “experts”
and taking different amounts of time.
81 Pers. comm. R. Al-Salem UNHCR. Also see WFP 2000.
Box 9: Resolving Disputes in Khuwaja Omari District in Ghazni Province
"Khuwaja Omari is a new district that I carved out so as to protect it. I am the district administrator (woluswal
or hakem) and I am recognised by the provincial governor in this position. I used to fight with an anti-Sunni
group and I took over this area because I did not want other people invading and controlling it. I come from
this area. Everybody knows me and supports me. My army is not just Pashtun. I also have Tajiks and Hazaras
in my militia. We have 30 villages in this district and 30,000 people. Just in the same way as it has always
been, each village sends a representative to our district committee (shura). I am the chairman. We meet
every Thursday. All the government officers attend. We do all our planning and we are just waiting for the
government to instruct us to start collecting taxes again. We have the books and it will be easy to identify
just who owns what and how much they should be taxed. We are ready to start taxing again. People don't
mind taxation, the Daoud way, when the more land you have the more tax you pay.
In our meetings we often hear cases that villagers brought to us that they can't solve. Often these concern
land and water. We use Shariat to resolve the conflict. Last week, we had a conflict concerning a fight
between an owner of a karez and the owner of the land above the karez. The owner wanted to construct
Issues Paper Series
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 36addition to ruling in ways different from his fellow
judges, a judge has ample room to make different
judgements on similar cases.
Reporting from the courts is slow and probably
inaccurate. Land cases are believed to make up
around half of all civil cases; the current sharp
rise in these cases has led to the establishment
of a Special Circuit Land Disputes Court.
Nonetheless, figures provided by the Supreme
Court indicate that only 16 percent of civil cases
are land-related [see Appendix
E]. Most cases concerned
conflict over sale and purchase
of lands (56.3 percent), water
rights (27.7percent) and
rent/mortgage matters (12
percent). The provincial judge
in Parwan reported that
inheritance problems make up
the bulk of dispute in most land cases in his
courts.
Mediation
An alternative to court resolution is mediation
through the law department (hoquq) of the
Ministry of Justice. This mainly operates at a
provincial level with offices in larger or more
established districts. Its aegis is limited to disputes
around family matters, land and debt. Assistance
is provided through application, with the hoquq
empowered to summon contestants, or request
the police to do so on its behalf. Where resolution
or reconciliation fails, the case is sent to the
court as above.
The courts
The formal court system operates alongside
customary routes. While the system seems
accessible and official fees are low, it is most
likely to be used by those with institutional
strength and/or means. The system comprises a
well-established hierarchy of courts at district,
municipal, provincial and national levels, headed
by appointed judges ultimately reporting to the
chief justice of the Supreme Court. While smaller
districts may only have one
judge, there are four different
courts dealing distinctly with
civil, criminal, commercial and
public security disputes at
provincial level. There may be
three or more judges for each
sector. There are additional,
special courts or tribunals that
mainly operate in cities and deal with traffic,
juvenile, labour, civil servant, tax or military
cases. Appeals are handled through the high
central court of appeals and the Supreme Court.
Land cases are dealt with in the civil courts. Most
judges are trained only in Shariat, particularly
those operating in rural areas. There appears to
be no system for the accused to receive defence
counsel, and generally they defend themselves.
With the exception of a single issue of a Law
Report in 1976, there is no law reporting and
therefore no establishment of precedent or
evolution of the law through this route. There
appears to be no other official form of outcome
reporting. Judges thus escape this important
source of scrutiny and public accountability. In
a new house and he enclosed the land over the karez and the karez owner is against this. He needed to
make a tunnel to get to the karez and clean it. We got the owner to shift his plans for a house in order to
make a place for the tunnel. The problem couldn't be easily solved at the village level because both are
powerful men. We had another conflict a few weeks ago. This was about the closure of access by one village
to a route to grazing by another community. That one we also helped to solve." [Mr. Zakir, District
Administrator]
A view offered by a respected villager: "This man is a warlord. He has a lot of armed men and missile
launchers. But this is a son of the area and he keeps the peace. No one is against him."
Source: Field visit to Ghazni province
Land cases are believed to make
up around half of all civil cases;
the current sharp rise in these
cases has led to the establishment
of a Special Circuit Land Disputes
Court.
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century provides an appropriate context within
which state policy on land relations may be
explored [Box 10]. Three debates have tended to
focus historical analysis of this process.  The first
concerns how far back the roots of the modern
Afghan state, taken to have been established in
1880, may be found.82 The second is the extent
to which Afghanistan evolved as a state and has
been sustained in response to regional and
international ambitions. Rubin in particular has
developed a powerful analysis of the evolution
of Afghanistan from buffer state into rentier state
by mid-century, followed by full capture by a
foreign state (The Soviet Union).83 Fragmentation
Three findings of this study lay the foundation
for this chapter:
1. It is necessary to understand the past, at
least as occurring in the 20th Century, to
understand current land relations in
Afghanistan.
2. Formal land policy does not currently exist
and has only sporadically been declaimed;
reference to law as the expression of formal
policy must be made.
3. Examination of land policy is important at
this time given the role government strategies
in matters of land ownership have played in
generating and sustaining conflict.
82 The historical orthodoxy is that the area that is now Afghanistan had no geo-political identity during the 16th to early 18th
centuries, at which time it comprised a series of tribal areas between empires of India and Persia. The beginnings of
Afghanistan as a discrete geo-political state is located by some historians as the founding of the Durrani empire in 1747,
achieved through the gathering of Pashtun tribes in a jirga (council) and at which time the khans elected one of their number
as king. From that time, Afghanistan acquired features normally attributed to states a definable territory (though its
boundaries were disputed) with sovereign status, (though this was not universally recognised), a name and a “government.”
Other historians date the beginning of Afghanistan as a nation state as 1880, on the grounds that the Durrani Empire
constituted more a tribal alliance than a centralised administration; see Dupree 1980 and Olesen 1995.
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the rise of the Taliban and a conservative, rural
and religious-cultural movement supported by
opium production and smuggling.84 A third line
of debate looks more closely at the nature of
societies within the area now defined as
Afghanistan. As Allan's effort to define place and
people in Afghanistan suggests, western notions
of ethnicity may cloud understanding of the still
very fluid boundaries of tribal territory and identity
and encourage inappropriate decision-making as
to rights over land.85
Evolving Tenure Strategies of the
Past: 1880-2001
Broadly, there have been four main strategies for
rural land policy in Afghanistan over the past
century:
1. Pashtunisation policies that saw leader after
leader empower loyal Pashtuns to colonise
the territories of minority and potentially
rebellious ethnic groups;
2. Settlement policies associated with large
dam and irrigation developments, which
routinely replaced local occupancy with
selected settlers; often these "eligible
applicants" were Pashtun nomads (Kuchi),
who were to prove less than dedicated to the
settled farming lifestyle provided;
3. Structured survey, mapping and recording
of land holding, in an effort to clarify, order
and control land ownership; and
4.  Reforms, designed to bring more equity to
land ownership.
All four strategies were implemented in the service
of state building and modernisation. All four failed
in their objectives. Untangling the conflicts that
resulted is a main task facing the current
administration. Below is an overview of these
strategies, as they evolved under different
regimes.
Box 10:  Periods of the Modern Afghan State
1880 - 1973: Monarchy:
Absolute monarch - Abdur Rahman Khan 1880-1901
Popular absolute monarch - Amir Habibullah Khan 1901-1919
Interregnum monarch - Nasrullah 1919
Constitutional monarch - Amanullah Khan 1919-1929
Reformist monarch - Mohammad Nadir Shah 1929-1933
Modern monarch - Mohammad Zahir Shah 1933-1973
1973 - 1979: Republic:
First Republic - Mohammad Daoud 1973 - 1978
Second Republic - Noor Mohammad Taraki & Hafizullah Amin 1978-1979
1979 - 1989: Occupied State:
Second Republic continued - Babrak Karmal 1979-1986
"Third" Republic - Najibullah 1986-1992
1992 - 1996: Mujaheddin State:
Sebghatullah Mujaddidi 1992
Burhanuddin Rabbani 1992-1996
1996 - 2001: Islamic State:
Taliban - Mullah Omar 1996-2001
2001 - Interim State:
Interim Administration - Hamid Karzai 2001-2002
Transitional Administration - Hamid Karzai 2002 -
83 Rubin, passim.
84 See Rashid 2000.
85 Allan 2001.
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Disorder: 1880-1919
Although not defined as such, national land policy
may be discerned as beginning in Abdur Rahman
Khan's reign (1880-1901), and by his efforts to
bring the newly defined boundaries of the Afghan
state under his control.86 His instrument
throughout was the colonisation of unstable or
rebellious areas by loyal Pashtun followers.
Accordingly, large numbers of semi-nomadic
Pashtun were sent to the north to hold the border
against Russia, to discourage rebellion by local
Turkic and Tajik people and to exact tribute.87
The treatment of Hazaras in the centre of the
country was particularly cruel, and included the
handover of their grazing lands to Pashtun
nomads.88 Already poor, the Hazaras were forced
into a tribal serfdom that overlaid their already
feudal internal land relations.89 Rather than
binding the new country under one dominant
tribe (or doctrine of Islam),90 such policies laid
the foundation for disorder, realised to this day
in the cyclical appropriation of land and water.91
Predictably both the Hazarajat and the north are
centres of this disorder.
Land grants were the modus operandi of Pashtun
colonisation. The evidence is still found today in
deeds ("firman").92 These were usually given as
corporate rights under the name of a tribal
leader.93 This was part of a broader development
of record-keeping and bureaucracy. From the
outset, judges and their scribes, who were posted
to every district in the territory, played a key
role in regulating land access. Land taxes were
rigorously extracted and recorded.94
The reign of Abdur Rahman's son, Amir Habibullah
Khan (1901-1919), is generally regarded as a
period of consolidation, in which most of the
strategies of his father were sustained but in
peace. The period is perhaps most notable for
the increased role of Islamic clerics in the control
of land, laying the foundation for the tug of war
over rights and roles that were to subsequently
make state history. Religious lands — vast commons
over which clerics had control — became more
definitively a category of state property in this
period.
Provisional Reform: 1919-1929
The post-war reign of Amanullah (1919-1929) is
noted for its reformism, but also for its failed
policies.95  One liberal aspect was to tackle the
servitude of the Hazaras and to restore an element
of balance in their land relations with their
colonisers. Access to grazing was limited and
redefined as seasonal rights, allocated to named
clan heads and referenced to named pastures
surrounding named wells.96 These entitlements
were written in new land documents (qabala),
and the rights they provided made conditional
upon payment of livestock taxes to the district
administrator.97 The Hazaras began to re-cultivate
their original lands. This was to prove a brief
respite. With Amanullah's forced exile, Pashtun
and Kuchi all over the country reasserted their
land interests. In the case of Hazarajat, Kuchi
increasingly provided credit for farming, placing
more and more Hazaras in debt.98
Afghanistan's first constitution was introduced by
Amanullah in 1923. This introduced the basic
86 As agreed with the British (1893) in the form of the infamous Durrand Line cutting the Pashtun population in half, and with
the Russians in the north (1891, 1985-96). See Cullather 2002.
87 An important source for this period is unpublished work by Ghani (undated). Also see Rashid op. cit.
88 See Ghani (undated), Rashid op. cit., and De Weijer op. cit.
89 Many were to end up as indentured servants in the towns. Levels of rural indebtedness in Hazarajat continue to be extremely
high, with sometimes whole villages effectively owned by seasonally visiting Kuchi or settled Pashtun, granted rights at
this time, or in subsequent state-directed colonisation [WFP 2000].
90 A crucial element of the treatment of Hazaras right up until the Taliban period has been their affiliation to Shi’a rather
than Sunni Islam.
91 As Allan writes, “despite years of depredations, murder, torture and theft of land and water by the Pashtun royalty over
the following century, they failed to Pashtunise the country” [Allan 2001].
92 Some of the oldest are made of fine calf-skin, embossed with the King’s seal.
93 Glatzer 1984.
94 Magnus & Naby 2002, Ghani op. cit., Olesen op. cit.
95 Most notably in the attempt to separate religion and state, to promote universal education and to emancipate women —
all of which broadly failed with especially the rise of religious and ethnic fighting groups, including the famous Young
Afghans, and saw Amanullah eventually fleeing into exile [Olesen op. cit., Anwar op. cit.].
96 Glatzer 1984.
97 Ibid.
98 De Weijer op. cit.
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it had appropriated for public purposes (Article
19), a concept that had origins in European law99
and one that was not to be applied in following
decades. In addition, no clear stand was taken
on the relative authority of Islamic law or state
laws in resolving land disputes; both were to be
applied (Article 21). Amanullah also took steps
to reclaim barren lands, with assistance from
outside experts and financing. By the end of his
reign, Amanullah had initiated three dam projects,
opening up around 23,000 hectares of new irrigable
land settled mainly by Pashtuns.100
Greening the Desert: 1929-1963
The greening of the desert preoccupied both Nadir
Shah (1929-1933) and his son, Zahir Shah (1933-
1963). This was founded upon major dam
developments, assisted after World War II by the
American government. The centrepiece was the
Hilmand Valley Scheme, which came under
American supervision in 1946 and continued until
1979, absorbing around US $80 million.101 This
comprised a vast complex of dams and irrigation
canals, opening up more than 100,000 ha. of land
for cultivation.  However, this project met with
engineering failure after failure.102 With each
expansion, more land was acquired, displacing
more people. Early laws governing the acquisition
of property do not seem to have been applied.103
Pashtun nomads were favoured as settlers, with
plans to settle 20,000 families on 15-acre plots,
towards the creation of a "Pashtun homeland"
and buffer against agitating landless in Paktya.104
Problems with plot size, soil and the fact that
farms were far from the houses provided, resulted
in recurrent failures of the settlements. Many
Pashtun were transferred to the north, increasing
tensions and displacement. Both ethnic rebellions
and landless peasant uprisings occurred regularly.
Even the semi-official newspaper, Islah, urged
reform.105 By the 1950s, a further range of dam
projects, funded by the Soviet, Chinese and
western governments, were underway.  These
were more focused on providing irrigated land
for the landless and poor,106 a trend encouraged
by growing Soviet influence and communist party
formation during the 1960s.107
Bringing Land Under State Control: 1963-1973
By the early 1960s a new approach to the "land
problem" was launched. This took the form of
classical land registration and entitlement
programmes, such as was being advocated by the
World Bank and USAID at the time. Building on
the Australian "Torrens" system, the entire land
area would be mapped, each plot surveyed,
numbered and its mapped coordinates recorded
on a similarly numbered file held by government,
along with information as to ownership.
Certificates would be issued as proof of
ownership.108 Such titles, it was argued, would
be easily and reliably used as collateral for formal
bank loans. This system was also seen as a means
of bringing customary, religious and other
landholding norms into a single, integrated national
system — and under the control of the state. The
register could also double as a list of taxpayers.
In Afghanistan, the Land Survey and Statistics
Law 1965 laid out the process (see Box 11).109
In 1963, using USAID funds, the government
established the Department for Cadastral Survey
in Kabul, and built a training institute for surveyors
and draftsmen. Survey work was launched in 1966
with the help of more than 400 American vehicles,
99 Amanullah involved Turkish and Egyptian advisers whose own legal systems have origins in the Napoleonic Code.
100 These were the dams of Butkhak, Ghazni and Kharwar/Logar [Majrooh 1986].
101 See Cullather 2002 for a detailed account of this development.
102 See Cullather op. cit. for the litany of engineering, soil and land use planning failures.
103 The Law for Appropriation of Property for the Public Welfare in Afghanistan 1314 (1935) and the Law for the Sale of Land
Under Dams and Rivers 1318 (1939).
104 “Settling Pashtun nomads in a belt from Kabul to Kandahar would create a secure political base for the government and
bring them within reach of modernization programs” [Cullather op cit; 529].
105 Emadi 1997.
106 For example, 30,000 acres were opened up in 1960 in the USSR Darunta/Nangarhar Project, and two large commercial
farms in the Jalal Abad Valley were begun, employing 9,000 landless peasants [Majrooh op. cit.].
107 At this time, Afghanistan was receiving the highest level of development aid per capita in the world [Cullather op cit; 530].
Locally generated revenue plummeted, with local taxes dropping from one-third of the total budget in the 1950s to around
one percent by 1963; see Rubin 1996. Also see Rashid op cit., Emadi 1997, Magnus & Naby op cit. and Majrooh op cit. on
this period.
108 See World Bank Land Policy 1975.
109 See Appendix J for translation of the law.
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The costs were enormous. Within a year the
government's Annual Report on Progress was
reporting that cheaper and faster "inventory"
surveys were replacing the cadastral surveys in
order to speed up registration of owners.111
These resulted in the collection of the same
information (name of owner, jeribs of land, land
types, tax payer's name etc.), but without the
benefit of being able to precisely relocate the
farm on the map. Maps were still produced but
at smaller scales and without coordinates.
Even with this shortcut, the survey was never
completed [see Appendix I]. By 1977 around
20,000 villages and around 45 percent of all
landowners had been surveyed.112  Only Nimroz
Province was covered in its entirety. Although
around half the total land area of the country
was surveyed, this included less than one-fifth of
total arable land (of a total of 7.36 million ha.).
While not a single title deed was ever issued, the
resulting 5,502 registers provided a basis for
calculating land taxes, a main purpose of the
programme. The registers have also subsequently
provided a basis for the confirmation of ownership
in the court-endorsed transactions described
earlier. They were also to provide a tool for the
reformist policies described below.
A main output of the exercise was to formally
bring several million hectares of land under formal
government control. Some 850,000 ha. were
identified (or rendered) as "government land,"
and another 2.6 million ha. of pasture and barren
land were placed under state control or outright
ownership. As we have seen, it was around this
time that descriptions of what constituted
government land began to enter state law.
Tackling Inequities: The Land Reforms
1973-1979
While the survey continued, little attention was
paid to distribution. By the early 1970s,
government reports barely mentioned the survey
project, focusing instead on the Hilmand and
Arghandab Valley projects, the Paktya
Development project and programmes designed
to improve distribution of seed and fertilizer.113
Nonetheless, the question of how rural farmland
was distributed continued to arise. In 1971,
following the conduct of surveys in seven
provinces, the annual Survey of Progress report
stated that, "Thirty-five percent of farmers are
landless, eking a living on other people's land...,"
and also declared that,
"The inequitable distribution of farm
production between the landlord and the
peasant is the reason why peasants hesitate
to make changes in their farm practices. The
continuation of this situation is the reason
why land ownership of large sizes remained
Box 11: Land Survey & Statistics Law 31 Jawsa 1344 (1965)
This law comprises 70 articles that aim "to acquire land statistics of the country, to set up and maintain a
land register and to organize tax affairs." Tax forms were to be completed by each landowner, attested to
by witnesses and by the chief of the village and returned to the declaration office. The law set up the
Cadastral Survey Department to conduct surveys of all usable land, whether in private or public ownership.
Once each farm was surveyed, mapped, registered and confirmed, certificates of title would be issued.
Changes in ownership were to be reported to a special statistics office. A land registration court would hear
disputes arising during the registration process. Owners of large plots were encouraged to subdivide their
holdings. Government land was defined, and it was declared that it could be sold "in accordance with the
Manual for Nomadic Tribes." Conversion of pasture to arable land was prohibited. Pastures could be leased
but not privately owned.
110 Sources on the survey are mainly government reports; GoA 1964, 1965, 1968, 1970, 1971, 1976 & 1978, and personal
communication with staff of the current Geodesy & Cartography Department in Kabul, where the original copies of the
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productivity is low ... Devising a
comprehensive law in this connection is
required to regulate the relationship of
peasants and landowners".114
Public debate about polarised landholding was
fully in the public arena. Distinctions between
rich and poor, educated and uneducated, urban
and rural were a topic of discussion among the
burgeoning student population in Kabul.115
Freedom of the press was pronounced, with some
30 different publications operating between 1965
and 1973.116 Criticism against the king and his
government increased annually. The drought of
1969-1972 added fuel to dissent. In July 1973,
Daoud, the one-time prime minister, overthrew
his cousin the King, and with the help of the
Soviet trained army, named himself president
and premier of the new republic. One of his
objectives was land reform.
Moderate reform: 1975-1976
President Daoud was anxious to avoid a backlash
from conservative rural opinion and forged a
modern way forward that would be encouraging
rather than coercive.117  The principles were laid
out in the 1975 Land Reform Law, in the 1976
Tax Law and in new articles enshrined in the new
Constitution of 1977. The Land Reform Law
introduced a generous land ceiling for each class
of land, above which the state would buy the
excess for redistribution. Compensation for both
114 GoA 1971.
115 Marsden writes that the late 1960s witnessed growing dissent as young people came to the capital to take advantage of
expanded educational opportunities, particularly in Kabul University, “but found a system that was still highly elitist.
Radical movements found fertile ground among Kabul’s student population” (Marsden 2002).
116 Majrooh op. cit.
117 See Edwards 1998, Dupree op. cit., Majrooh op. cit. and Emadi 1997.
Box 12: President Daoud's Land Reform
The Land Reform Law 15 Assad 1354 [1975]
This law established generous ceilings above which excess land were to be redistributed (e.g. 20 ha. of
irrigated land, 20 ha. of gardens and 40 ha. of rain-fed land were permitted per owner).  Companies and
private agricultural societies were to be permitted to have more land as long as it was arid and made
cultivable [Article 3]. Heirs were to have one year to transfer inherited surplus land to another person
[Article 3]. Compensation for excess land was to be paid to the owner over 25 years with two percent interest
[Article 10]. In addition, improvements to the property such as vines or structures were to be paid for
[Article 5]. Priority groups for distribution included landless farmers in the local area, followed by landless
nomads and then by other farmers and graduates from agricultural and husbandry schools [Articles 12-13].
They were to pay for the land in installments at three percent interest [Articles 16 & 22]. If the new owner
did not use the land within six months, or if he took a job, the land was to revert to the government [Articles
18 & 42]. The farm could not be transferred, sold, mortgaged or subdivided until the full payment made
and a final certificate of title was issued [Article 37]. A special council of ministers was to be established
to devise guidelines, draft regulations [Articles 23-25]. A reform office was to be established under the
finance ministry to implement the law [Article 26]. A special high court on land reform was to be formed
as the final arbiter of disputes [Article 28].
Land Tax Law No. 338 Saratan 1355 [1976]
For tax purposes, all land was to be ordered into three classes with seven degrees [Article 4]. Each degree
was to indicate a different proportion of land that would be tax-exempt. Landowners who were exempt
from paying taxes were to include those who owned two jeribs or less, those who were working five jeribs
or less, government and municipalities [Articles 17-18]. Cooperative members were to get a reduction in
tax rates [Article 19]. No land could be transferred if tax payment was outstanding [Article 5]. Tax payments
could be delayed or cancelled in cases where the owner could explain convincingly why he was unable to
pay, e.g. due to natural disasters or problems of crop failure [Article 22].
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to the owner. The more effective law was the
tax law, which delivered rigorous progressive
taxation on size of holdings and was designed to
impact all but the very smallest owners and the
landless. Landless farmers were to have priority
access to land for redistribution. They were to
pay for the land, by instalment and at low interest
rates [Box 12].
The reforms were announced in the First Seven
Year Economic and Social Development Plan (1976-
1983),118 and were part of an 18-point national
policy, that included the promotion of cooperatives
and a promise that new labour laws would be put
in place to protect farm and factory workers'
rights.119 In reality, taxes were collected for only
one year and little private land was purchased
by the state and redistributed. Daoud's ambassador
to Cairo at the time later wrote that the survey
was by then showing very large landholdings to
be fewer than had been imagined.120  While the
government continued to distribute land, such
lands were largely government lands opened up
by irrigation projects. Allocation priorities
appeared fairer to many than in the past:121
Priority was given to those living in densely
populated areas and to landless farmers. Most of
the schemes were run as cooperatives. Intentions
to regulate farm worker conditions were not
realised.
Revolutionary reform: 1978-1979
A central platform of the incoming communist
government of Presidents Noor Mohammad Taraki
and Hafizullah Amin was agrarian reform.122
Within months of gaining power, their small and
mainly urban-supported People's Democratic Party
of Afghanistan (PDPA) launched the reform through
four cornerstone decrees.123 Decree No. 6 Against
Usury cancelled all loans and mortgages of more
than five years on the grounds that crop-share
repayments of one-fifth annually would have
Box 13: The Revolutionary Land Decree Of 1978
The stated aim of the Land Decree of 1978 was "to abolish the feudalist and pre-feudalist relations of the
country's social and economic system; to free people of class distinctions and to increase production [Article
1]. No family (defined as a nuclear family by Article 2) was to occupy more than 30 jeribs of first- grade
land or its equivalent [Article 3]. Excess lands above this were not to be sold, leased or mortgaged [Article
4]. Government was to fix fair water-sharing [Article 5]. No payment was to be made for excess lands.
Government was to pay for houses and other fixed improvements [Article 9]. Land was to be distributed
to landless farmers free of charge [Article 17]. Recipients were to promise to develop the land and they
were prohibited from inheriting additional land [Article 23].  This was to be either five jeribs of garden,
six jeribs of two-season, irrigated land, eight jeribs of one-season, irrigated land, 12 jeribs of lower grade,
one-season irrigated land, 25, 33 or 50 jeribs of rain-fed land depending upon quality [Article 12]. Land was
to be allocated by public lottery [Article 16]. Fragmentation and over-subdivision was to be limited, and
sub-divisions at time of inheritance could not fall below five jeribs of Grade 1 land [Article 20]. It was also
compulsory to register land ownership; if a person gave more than 20 percent incorrect information on the
registry, he would lose a portion of his holdings in proportion to the amount of incorrect information given
and that land would fall to government for redistribution [Article 31].
118 GoA 1976.
119 Seven year, five year, three year and annual plans were variously drafted from 1955 (Plan for 1335-1340 (1956-1961)) until
1986 (Plan for 1986-1990), but few of these are available.
120 Majrooh op. cit.
121 Majrooh op. cit., Edwards op. cit.
122 The communist coup, the “Saur Revolution” took place on April 28, 1978 with the murder of President Daoud and 30
members of his family. Taraki was himself murdered on September 15, 1979, and Amin took over. Amin murdered on
December 27, 1979.
123 Although the impact of the PDPA was to be in rural areas, party members were mainly drawn from urban students and
elites [Edwards op. cit., Rubin 1996]. Problematically, the party had little military backing [Rubin 1996].
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crushing debts and interest rates, this was popular
and the minister of agriculture was confident that
more than 80 percent of the rural population
would directly gain from this single
intervention.124 Implementation proved difficult
where there was no institutional framework in
place to enforce the decree, and in circumstances
where it was found that few mortgagors had the
written evidence of loans and shares paid upon
which the cancellation of their debts depended.
The sister Decree No. 8 on Land Reform followed
in November 1978, its principles having been
widely publicised in the Kabul Times.125 This
decree revisited the existing categorisation of
land and made sharp reductions in land ownership
ceilings, (e.g., from a 20 ha. to a six ha. ceiling
for irrigated land). The excess would not be
bought by the state, but directly expropriated
without compensation. No one, including the
royal family, was to be exempt from the reform.
Free redistribution focused on landless labourers
and tenants, small peasants (those owning less
than 2.5 acres) and landless nomads. Tenancy
was to be abolished [Box 13].
Implementation began in Kabul province and
spread. Regional branches of the cadastral
department were forced to provide information
as to who held large holdings.126 Handover of
lands took place in villages with much publicity
and party-led celebration.127 Eight months later,
the government announced that 250,000 families
had been given 600,000 hectares of redistributed
land.128 How many peasants took up these lands
is not known; it only took one peasant in an area
to be murdered by an angry landlord and his body
hung in the square to discourage others.129 Not
all villages were affected, however. Where there
were few PDPA party members, little action was
taken, because there was no one to organise the
public meetings. In other areas, whole
communities were affected.130
In the event, the reforms were highly unpopular,
especially with the more conservative religious
communities. Rebellions abounded almost from
the outset (beginning in Paktya), but accelerating
in earnest after the Decree No. 6 On Marriage
was announced. This prohibited the payment of
a bride-price, banned child marriages and required
that both partners consent to the union. Decree
No. 9 On Education was almost as unpopular. It
enforced education for girls and women, and
implementation began in public co-educational
classes. Sometimes the teachers were young
women from the towns and considered
inappropriately dressed.131 Resistance took on
the shape of a Jihad (holy war). Once news of
the disturbances in Paktya spread, "the Mullahs,
grateful for the God-sent opportunity to discredit
the government, further began to issue fatwas
(Islamic legal rulings) charging the government
with shamelessness and irreligiosity."132 This was
despite the fact that the reforms against usury
and high bride prices had direct support in Islamic
law. Taraki and Amin were, however, rigorous in
their secularity. They denounced the reaction as
counter-revolutionary, they arrested and executed
the reforms' opponents and launched a
concentrated campaign of ideological education,
including rallies and daily articles in the Kabul
Times. The Soviets provided arms and advisers.
Resistance increased.133 By June 1979 much of
the country was in uprising. The army was
124 Recorded by Anwar 1988. Seventy-one percent of farms were considered below the five-acre ceiling and many owners had
been forced to mortgage their land [ibid.].
125 These were first published in May 1978 within The Basic Lines of Revolutionary Duties of Government, put forward as a
preliminary to formulation of a new Constitution. See Yunas 2001. See Appendix J for a translation of the Land Reform
Decree 1978.
126 Pers. comm., deputy chair, Geodesy & Cartography Department, Kabul.
127 Edwards op. cit.
128 Rubin 1996, Anwar op. cit.
129 Emadi 1997.
130 Edwards op. cit. Edwards describes how in some areas, the reforms had little impact while in others, most people were
affected, especially by the usury reform.  He details a case in Khas Kunar where an entire community was put out of
business as it lived on the rewards from mortgages.
131 Edwards op. cit.
132 Anwar op. cit.
133 For 50 years, the tribal-feudal ruling class and the bureaucracy it served had successfully resisted attempts by central
government to implement much less dramatic reforms. The reaction now was accordingly greater [Edwards op. cit.].
134 Rubin 1996.
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at Taraki's failure to keep control, the Soviets
engineered his murder and replaced him with
Amin. Amin, in turn, was unable to stem the
rebellion and was similarly duly dispatched. Babrak
Karmal was made president in
December 1979 and the
supporting Soviet invasion
began a month later (and
would ultimately involve
115,000 troops). Flight began
in earnest.135
Why did the reforms fail?
There are many reasons for the failure of the
reforms. There were technical problems, such as
attempting to redistribute land without an equal
effort to carry through redistribution of water
rights, and the disabling effect of banning local
usury without providing alternative routes through
which farmers could borrow money for seeds and
fertilizer. The PDPA was quick to realise its mistake
in the latter area and launched a new drive
towards cooperatives to fill the gap, but seemingly
too late. Meanwhile, the local capital that was
available - often coming from workers returning
from the Middle East - could not be spent because
private money lending and renting of land were
disallowed. There was also the fact that the
proportion of very large landholdings above the
critical six-hectare mark was not as abundant as
thought. In some areas, the available land to
distribute to those who had listed their names
under the different categories of "eligible
applicants," (landless, not enough land to live on,
nomads, etc.) quickly ran out. The proportion of
these applicants was higher than the state had
appreciated and the number of very large
landholdings fewer.136
More powerful factors relate to the manner of
implementation. As Anwar observed, the PDPA
were "men in a hurry," an elite launching a reform
prior to establishing legitimacy in the rural
areas.137 Rural people had long kept the state
at arms’ length whenever they could, but here
was an administration penetrating to the very
heart of the rural
community.138 The urban
origins of the small party did
not help; decrees affecting
farmers were first read out and
celebrated in Kabul. Rural
people resented the arrival of
officials in the village, sometimes including young,
poorly dressed (i.e. partly uncovered) women,
telling them how to run their lives.139 While these
were reforms of the kind that the poor had been
advocating for decades, this was not how even
they had imagined it would come about. Cultural
135 By the end 1978 some 80,000 refugees had reached Pakistan.
136 Definition of “eligible applicants” — persons who could apply for redistributed land altered in subtle ways over the reform
programmes; in Daoud’s 1975 Land Reform Law, priority persons were landless workers on the land that was to be
redistributed, followed by landless nomads, farmers and labourers in the area and graduates of agricultural and husbandry
schools [Article 13]. Under the 1978 Land Reform, “eligible applicants” were listed in six grades, priority being given to
landless farmers working on the land to be redistributed and those who had lost land to government for public uses, and
ending with landless farmers and nomads in other provinces [Article 24]. Later, the Taliban Law on Land 2000 listed “eligible
applicants” for redistributed land as being first, farmers with no or insufficient land, second, farm workers, third, retired
state workers and fourth, nomads. See Appendices J & K for these articles.
137 Anwar op. cit.
138 Ibid.
139 Majrooh op. cit., Edwards op. cit.
140 Edwards op. cit.
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annoyance at the abandonment of traditional
exhortations like "God is great!" in favour of,
"Death to the reactionaries!" or, "Land to the
peasants!"140 Marches, parades and rallies in the
villages were impressive, but culminated in an
embarrassing transfer of land documents and a
procession sometimes to the new properties. The
humiliation of the original owners - to whom they
would have to return to beg the seeds government
was not providing - raised anxieties.141
As each redistribution rally finished and the TV,
radio and officials hurried to the next village,
those left behind began to feel that the show had
counted more than the reality.142 The Party did
not have the manpower to support those to whom
land had been distributed or to protect them
from the wrath of dispossessed landlords. Many
were troubled by the illegality — by custom and
by religious law — of depriving people of land
without payment, a principle that even the
reformist Daoud had been careful to emphasise
as essential only a year or so earlier (1977
Constitution). Uncertainty that the PDPA could
follow through grew along with repugnance as to
its methods. Rubin concludes that it took little
time for the poor to sense that they were not,
after all, being given a choice between freedom
and exploitation but "a choice between leaders
they knew, with whom they
shared much, and leaders
whom they did not know, who
believed in an alien ideology
and who showed by their
actions that they could not be
trusted."143
Many perceived their whole
society to be under attack. The
linking of the land and usury reforms with the
marriage reform, discussed earlier, was
particularly potent. While the marriage decree
was welcomed in Kabul with a flurry of couples
marrying in civil ceremonies and on their own
accord,144 "the banning of sale and purchase of
brides enraged peasants across the country."145
This was a practice that was the cement of a host
of social and economic relations, and had the
sanction of rich and poor and all ethnic groups
alike. To add insult to injury, district officials
began to arrest those who broke the new rules,
and as to be expected, most of the victims were
poor and powerless farmers and landless farm
workers.146 Being forced to attend literacy classes
in public coeducational classes, which were often
led by young, female party members from the
city, added to local fury.147  Significantly, the
cause of the first rebellion in Paktya was not the
land or usury reform, but a reaction to being
forced to send women to the literacy centre.148
Retrenchment: 1979-1985
In public at least, President Karmal sustained the
land reform initiatives with the same vigour as
Taraki and Amin, complaining of counter-
revolutionaries impeding its implementation.149
In practice, the reform was scaled back through
several amendments to Decree No. 8 on Land
Reform during 1979-80. These
changes eliminated references
to ridding the country of feudal
land relations, and exempted
mullahs and commercial
farmers from adhering to the
ownership ceilings.150 By 1981,
under Russian advisers, the
reform had gained the order
of a planned project, which
141 Ibid.
142 Majrooh op. cit.
143 Rubin 1996.
144 Anwar op. cit.
145 Majrooh op. cit.
146 Ibid.
147 Nor was the campaign assisted by the use of teaching which exampled “A” stands for Amin and “T” stands for Taraki
[Edwards op. cit.].
148 Anwar op. cit.
149 Anwar cites the Moscow New Times as reporting Karmal as saying that he had “distributed 6,657 ha.  free of charge to
296 families and at present more than 70,000 ha. are ready for distribution. 1,217 peasant cooperatives have been set
up but due to the destructive actions of counter-revolution only 207 units are operating ….” [Anwar op. cit.].
150 Article 22 of 1980 Constitution [Appendix D]. See Appendix C for amendments to the 1978 Decree.
151 The Socio-Economic Development Plan for 1982-83 soberly recorded that, “The First Phase of Land and Water Reform was
completed last year (1981-82) … effective measures were adopted to make up for the past mistakes, improve methods of
utilisation of land and water resources and expansion of the cooperative movement. The Law Concerning Utilisation of
Water and the plan for the second stage of land reforms came into effect in 1360 (1981)” [GoA 1982].
No farmer or farmland was safe.
Asset-stripping and extortion
flourished, as myriad warlords,
militias and parties gained, lost
and regained territory, and in
some areas secured land
specifically in order to launch
large-scale poppy production.
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on annually.151 In addition, instead of
appropriating private properties for redistribution,
needy landless farmers were offered plots in
cooperative schemes using government lands or
supposedly un-owned public lands.152 The 1983
plan declared that this Nationwide Land Reform
Operation would involve distribution of 2.55
million ha.153
In the meantime, some original landowners were
regaining their land, either voluntarily from
tenants who had found it impossible to farm
without the support of landlord capital, tools and
water, or by default, as farms were abandoned
with the exodus of thousands of farmers in the
face of periodic Soviet-led pillaging of their
villages. Farm production plummeted and
retreated into mainly subsistence farming. By
regulations in 1982 and 1983, the land ceiling
quietly ceased to apply to several new categories
of persons: mullahs, khans who supported the
government, military officers and commercial
farmers.154 In some areas, land was officially
returned, at least up to the ceilings laid out in
the decree. Compensation for land that had been
appropriated but which could not be returned to
owners, also began to be paid. More telling, land
taxes ceased to be collected.
The End of Reform: 1986-1989
Karmal's ouster by Major General Najibullah in
May 1986 marked a further scaling back of the
reform. Within a year, the new prime minister
launched a programme of national reconciliation
designed to restore stability to rural areas. He
denounced the fact that "land has not been
properly distributed ... and thousands of land
reform officers have received salaries for doing
little work," a claim that was soon to be echoed
in the opinion of retreating Soviet generals.155
They observed that no more than one-third of
the programme had been implemented. This was
nonetheless a substantial 700,000 hectares of
new or redistributed farmland. A new land decree
was passed in June 1987, raising the ceiling on
land ownership from six hectares back to 20
hectares of first-grade land. This had little impact,
as most landowners affected had already been
exempted from the ceiling under earlier
regulations. More significantly, the new law
allowed landowners to rent their land out again
and to hire labourers. Though important clauses
empowering the state to determine "the land
interests of society" were not revoked, Najibullah
restored the protection of property clause to his
new Constitution of 1987. He also introduced a
constitutional clause assuring heirs of their right
to inherit land.
None of these reversals could overcome the
damage that occupation and war, if not the land
reforms, had done to rural life and production.
By the time the Soviets left in 1989, more than
half a million homes had been destroyed and less
than half the arable land area was being
cultivated.156 Half a million household heads
were widows, life expectancy dropped and the
country was littered with landmines.157  Tenure
security itself , though not directly affected, was
held in abeyance. Neither those who remained
nor those who left knew what the future held.
The land reform movement came to an end at
the beginning of the 1990s with a new edict that
confirmed that compensation would be paid for
all seized lands that could not be returned to the
original owners. Agricultural policy turned firmly
to the promotion of commercial agriculture and
the distribution of subsidised inputs, such as
improved seed and machinery, some of it provided
for free by a repentant Soviet administration.
State companies were permitted to buy wheat
directly from farmers, excluding middlemen.
Nomads and poor peasants continued to be
allocated land on the few new settlement
schemes. Writing in 1991, Nathan & Berger were
bewildered at the lack of clarity in the local
situation as to land ownership and observed that
152 Several new edicts were issued in 1982 and 1983. By the end of 1982, 140 new cooperatives were registered.
153 GoA 1983.
154 Nathan & Berger 1991, Rubin 1996.
155 Rubin 1996.
156 At the peak of the war in 1985, interviews that the Swedish funded Agricultural Survey carried out with 5,000 farmers
showed that more than half of their villages had been bombed, 11 percent had had their crops destroyed and nearly a
quarter had had their irrigation systems damaged and lost livestock [SCA, 1988]. Gaining a statistical picture of the decline
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normally sustain rights and
deal with problems have fallen
into disarray." Assuming at that
time that mass refugee return
would occur, they warned that
the majority will be
sharecroppers or subsistence
farmers and who "will benefit




political environment was not,
however, conducive to stable
land relations. Fragmentation
among local factions was rife.
Ominously, as it were, in a
last-ditch effort to keep
control, Najibullah offered autonomy, weapons
and tanks to local leaders who could keep
communications open in the countryside. Land
appropriation by mujaheddin (fighters in a Jihad)
began with a vengeance.
Collapsing Land Relations: 1990-2000
Najibullah clung onto power until April 1992, at
which point the mujaheddin captured Kabul and
proclaimed it an Islamic state. By 1994 the peace
accord they had agreed to among themselves had
unravelled, and banditry and violence escalated
to unprecedented levels.159 No farmer or farmland
was safe. Asset-stripping and extortion flourished,
as myriad warlords, militias and parties gained,
lost and regained territory, and in some areas
secured land specifically in order to launch large-
scale poppy production.160 Land documents held
no sway. Traditional agreements collapsed.161
Typically, poor households bore the brunt of these
expansions, unable to pay the bribes demanded
of them to keep the militias at bay. Government
lands were also routinely invaded, and the
construction of unplanned, self-help housing in
towns was rife.162 Fragile lands were degraded
by cultivation of inappropriate crops like cumin,
or through excessive sinking of boreholes, which
lowered the water table. The importation of
pumps to lift water to higher lands, sometimes
deprived downstream communities of traditional
water rations. In the absence of order or planning,
each community fought for itself, and families
were pitted against families.163
The Taliban, a little known faction in 1994, rose
to power in this environment, their capture of
Kabul in 1996 raising expectations of peace and
order.164 To some extent and in some areas, this
was achieved during the five years of Taliban
rule. In other areas, inter-factional fighting and
land-grabbing continued as individuals and groups
gained and lost power. This included those
favoured by the Taliban, such as Pashtun nomads
from the south and Pashtuns from the north, who,
as noted earlier had been evicted by resentful,
indigenous populations. With the support of the
Taliban, they now sought to recover their lands.
In some areas, and most famously in the Shomali
Plains and the Hazarajat, Taliban zealotry and
vengeance (in the form of blockades followed by
compulsory conscription and tithing) reduced
whole communities to destitution, destroyed
158 Nathan & Berger op. cit.
159 Rashid op. cit.
160 Rashid op. cit., Gohari 2000.
161 See Pain 2001.
162 Rashid op. cit., Gohari op. cit. and see Appendix H.
163 See Pain op. cit. for examples.
164 Rashid op. cit., Gohari op. cit.
165 WFP 2000.
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Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in AfghanistanDevelopment Bank (ADB) had identified "unclear
tenure rights" as an issue to be addressed.168
Specifically, it proposed that,
• in the short term, "existing rights and records"
be assessed;
• in the medium term, "a computerised registry
linked to a national cadastre" be set up;
• in the longer term, "land tenure policy
development” be promoted.
In its approach paper, The World Bank eschewed
mention of the topic altogether.169
A more definitive guide to current policy is the
National Development Framework (NDF), an
overarching document produced by the Afghan
Assistance Coordinating Agency (AACA) in
conjunction with the Ministries of Planning and
Reconstruction in April 2002. The NDF is still a
draft and has not yet been approved by the
cabinet. The statement is curiously passive in its
recognition of the disturbance to land relations
wrecked by years of war. However, pursuant to
the ADB, the framework states that,
"Access to land is regulated through Islamic
and customary law. There is a need for a
programme to produce a
nationwide land registry and
to settle disputes between
individuals and groups over
land. Such a registry would
allow for the use of land as
collateral for entrepreneurial
activities."170
Aside from the minor inaccuracy concerning the
legal framework through which access to land is
regulated (which, as shown above, has also been
very potently exercised through state law), this
vision bears the hallmark of an international hand
offering up the conventional - and now somewhat
outdated - panacea of land registration as the
farms and deeply disturbed land relations.165 In
general, the Taliban's approach to land reflected
its typical mix of intentions: on the one hand
seeking to restore stability to the land sector,
including recovery of lost properties; and on the
other, adopting such partisan support that new
cycles of resistance ensued.166
Nonetheless, by 1999, the semblance of orderly
policy making resumed through the issue of edicts.
Those related to land sought to build on
Najibullah's efforts and restore land relations to
pre-reform, pre-revolution times. Because these
decree-driven pronouncements, in effect, remain
current policy today, their strategies are discussed
in the next section.
CURRENT TENURE POLICY & LEGAL
FRAMEWORKS
The Absence of Guiding Policy
The Afghanistan Transitional Authority (ATA) is
less than one year old, and specific land policy
has not been issued. Certain public documents
may be examined for clues that may help
determine how land policy will be handled by the
current regime. These include important
statements made by President Hamid Karzai and
his ministers at various
meetings such as during the
Tokyo Ministerial Meeting in
January 2002, in a report to
donors in April 2002 and again
during the Afghanistan Support
Group meeting in October
2002.
In Tokyo, the then-Afghanistan
Interim Administration (AIA) did include
"agriculture and rural development, including
food security" among its priority areas for action,
but specific mention of land rights (even those
of returning refugees) was not made. Although
the conference welcomed the efforts of donors
in bringing issues to the table,167 only the Asian
167 See Government of Japan 2002. The World Bank effort included a range of studies conducted from 1997, a series of
workshops held in November 2000 and April 2001 and a joint Bank-UNDP conference in June 2001. See World Bank 2001.
168 ADB 2002.
169 World Bank 2001.
170 GoA 2002a. Under the Governance and Security section, it was again noted that, “Uncertainty over land ownership will
hinder investment from the private sector as well as the ability of individuals to use land as collateral” [ibid]. More
significantly, the NDF did add that ”a credible system to resolve land disputes and provide certainty is urgent” [ibid].
[The current] vision bears the
hallmark of an international hand
offering up the conventional – and
now somewhat outdated –
panacea of land registration as
the way forward.
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chapter. The NDF as a whole looks to the private
sector and international investment into
Afghanistan as the engine of growth. There is a
concern among the AACA and other government
departments to find ways to release land to
foreign investors appears to dominate the land
agenda, such as it is.
Though not surprising given the short time period
involved, this strategy remained undeveloped
when the National Development Budget (NDB)
was presented to donors in October 2002.  Tackling
land tenure issues remains absent in this document
as well. Though the Ministry of Rural
Reconstruction and Development (MRRD) paid
fleeting lip service to the role of "inequalities in
access to productive assets" in sustaining poverty
in the NDB, it presented no plan to address these
inequalities.171 The budget from the Ministry of
Agriculture remained fixedly focused on providing
seed, fertilizer, breeding stock and other inputs
for arable and livestock development. However,
policy points under the proposed Rule of Law
programme do state that,
"The situation in the north of the country
requires measures to be taken to end
displacement and to permit returns of
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).
"The displacement of large numbers of
nomadic pastoralists (Kuchi) represents a
complex socio-economic problem that requires
the appointment of a government focal point
and close cooperation with assistance agencies
to resolve.
"A policy must be crafted that foresees the
settlement of disputes among the protagonists
at different levels, includes provisions for
their commitment to implementation of
agreed measures for peace and security,
reconciliation and justice."172
These three concerns, while not supported with
a plan of action or funding, do fairly accurately
identify three primary crisis points in current
rural land relations. The last in particular hints
at recognition that some form of dispute resolution
and reconciliation is going to be necessary. For
further development on these concerns, we need
to turn to the land law itself.
Policy Through Law
The context for this necessarily begins with the
Bonn Agreement of 5 December 2001. This
established that the overreaching framework for
all matters, including those of property, would
be the 1964 Constitution until such time as a new
constitution is prepared (due by end 2003).173
At the same time, "existing laws and regulations
are to apply," provided they are not inconsistent
with the Bonn Agreement or the 1964 Constitution.
The AIA was given the right to repeal or amend
those laws and regulations.
In February 2002 the AIA accordingly abolished
all laws, decrees and private constitutions that
were inconsistent with the 1964 Constitution.174
At the same time, it ordered each ministry to
study legislation in its sphere that was in force
prior to 21 December 2002, and to bring forward
amendments or fresh legislation as needed in
order to remove the above-mentioned
inconsistencies. Therefore, unless repealed or
amended, or obviously in contradiction to the
1964 Constitution, decrees in existence during
the Taliban era still represent the applied law.
Constitutional positions
Current articles on property in the 1964
Constitution have been mentioned above (and
are reproduced in Appendix G). Taken together
these have the following implications:
• A person who has taken out a loan or who
has mortgaged his land cannot have his land
taken from him unless a specific law is made
that allows this to happen [Article 26].
• No member of one ethnic group may be
prevented from moving to or living within an




173 Provisions relating to the monarchy and executive and legislative bodies were not to apply [Clause II 1(i)].
174 Decree No. 66; see Appendix K for translation.
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Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan• The state may not dispossess people of their
land unless it is essential for a public purpose.
In that event, the owner must be fully
compensated for the loss, and paid prior to
being evicted [Article 29].
• Nobody other than government may
appropriate private land; warlords who do so
are acting illegally [Article 28].
• There are no longer limitations on the amount
of land any person or body may hold (ceilings)
- unless and until a special law provides for
this [Article 29].
• Foreigners may not own land, but they may
lease land from Afghan owners [Article 29].
• Courts are to deal with property disputes on
the basis of statutory laws; only where no
clear provision exists will the principles of
Hanafi Jurisprudence of the Shariat of Islam
be used to render a decision and even then,
the decision must fall fully within the rights
laid out in the Constitution [Article 102].
A commitment to restitution
Although of limited coverage, the above represent
tangible policies. Already these have been
appended.
First, in 2001and in accordance with international
law, the AIA promised that "the recovery of
movable and immovable properties such as land,
houses, markets, shops, apartments etc. will be
effected through relevant legal organs."
Furthermore, it committed to work with UNHCR
on the monitoring of this commitment [Articles
5 & 8 of Decree on the Dignified Return of Refugees
2001].175
175 See Appendix K for translation.
Box 14: Examples of Land Loss
• Landlessness in Bamyan is severe "due to occupation of Tajik homes and land by military personnel."
• Around 50 percent of people are landless in Sholgara in Balkh, "where the Pashtun minority has farms
of 300-500 jeribs."
• 1,000 Pashtun families have been expelled from five areas of Farkhar and are now landless.
• Pashtun living in Kunduz have also been targeted by Uzbek authorities and find their farms occupied
by warlords; "The Governor of Kunduz is said to occupy 1,700 jeribs of land belonging to refugees."
• In Iman Sahib, Uzbek returnees are being prevented from living there by current Turkmen residents;
"One commander is reported to have taken all livestock and all land in his area."
• There are reports in Moqur in Ghazni of forced occupation of land by local commanders; "One commander
has sent his men out to capture land for his own use."
• In Besud, 8 jeribs of land have been occupied by a commander, who sold the land then disappeared.
So the returnee has found an occupant who holds a court certificate of payment.
• A widow in Kunduz reports that her husband's family will not release any share of his land to her.
Source: District Profiles UNHCR 2002c.
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resolution. In particular, this
will be the case if, as implied,
ordinary courts at district and
provincial levels are no longer
able to hear land-related
disputes.
It remains to be seen just how many of the pending
or latent cases involve rural farmland. UNHCR's
recent district profiles highlight one of its priority
concerns as the lack of housing or damaged housing
for returnees (respectively reported as 45 percent
and 38.4 percent in September 2002).178  In Shiba
in Bamyan for example, UNHCR reported serious
overcrowding among returnees, where 298 houses
have been totally destroyed and another 643
partially destroyed.179 As municipalities come to
grips with their situations, more figures are
emerging. For example, the deputy mayor for
property in Kabul knows for certain that 600
private homes are wrongfully occupied, but
suspects that there may actually be many times
that number [Appendix I]. Many of these cases
originate from the redistributions of 1978-1980,
but many more are emerging as the result of civil
war and disorder since 1990, and from the current
control of many districts and villages by warlords
and their militias. With each passing week,
awareness of the large extent of lost farmland is
coming to light, though on a still ad hoc basis.
Box 14 provides examples drawn from UNHCR's
district reports. The UN refugee agency says it
will publish a fuller analysis of the district reports
by early 2003.
It is also not clear on what basis the court will
rule, or indeed how current cases are resolved.
Although not inconsistent in principle, Islamic
law, civil law and state law provide different
guidance and strategies. None appear to cover
the kind of problems being encountered to the
depth required for safe and lasting decisions. The
Law on Land 2000 provides a sketch of the basis
Second, the Afghan govern-
ment has more recently
created a special court under
the Supreme Court to hear
property disputes [Decree No.
136 of September 2002].176
These disputes may relate to
issues of possession going back
as far as 27 April 1978, the date of President
Daoud's murder and the establishment of the
PDPA communist regime of President Taraki (and
thereafter Amin and Karmal).
Hearings will be held on the basis of individual
claims/submissions. Submissions will be reviewed
by a panel of experts (the Disputes Resolution
Commission) prior to decision by the three-judge
special court. The court's ruling will be final. So
far, no advertisement for applications, elaboration
of procedure as how to apply to have a dispute
heard or establishment of detailed principles upon
which the court will rule have been made. It is
not clear, for example, how far the special court
will use state law, civil law or Shariat to guide
its decisions, and if the last, then how far it shall
enforce decisions based upon Hanafi doctrines
upon non-Sunni claimants.
It might be expected that the initiative for this
court arises from the presumed immense number
of cases where returnees or displaced persons
have been unable to recover rural homes or
farmland. However, it is more likely that the
catalyst has been a growing number of cases
involving high-profile individuals, whose concerns
relate mainly to difficulties in recovering valuable
urban properties.177 Whether or not this is true,
the land disputes court is likely to find itself
quickly inundated with hundreds — if not thousands
— of cases, especially if access to the court is
made public, simple and cheap. It is highly unlikely
that its plan to be a single-circuit court moving
around the country will be sufficient to meet the
176 See Appendix K for translation.
177 Such a case, for example, is that of the governor of Paktya Province, Babrak Khan, who lost many valuable houses and
land in Kabul to government occupation and reallocation during 1978-79, properties since sold or built on by purchasers,
and which he has allegedly been unable to retrieve. The manager of a guest house in which the author was staying claimed
that in almost every guest house in Kabul there is a steady stream of wealthy returnees, particularly from England and
America, who have come to reclaim their valuable properties and hope to sell these or rent them out now that prices are
so high. Not all of them want to stay. It is these people who are complaining so strongly to ministers. Some of them would
stay if they could get their houses back to live.
178 UNHCR 2002b.
179 UNHCR 2002c.
The land disputes court is likely
to find itself quickly inundated
with hundreds – if not thousands
– of cases, especially if access to
the court is made public, simple
and cheap.
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While this could be used to recover land
appropriated by warlords, neighbours and
relatives, its terms are firmly fixed on recovering
land that was distributed following the 1978
revolution. This Law on Land 2000 was published
under Taliban Edict No. 57 along with 25 other
rural sector laws.180 An informal translation of
this land law is provided in Appendix K.181
Restoring government property
Another new law decreed by the Afghan
government was to halt the distribution of
government property in municipal and rural areas
[Decree No. 99 of 4.2.1381 (2002)]. This reflects
a government objective of re-securing government
property, an effort that has spearheaded what
limited policy evolution/legal regulation has been
undertaken, other than the above-mentioned
court. Nonetheless, in practice, warlords are still
visibly distributing land to their followers, often
using unutilised government lands for the
purpose.182
Developments in support of securing government
property are mainly focused on the re-drafting
of a Taliban edict on the subject [Decree No. 26
Concerning Land 1999]. A translation of the
180 These ranged from orders or edicts (firman) concerning the organisation of agricultural and livestock activities, laws for
nature and forest conservation and hunting, orders relating to poppy cultivation, rules for parastatals, orders from the
Supreme Leader “Regarding Working Restrictions For Women in Local and International NGOs,” “Regarding Punctuality
of Workers on Government Duties” and an “Order to Government Officers Not to Serve Persons Who Have Trimmed Their
Beards.”
181 The law was not freshly drafted by the Taliban, but re-issued and amended from the Rabbani and Najibullah decrees, which
were themselves amended versions of the Revolutionary Land Decree of 1978, with many clauses extending back to President
Daoud’s Land Reform Law of 1975.
182 One documented case relates to the distribution of land in peri-urban areas around Kabul, for which loyal soldiers of the
United Front may apply on payment of around US $350 into a private account. One receipt seen by the author was number
1,223. UNHCR has reported cases in the eastern region, among others, of warlords planning urban developments on peri-
urban, rural lands that are then handed over to supporters. Warlords are allegedly encouraged in these developments by
one or other supporting members of cabinet.
183 Redrafting has been undertaken by a committee composed of representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation
and Water under the leadership of the Ministry of Justice.
Box 15: The Current Legal Basis for Retrieving Rural Land
• If the land has not been distributed to a new owner and there is valid documentation then the land
will be returned to the claimant or to his children.
• If the land was distributed (under the land reforms), then the current occupant will pay the owner for
the land at present-day values. If they can't agree on a price, the owner may reclaim the land and may
also claim "all the lost harvests" from the occupant.
• If the land has been distributed to the government, it does not have to return the land to the owner,
but will pay the farmer at present day values, and in one instalment.
• If the land was distributed to a person who has subsequently sold the land to another, then the current
owner may claim costs from the person who sold him the land, when returning the land to the original
owners.
• If the boundaries of the property have been altered (reduced), then the occupant must compensate
the owner for the land area that has been lost.
• Owners and occupants are to agree on the value of buildings constructed since the owner lost the
property and to come to an arrangement to repay the costs to the occupant who constructed the
buildings or improvements; and
• No claims for degradation to the land may be sought.
Source: Chapter Four of Law on Land 2000.
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to the 1999 Taliban version, is provided in
Appendix K. The draft makes changes to only
eight of the 26 standing articles.183 Only three
of the changes proposed are matters of substance,
and none significantly alter the intentions of the
law.184 Should the cabinet approve the law, it
will in effect be re-issuing the Taliban decree.185
It will be recalled from the discussion above that
the definition of government land has not been
stable over the years. In summary, government
land was first defined in 1965 as part of the Survey
and Statistics Law guiding registration. However,
this did not identify current government land.
Rather, it stated that all land that was registered
to the government, including all wastelands,
would be called government land. The government
then proceeded to register as much land as it
could from 1966-1975. This amounted to 856,000
ha. of agricultural land (mostly under schemes
of one kind or another) and 943,500 ha. of
wasteland.186 The status of the additional 1.6
million ha. of pasture registered is unclear.
Surveyors have offered different views as to how
much of this was registered as belonging to
government, and how much was recorded as
"public land." The question was largely irrelevant
under the Revolutionary Constitution of 1980,
which firmly placed pasture under the description
of state land.187 By 1992, this was retracted to
include only "unclaimed pasture."
To recover government land the Taliban/ATA Law
on Land orders that even if no documentation
exists, properties that have been under effective
government authority since 1965 will be held to
belong to government [Article 2]. "Effective" is
not defined, but could be considered to mean
occupation and/or use by government, through
development of structures or otherwise. The
decree also lays out other stipulations [see Box
16]. In addition, Article 22 is emphatic that,
"Government officials or persons who misuse
their power and occupy the lands of others
by force of arms must not only return the
land, but be punished in accordance with the
law."188
How far the government is able to enforce the
law under current conditions is moot. The Minister
of Agriculture indicated that, should the law be
put into effect, 85 percent of the government's
land would be restored to the government.
184 As per changes to Articles 7, 23 & 24. The most interesting clause that was dropped was the Taliban directive about how
village commons may be defined: “If a man with a loud voice stands at the last house of the village and shouts, the last
point at which he may be heard marks the beginning of maraa (public land)” [Article 7].
185 By end October 2002 the proposal had apparently been discussed twice by the cabinet but no decision was made.
186 See Appendix I.
187 By contrast, President Daoud had been careful to only specify “forests” in his 1977 Constitution.
188 Law on Land 2000.
Box 16: The Current Legal Definition of Government Land
• All lands for which the government has paid compensation and for which there is related documentation;
• All lands for which the government has paid compensation and where, if the relevant documentation
has been lost from government offices, there are sufficient witnesses to testify that the estate is
government property, or where there is evidence of public development or structures;
• Lands registered as government land with documentation, even though compensation may not have
been paid;
• Lands that have been under the control of government since 1965 and developed by government;
• Water channels that are not under proven private ownership and the lands irrigated from these channels;
• Land designated for housing in urban areas that has been allocated, but where no construction has
taken place within the specified time limit;
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of redefining government land, and in the process,
may reduce its scope. For example, even though
vast lands may have been under the control of
the state in 1965, they may not all meet the
criteria of having been developed by the
government since.189 The final limits placed upon
government land come, however, from the
corollary definition of other classes of land, which
explicitly exclude government land. Table 1 sets
these out. Most striking are the distinctions drawn
among government land and public land and
wasteland.
Government as administrator
While the state limits the range of its own tenure,
it does retain to itself controlling jurisdiction of
how other classes are used and who uses them.
For example, maraa is thus to be "reserved for
use by villagers."190 Rights to its use may be
obtained through Shariat provision,191 and
remembering that Shariat itself acknowledges
local customary rules.192 Therefore, the
arrangements for maraa will be through largely
informal rules. The connotation is that these are
common lands rather than public lands. They are
treated classically, however, as being both un-
owned and un-ownable. That is, no space is made
in the current law for consideration of local
commons as private, group-held property.
Arrangement for the use of mawaat is more
formal. This may occur through issue of leases,
and which assumes the state as the lessor.193 A
distinction is drawn between barren lands that
belong to the government and mawaat; the latter
may be sold by the state, at fair prices.194
Opening up new farmland
The thrust of current land policy is one that has
roots in past policies to open as much land as
possible to arable farming, mainly through dam
and irrigation developments like the Hilmand
Valley Scheme (1949-1979). As discussed above,
most of the land actually surveyed in 1966 onwards
was so-called barren and virgin land, recorded as
"under government," and excluded from the Books
of Ownership and Taxation. Disposal of these
lands to the private farming sector has been policy
for years, often with Pashtun nomads prominent
in the line of 'eligible applicants." This was both
to encourage them to become settled farmers
and to build Pashtun hegemony in invaluable,
new farmland areas. An example of
implementation of this policy under the Taliban
was given earlier in the case of Altamur Village
in Logar Province. While current policy may have
lost its Pashtunisation objectives, the Ministry of
Agriculture remains firmly committed to the
expansion of arable land, and is looking to cabinet
support for this development.
• All government properties sold to the private sector by municipalities of other government departments
without written statement of transfer;
• All government lands that were distributed from April 1978, but where no subsequent development was
undertaken and where no documents of transfer were issued; and
• All lands which in Shariat prove the right of government.
Sources: Taliban Decree No. 26 Concerning Land 1999 and proposed ATA redraft, and Taliban Law on Land
2000.
189 The definition relating to Shariat is less constrained, given that its main interpreter, the civil law, does not describe
government properties so much as define the limits of private possession [Book Three, Title One, Chapter One, Part One
Rights of Ownership of Civil Law]. However Edict 26 describes Shariat proof as being “by the evidence of legal documents,
history of use, the evidence witnesses provide and by developments that have been undertaken on the land” [Article 10],
all which limit the land which the state may claim as its own.
190 Article eight of Edict 26/draft decree.
191 Article 84 of Edict 57 on land [Law on Land 2000].
192 At least as stated in the Civil Law, Article 26.
193 Article 15 of Edict 26/draft decree.
194 Articles 87 and 88 of Law on Land 2000.
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a main objective of the Law on Land 2000, passed
by the Taliban under a general Agricultural Decree
No. 57 and still the operative law today.  The
source of these new lands land is to be government
lands, and specifically those areas that have
either been gifted to the state, state agricultural
lands or "wastelands made ready for agriculture"
[Article 43]. "Eligible applicants" are once again
defined as the local landless followed by nomads
to make way for retired government workers,
who will receive land instead of pensions.
Successful applicants will pay for the land in up
to 10-year instalments and at a price set by a
special commission.
The contents of this law go hand-in-hand with
the Edict on Acquisition of Property 2000, another
law that is yet to be scrutinised by the ATA. This
confirms that the state will only take land for
public purposes.  It defines public purposes as
buildings, highways, pipelines, communications,
electricity, tunnels, water supply, religious schools,
mosques, underground mineral resources, lands
of cultural and scientific value, forests, dams and
lands that are part of water "catchment."
Pastoral rights
The status of pasture is central to the land
categorisation. Arguably, it has been definition
TABLE 1: CURRENT LAND CLASSES
Tenure Class Dari Name Specified Owner Use/User Extent to Which May
be Transferred Into
Another Class
1 Private land Amlaki  Private persons Not specified Not specified
shakhsi
2 Government land Amlaki  Government Not specified To private lands such as
Dawlatii "lands made ready for
agriculture, and not
under any plans for urban
development, minerals or
pasture"195
3 Public land Maraa Un-owned land Public purposes Nil [but use rights may





4 Religious land Waqf Public land available For "common None ["may not be sold,
for common, good" rented, mortgaged,
religious purposes gifted or inherited"]
5 Wasteland, Mawaat Un-owned land Not specified May be brought under
defined as desert, from which lease with permission of
mountains, hills, government land the head of state
rivers, virgin lands, is specifically
barren lands, excluded197
forests
Sources: Taliban Decree 26 Concerning Land 1999, proposed ATA redraft and Taliban Law on Land 2000.
195 Article 43 of Law on Land 2000.
196 Article 84 of Chapter Nine of Law on Land 2000 provides for “rights to maraa use may be obtained through Shariat provision.”
197 But over which the state exercises jurisdiction and may be the lessor; see Article 13 (2) of Edict 26 of 1999/Draft Edict
in Appendix K.
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 57
Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistanof pasture and the will to bring
this under control that has
driven definition of
government and other classes
of land. In 1965 the Survey and
Statistics Law defined pasture
as any land that had been used
for grazing in the past (and
irrespective of whether it was
in deserts, hills or valleys and
definable therefore as various
wasteland, barren land or
public or private land) [Article
63]. Conversion of pasture to
agricultural land was not
permitted [Article 64]. Pasture
could not be privately owned
and its use was to be
supervised by provincial
governors. They were instructed to delimit and
survey pastures. They could allocate use rights
to these pastures through the issue of grazing
licences [Article 64-65]. The Law of Pasture Lands
19 Hoot 1349 (1970) elaborated this position,
emphasising that "new rights to use pastures may
be acquired through application to provincial
administrations." [Article 16]
Many rights were so acquired through the 1970s,
mainly by nomadic peoples seeking to secure
summer pastures [see Appendix I]. This was in
addition to rights that were allocated to nomads
through settlement schemes on government land
or reclamation of "wasteland."198 As had been
the case under King Amanullah in the 1920s,
pasture rights were conditional upon payment of
a livestock tax to the local administrations. Once
allocated, the usufructary nature of the grants
tended to blur, as did the distinction between
government as owner or administrator, so each
side considered itself the owner. The core conflict
area was not, however, between state and
pastoralists, but between pastoralists and settled
villagers, who considered a good part of the
grazing land to be their own property. By 1980,
an interim constitution, drawn up by the largely
Marxist government, had sided with the nomads,
declaring that,
"The government will guarantee for the
nomads, tribes and livestock breeders vast
opportunities to use pasture free of charge
on an equitable basis and guarantees for the
nomads the right to unhindered passage over
national territories" [Article 20].199
Attempts by both the Taliban — and now the ATA
— to unravel the complex status of pastureland
and pastoral rights through the re-issue of a
slightly amended version of Decree 26, need to
be seen in this light. The result is complicated.
First, an attempt to clarify lands over which rights
may be held is being made by drawing clearer
distinctions among government land, public land,
wasteland and private land. Pasture may exist in
all of these classes. Under Decree 26 in its existing
and proposed version and the Law on Land under
Decree 57, pasture rights appear to be obtainable
through sale or lease of government land and
obtainable by lease through public auction from
wastelands. No private rights over pasture may
be obtained in public lands (maraa). As discussed
above, these are by definition "un-owned and un-
198 The 1965 Survey and Statistics Law permitted government lands to be sold “following the Manual for Nomadic Tribes”
[Article 56]. Reclamation of wastelands was to be encouraged and re-claimants were to be given a certificate of title
[Article 57]. “Land allocated to nomads, banished persons or settlers may not be sold for 20 years” [Article 62].
199 The 1964 Constitution also offers specific support to nomads: “The government will help the nomads, tribes and livestock
breeders through grants in aid, favourable bank loans and other aids in order to enable them to grow more animals, market


































Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 58for example, where short-term cumin production
on fragile pasture is leaving behind ruined soils
unable to regenerate grasses, rendering them
useless after one or two years for either cultivation
or pasture.202 Other pastures are being degraded
through overuse, itself often possible through
new water development.
Particularly where land rights
have been held in a delicate
balance among different sets
of users, the installation of
boreholes and irrigation
channels carries with it an
assertion of ownership than
may seriously unsettle norms. As has been
cyclically the case in the past, ethnic, arable-
pastoral, territorial, and development conflicts
are increasingly crystallising in the question of
pasture and its ownership. Despite a fairly
ownable lands." However, the Taliban and
proposed ATA decree are quite clear that these
lands are to be reserved for villagers — that is,
not nomads [Article 8].
And indeed, this is so firmly the case that the
Taliban Law on Pasture
2000200 goes so far as to refer
to local rights over public land
as "private rights." "Private
pasture" is declared as
including maraa. This
reinforces the impression
gained earlier of maraa as less
"public land" than "commons," over which there
could be potential for communities to exercise
private group rights. This however is not carried
through in the proposed redrafting of Decree 26,
which instead confirms that neither government
nor individuals may secure private rights in maraa.
The lines of conflict between local and seasonal
or other rights over maraa are therefore clear.
This is even more so in the provision of the Law
on Pasture where "public pasture" is defined as
including barren lands and lands on the edges of
cities and villages" [Article 2]. This opens up
potential areas of dispute, and indeed refers to
the very lands that appear to be under such
widespread contestation: lands on the edge of
villages, used by both local people and nomads,
and which may be as easily classed as maraa.
When the related policy of encouraging farmers
to expand their cultivation as far as possible is
added to this mixture, the ingredients for dispute
are stirred. This is particularly so as deep well
technology begins to be employed, making the
conversion of dry lands into arable lands possible.
The levels of contention may reach violence and
murder — securing pasture with guns is not
unknown.201 There are innumerable cases where
Kuchi nomads claim their pasture is being
encroached by settled peoples (as illustrated in
Box 4 in Chapter One), and as many cases where
settled people feel their local commons are being
encroached by outsiders. Issues of land degradation
also enter the fray. There are cases in the west
200 Published under Decree 57 along with the Law on Land.
201 De Weijer op. cit.
202 De Weijer pers. comm.
As has been the case in the past,
ethnic, arable-pastoral,
territorial, and development
conflicts are raising the question
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toward Kuchi actions during the
Taliban period, this could backfire,
hardening antagonisms and making
the resolution of long and complex
land conflicts even more difficult.
A comprehensive land policy is yet
to be formulated by the ATA. The
principle strategy on offer —
registration of private lands to
provide a basis for collateral — appears curiously
mismatched to circumstances and dislocated from
a long history of rights recordation on the one
hand, and longstanding use of land as security
for loans on the other. This approach appears to
still refer to only arable lands, not the all
important pasture rights that increasingly conflict
with arable rights. Nor is it clear that the murky
area of what constitutes government land has
been resolved. Meanwhile, a history of land tenure
policy does in fact exist, expressed currently in
Taliban decrees. Continuity with the recent past
rather than change is a main trend, largely by
default than design. The result suggests a return
to strategies of the 1960s, a return reflected in,
rather than driven by, the choice of the 1964
Constitution as the guiding set of principles. With
or without guidance from a still unformed new
civil administration, decisions on land relations
are being made at a political level, and mainly
by edict. How far this ad-hoc approach will be
able to produce sustainable solutions and stability
in land relations is a subject of the following
discussion chapter.
substantial history of attention,
this is yet to be satisfactorily
resolved.
In this respect, it is worth recalling
the strategy of the recent budget
planning process for "the
appointment of a government focal
point and close cooperation with
assistance agencies" to resolve the
complex socio-economic problem
of the displacement of large numbers of nomadic
pastoralists (Kuchis).203 This was in fact very
promptly initiated through a cabinet decision in
early October 2002 to establish a commission on
Kuchis, comprising inter-ministerial
representation. This was closely followed by the
formation of a Kuchi Vulnerability Working Group,
launched by MRRD, but under the chairmanship
of the Minister for Tribal Affairs. The two bodies
have declared they will work together; the working
group is serving as an advisory group to the
commission.
Humanitarian aid and related water development
for rehabilitation are the shared primary
objectives, but with recognition of the need to
resolve underlying land conflicts also a key
concern.204 MRRD is considering how humanitarian
and dispute resolution needs could be met by
developing institutions at the community level.
Meanwhile, a political approach to the land
grievances of Kuchi is apparently being considered
at higher levels, in the form of a proposed Kuchi
shura or "parliament" of some 30 representatives,
with the intention of giving nomads a voice. In
With or without
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AN OVERVIEW
A Casualty of Mismanaged State-Making
Land tenure issues have been a catalyst to the
social and political disquiet in Afghanistan of the
last century, helping to trigger local conflict,
rebellion, disorder, civil war and even foreign
occupation.
In particular, the manipulation
of land rights at an official
level — including but not
limited to the revolutionary
agrarian reform of 1978 — has
played a significant role. For
just as land policy and land
law have become integral
elements of state making, the
right to land has been
continually buffeted back and
forth in the yet unfinished
game of nation building. Tenure insecurity has
been the constantly revisited casualty.
Oftentimes, the objectives are well meaning, or
imposed for assumed modernisation. However,
time and time again, the willingness of the rural
population to bow to coercive, and at times, cruel
change — even to their ultimate benefit — has
been misjudged. Controlling land access to punish
the disloyal and reward the loyal and to build
nations within nations has had costs that are still
being paid today. This strategy began with Abdur
Rahman's reordering of
territory, and has been
periodically sustained since,
particularly in the skewed
distribution of new lands
resulting from dam and
irrigation development. Land-
seeking pastoralists have
frequently been the instrument
- willing colonisers but also
uniquely adaptable, and
Chapter Three: Discussion
Just as land policy and land law
have become integral elements
of state making, the right to land
has been continually buffeted
back and forth in the yet
unfinished game of nation
building. Tenure insecurity has
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Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistansingle farmer may be owner, tenant, sharecropper
and mortgagor - and may even be in transition
from one status to another with respect to one
or more of his plots. The extent to which surveys
have come to grips with these distinctions over
the years has been insufficient. As a result, we
have no clear picture of land ownership today,
and the picture from the past is inconsistent. The
fact that official and unofficial change has
continued to occur throughout this "transitional"
period, and that the current situation is still self-
evidently fluid, do not make things any more
apparent.
Continuing Polarisation
Without hard data, it may nonetheless be inferred
that polarisation in land assets is more likely to
have increased than declined since 1978.
In the first instance, land shortages will have
increased because of
population growth since the
1970s, and the reduced
availability of new farmland
through dams and irrigation.
Fragmentation of plots,
competition for land and a
squeeze on the poor are some
possible results. Second, civil
turmoil, destruction or abandonment of properties,
flight and dislocation suggest that possibly
thousands (if not several million) who were not
entirely landless (or homeless) in 1977, may be
so now. Third, the asset-stripping behaviour of
elites, militias and warlords over the last decade
could only have left many landless while increasing
the land resources of a minority.
Fourth, drought has tipped the scales against the
already poor, apparently reducing thousands to
landless and livestock-less destitution. This is
occurring at a time when the drought has also
made traditional landlords uncertain about their
own crops and access to cash, and therefore less
willing to invest in sharecropping partnerships or
to offer loans. It therefore may be predicted (and
has anecdotally been described), that in such
times of economic stress, debts will be called in,
land under mortgage will be taken over and the
poor will lose the little they still possess. Cases
currently entering what may or may not be a
lasting period of stark tenure insecurity and
territorial limitation. Overlapping land rights
abound, particularly at the interface of marginal
rain-fed cultivable lands and pasture.
As the state itself has fragmented over the last
two decades, so contestation over land rights has
descended from the centre to the periphery,
involving a widening range of properties, including
family farms and houses. As is frequently the
case, war and instability have reignited old
disputes and provided opportunities for seizures
("retrievals") and the appropriation of vast lands
by the government, not always for public purposes.
Warlords have followed the route of their
predecessors, helping themselves and their
followers to valuable land in much the same way
as the Taliban, the mujaheddin and kings did
before them. A worrying dimension to these
developments is the periodic declaration by various
commanders that certain
ethnic groups are no longer
allowed to live in the territory
under their control.205 Plans
abound in both rural and urban
areas to provide supporters
with land through means that
appear illegal under state, civil
and customary law. Some are
under implementation. Land (and related control
over water) remains the ultimate booty in the
agrarian state.
A Bedrock of Inequitable Relations
Of course, the modern land history of Afghanistan
cannot be interpreted simply as a mosaic of
shifting territories, alliances and ethnically
disposed disputes. For just as clearly we have
seen that the foundation of land relations has
been — and still is — supported by a rural
production system that is seriously inequitable
in terms of ownership of land.
The exact dimensions of the inequities, both past
and present, have proven difficult to measure.
Strong regional divergences are apparent in report
after report throughout the last four decades.
Even more complex are the layers of tenure
arrangements that accrue. At any given time, a
205 Pers. comm.  N. Jawad.
At any given time, a single farmer
may be owner, tenant,
sharecropper and mortgagor - and
may be in transition from one
status to another with respect to
one or more of his plots.
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armed Kuchis demanding payment for access to
land they had foreclosed on 20 years before, will
be common.
Fifth, the unregulated Afghan economy, occurring
in spite of — or because of — war, disorder and
anarchy will have an adverse effect on resource
distribution. The literature on this grows monthly,
beginning with Rubin.206  More recent studies
highlight the destabilising affects of war and black
illegal economies on fragile mainstream
markets.207 Trade in (and tax on) guns, fuel and
smuggled goods (from wheat to emeralds), mass
extraction of timber and marble, the poppy/opium
economy, along with economic blockades of
dissenting areas (such as in the Hazarajat between
1996-1998), all deliver wealth and opportunity
for some and oppression, peonage and destitution
for others. Even the dramatic wealth from the
poppy cultivation sector in the 1990s, involving
more than three million farmers, has shown little
sign of reducing inequities.208 On the contrary,
land ownership in that sector may have polarised
further, as wealthy families reinvested their
returns, while poor cultivators remained burdened
by high interest rates and forced sales at low
prices to meet repayments.209
Adaption and Change
At the same time, we know that Afghan society
is changing, and that many of the roots binding
the poor to their patrons may be loosening. One-
time benefactors are feeling economically
squeezed and are less able to provide. Their
clients are moving away from the village to the
town, from farming into petty trading, and they
are becoming more educated. All of these factors
are changing social relations. Klijn, for example,
describes how client families returning from Iran
continue to provide certain services to their one-
time lords, but now mainly out of gratitude for
past support and to sustain social relations and
pride.210 They, like the many thousands who left
Afghanistan to find refuge or employment in
neighbouring countries, Europe, America or the
Middle East, have returned with means, education
or skills that open opportunities for off-farm
employment, enable them to purchase land for
the first time and provide a new basis for relating
to one-time khan families in the community.211
Significantly, these trends include women, a
growing number of whom are reluctant to step
back into their traditional roles.  In small numbers,
they have been among the first to challenge
current land inequities. This has been illustrated
in the rising number of cases where returning
refugee widows lodge complaints with courts
when they find are unable to secure any share of
their husband's land.212
Such shifts mirror changes within family relations
as a whole. Sons from privileged families who
were sent away for education and who now have
jobs and means, may never return to farm,
knowing that the farm has been virtually
subdivided away. A new form of land relations
emerges in the household, one that distinguishes
the sons who farm from those who do not farm.
The latter will probably receive less of a share
of the family property than was the case in the
past. Many of these arrangements are in transition
and uncertain. [Box 17]
In addition, UNHCR reports that a surprising 74.3
percent of returnees do not have farmland to
which they can return.213  While it is difficult to
know refugees' land status, it may be assumed
that a "significant" number of refugees did not
own land, surviving as workers, tenants, or
sharecroppers in varying degrees of dependency
to landowners. They left the country landless and
206 Passim.
207 For example, Bhatia & Goodhand op. cit.
208 ACBAR op. cit.
209 Mansfield 2001 cited by Pain & Lautze 2002. Also see ACBAR op. cit.
210 Klijn op. cit.
211 Even prior to 1978, Iran, Pakistan and the Middle East were destinations of migrant labour. The trend increased during
the communist era, and while several million refugees have returned, several million more remain overseas, periodically
remitting money to their families.
212 Pers. comm. C. le Duc UNHCR and see UNHCR 2002c.
213 UNHCR 2002b. Some observers dispute this statistic. One peer reviewer for example reminds the author that “many refugees
will not be willing to state their real status for fear of perhaps losing an additional benefit they may receive as landless
persons.” He adds “My own personal experience from the camps in Pakistan indicates that the majority of refugees in
camps did own land with the exception of a small number of nomads. Many returned to Afghanistan in the autumn and
spring to cultivate and went back again in summer to collect the harvest.”
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proportion of refugees (with their now much
enlarged families) are not attempting to return
to their rural homes, but to cities and towns
looking for work.214
Dependency, Debt and Destitution
The uncertain trends aside, a substantial
proportion of the rural population is unable to
produce enough to sustain its own living, and
instead is locked into dependency on others, be
they landlords, shopkeepers or more affluent
relatives. While land is not the only means of
production (in the classical model of land, water,
seeds, labour and capital), the strong correlation
between land ownership and wealth suggests that
landlessness and near-landlessness are safe
indicators of this dependency. It could even be
the case that most of those dependent on farming
are in debt. Indebtedness as a whole seems to
be as severe a problem as it was 30 years ago
Box 17: Changing Land Relations in The Village
Leaving land to needy family members
Ahmad was born 50 years ago in Kunduz. On his father's death he and his four brothers inherited their father's
lands. Ahmad was already at university in Kabul at this time and his share was made slightly smaller than
those of his other brothers. Ahmad has remained in Kabul, and his land has since been appropriated by
poorer relatives. He receives no rent and no crops, because his standard of living is so much higher than
his relatives in the village. In principle, he could return and reclaim the land. "I would be given it." However,
he does not believe he would ever do so. He has a house of his own in Kabul - a house that he first rented
from the government as a civil servant on the condition that if he paid the value of 40 years' rent, he would
obtain an ownership certificate. He has made the required payments and now has a document for the land.
The property is very valuable today. If he decided to return to Kunduz, he could buy a whole new farm just
from renting out his house in Kabul. "I would not need even to sell it," he said. [Mir Ahmad, Kabul]
Leaving land to tenants
Mahmood's father moved to Kabul in 1976, leaving his land under the care of tenants. These tenants were
then given the land during the revolution in 1978.
"Even though I could reclaim my father's land, what would I do with it? I was born in the city and I want to
work in the city. I do not want to live in the village or be a farmer. I could take the land from the tenants
through the courts because now all land is being returned to owners. But I would have to let the land out
again, and people in the village would be angry that I had taken the land from one group of families and
given it to others. Or, I could make the tenants pay for the land. But I know they have little money, as each
one only has a small share of the farm."
 [Mahmood, Kabul].
The limits of subdivision
"Our village has 75 households in five sub-villages. Our fathers have been here for several centuries. They
began as just two families. The way in which land is owned has never changed. Most people have no land,
and they farm for others as sharecroppers. Forty of the 75 households live as sharecroppers. We also have
eight Hazara families here who have no land and work as labourers. There are no large farms here. When
the communists wanted to redistribute land there was nothing to distribute here. Our biggest problem is
land shortage. My own farm has been subdivided down to 100 square metres. From my point of view, I do
not have land. Our children have to leave and work in the cities. Among my brothers, one is in Peshawar,
one in Paktya, two in London and one is working for DACAAR in the village. Only one brother is looking after
the land. Ninety percent of the village is like this. From this village alone 26 sons are in London. "We grow
food and vines to support ourselves but our children send us money to buy clothes and build canals."
[Bidmoskh Village, Hajamari district, Ghazni]
214 Figures published in September report that more than half have “returned” to Kabul (600,000) and Nangarhar (300,000)
[UNHCR 2002b].
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form of the 1978 decree against usury.
Living on borrowed assets or money and sinking
further into debt appears to be a widespread
trend, affecting a very large number of people.
How far charity or finding petty
employment may bring landless
and near-landless families out
of destitution is not yet known.
It may be a good deal less than
hoped. Labour is still heavily
preoccupied with farming in
order simply to gain a share of
food. Selling eggs and other
minor items, collecting grass,
water and herbs and even
making carpets, do not show
signs of improving the
livelihoods of the very poor.215
Instability and Ambiguity
Given that many Afghans have been away from
their homes and farms for sometimes a generation,
instability and ambiguity in land relations on their
return may be expected. Even if a refugee
possessed a farm and returns to find it intact and
unoccupied, he (or his children) will face problems
applying the asset base to a much-enlarged family
membership. As monitoring of returnees improves,
the dimensions of the problem will become
clearer.216 Internal displacement of whole
communities further disturbs land relations and
heightens insecurity among occupants, who know
from the experience of neighbouring communities,
districts or provinces that neither documents nor
officialdom will be able to secure their property
in the face of warlord vandalism, and/or ethnic
resentment. How many people have been
displaced and on what grounds are also not yet
known. UNHCR and the
government have recognised
that more local-level return
commissions are necessary to
help returnees re-establish
viable land and living
arrangements.217  Predictably,
the north, where tensions are
among the most severe, is the
site of the one of the first of
these commissions.
What is known is that the depth
and extent of tenure failure is
a good deal greater than assumed — a fact that
helps to explain the inattention to such matters
in the administration's plans or budgets. This
tenure failure seems to reach deep into rural
areas. Even in quiet communities that have seen
almost no violence over the last 24 years and
have not endured co-option by land-grabbing
leaders, the instability of the last decade has
stirred old grievances. These may go beyond
ethnic divides, such as is described in Box 18.
Lawlessness exacerbates this insecurity. The
significance of the few cases where the state or
its agents in the provinces and districts or the
courts have successfully resolved disputes and
215 Allen op. cit., Bhatia & Goodhand op. cit., Lautze et al. op. cit., Pain & Goodhand op. cit., Pain op. cit.
216 UNHCR’s returnee monitoring in particular is expected to yield interesting data. How far the ATA’s own inspectorate system
around the country is providing information is not known.
217 Pers. comm. A. Tyler, UNHCR, Kabul.
Box 18: Unsettled Relations in Villages
"We have been in this area for two centuries. But we only have documents from the time of Amanullah.
He returned the land to us that his own grandfather, King Abdur Rahman, had taken and given to two families
from other places. That was 120 years ago. When we got the land back, we got signed documents, saying
the land belonged to our grandfather, not to theirs. However, later the outsiders got their land back again
under the last Shah. They got the land registered as their own land in 1960s. Those outsiders are Pashtun
and they were given one-sixth of our land. We are also Pashtun, but we are not related. They came from
Warna on the border in no-man's land. Today those households number eight with many members. They
expand their land on that side of the river. We are not happy with them being here. This is not their land.
We want them to go away. We will never be happy until they leave."
[Bidmoskh Village, Hajamari District, Ghazni]
Internal displacement of whole
communities further disturbs land
relations and heightens insecurity
among occupants, who know from
the experience of neighbouring
communities, districts or
provinces that neither documents
nor officialdom will be able to
secure their property in the face
of warlord vandalism, and/or
ethnic resent-ment.
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 65
Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistanhelped people recover their lands cannot be
overrated.
CHALLENGES
A general finding of this study is that long years
of misdirected policy have entrenched, rather
than improved, deeply inequitable and often
unjust land ownership relations among tribes,
between agricultural and pastoral systems and
among feudally-arranged classes of society.
Attempts to remedy these have been poorly
executed. The question facing the new
administration is whether to ignore unsatisfactory
and conflict-ridden land relations and hope that
they will resolve themselves through increased
employment and urbanisation, or to deal with
the issues directly - and if the latter, then how?
What route can promise success without breeding
conflict? And what will constitute success? Will
the restoration of land ownership patterns to
those of 1978 be enough, or will it only paint a
veneer of stability over an unsound foundation?
Is it possible to achieve real tenure security
without change in the relations between landlord
and tenant, pastoralist and settled farmer, Pashtun
and Hazara? Is it possible to achieve lasting peace
without tackling the various disorders in land
relations? How far are stable land tenure relations
a determinant of stability overall?
1. Putting Land Relations on the Agenda
There are signs that both the ATA and the
international community are recognising that
disorder in land relations cannot entirely be
ignored, if peace and stability - let alone socio-
economic transformation - are to come about. As
described in the previous chapter, the
administration is making tentative moves in this
direction, as are supporting agencies, at least in
In looking to ways forward, a host of difficult questions arise...
• How may matters of rural tenure be addressed where warlords are in control?
• How important is restitution to pre-war conditions and will this solve the problem?
• How may questions of tenure security be tackled without risking more conflict?
• How may the traditional disparities in land interests of arable and pastoral societies be
balanced?
• Could the promotion of land rights be a workable route to gender equity?
• Will the planned policies offered by the administration thus far, such as registration and
entitlement, meet the need for tenure security?
• Should the mortgaging of rural land be promoted, or should other ways of securing loans be
explored?
• How will the current drive to open Afghanistan to foreign investment affect rural land relations?
What needs planning for?
• What may be learned from past experience in the use of land tax to levy much-needed
revenue?
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matters.
2. Developing a Sound Legal Basis for Land
Rights Management
The legal issues facing law as a whole in
Afghanistan are immense, and extend into matters
of the nature and source of
law itself. This involves, for
example, not only the need for
definition as to the relative
role and authority of
customary, statutory and
religious law, but clarity in
identifying which sources of
religious law are to apply and
when. These are in themselves
fundamental constitutional and judicial
development issues, elements of which have been
periodically revisited in Afghanistan's history.
They are matters that will surely exercise the
minds of jurists mandated to define the judicial
matters of restitution. The UN Centre for Human
Settlements (UNCHS- Habitat), for example, now
recognises resolution of property rights as essential
to rehabilitation of Kabul City and has begun the
process with an investigation into the legal norms.
FAO's agricultural projects, some of which have
operated throughout the conflicts of the past 24
years, are beginning to turn their attention to
the tenure constraints that
impede local development.218
Through return commissions,
UNHCR is opening routes
through which issues of tenure
may be locally addressed. Even
during the month of October
2002, this author noted new
acknowledgement within the
assistance community that
instability in land rights may well be helping to
sustain disorder and delay recovery. Arguably,
"land tenure" is slowly now becoming part of the
public agenda. It is both timely and necessary to
formulate a more explicit and comprehensive
• Are definitions of government land changing in the right direction? How adequate are the
constructions for pastureland and commons?
• Is the law good enough for ordering land relations in a consistent and fair way? What are the
implications for using religious law to resolve land disputes? And which school of religious
law?
• How do urban and rural tenure issues relate and do they need to be treated separately? Could
there be mileage in focusing on urban problems first?
• How real is the problem of farm fragmentation and when should the state step in, if at all?
How should severe under-capacity in government be dealt with? Will capacity building be
enough, or must other ways forward be found? How many tenure problems will the state be
able to resolve anyway?  What should be its role in the short and longer term?
... including the larger questions:
• Is peace conditional to restoration of stability in land relations? Or is such restoration a
prerequisite to peace?
• How may urgency/expediency be balanced with longer-term needs for transformation?
• May ethnic concerns be addressed separately from tenure concerns?
• How may land rights ever be equitable where there is such pressing land shortage?
• Do restitution issues need to be treated separately from reconstruction and equity issues?
• Is promotion of land rights a workable route to social transformation?
218 For example, the earlier-mentioned Nangarhar Agricultural Development Authority’s 30,000 ha. estate, where it is being
recognised that a crucial decision that needs to be made to determine the future of production in the area, is the tenurial
basis on which that land is held or distributed [pers. comm. D. Davis FAO]. Another FAO-supported programme, the
Development of Sustainable Agricultural Livelihoods in Eastern Hazarajat, has recently deemed land relations a key activity
for moving forward [pers. comm. D. Hitchcock FAO].
Though constitutional principles
would not alone amount to reso-
lution, the formality and inclusive-
ness of the constitutional process
would help identify the routes
and means through which
resolution may evolve.
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may be addressed. There is also a discernible
divide between the political and executive arms
of state overall (and quite aside from the
relationships with the judiciary). Cabinet members
have brought land recovery issues into a court-
bound process, and, in particular, have taken
legal and practical steps to reclaim government
properties.  Policy makers, attempting to lay out
a framework for the future development of the
state, have settled on registration of landholding
as one of the pre-conditions of an investment-
friendly environment. As outlined later, this may
prove to be an in-effective plan. More important
for the moment, these different agenda need
integration into a single and consistent strategic
vision as to how land rights should be ordered,
governed and sustained in the future.
4. Learning From International Experience
Unfortunately, international experience in
resolving deep-rooted property rights issues is
quite limited. Even where peacekeeping has
moved into peace-building initiatives along UN
coordinated lines (of which UNAMA is a current
example), its ability to address anything beyond
immediate priorities has generally been deficient.
Efforts in Rwanda, Burundi, Kosovo, Sierra Leone
and East Timor, among others, have allegedly
been at once late, halting and insufficiently
professional in technical support, or thorough
enough in analysis to offer lasting ways forward
in matters of property.219
Though some useful elements have come out of
these experiences,220 it is unclear that their more
fundamental lessons have been absorbed. Such
lessons include evidence that the conventional
strategy of first helping people
recover lost property and only
then addressing the problems
associated with land
ownership, though logically
appealing, may be flawed.221
That is, while returning people
environment. Working in the abstract may not be
easy however. Land ownership matters could
provide a very concrete arena for such legal issues
to be worked out. Every encouragement should
be given to the independent Judicial Commission
to consider the legal and judicial requirements
needed to support tenure security.
It has also been observed that the forthcoming
constitution-making process could - and perhaps
should - be a route through which deep-rooted
contentions over land access are publicly laid out
and explored. Though constitutional principles
would not alone amount to resolution, the
formality and inclusiveness of the constitutional
process could help identify the routes and means
through which resolution may evolve. Because
many of the issues are too deeply rooted in
principles of human rights and justice, attempts
to block matters of tenure from the constitutional
agenda would be unproductive. Nonetheless, how
to guide this process must be carefully considered
and the issues involved handled with care.
Exploring land rights through constitution-making
is a journey upon which several post-conflict
states have already been forced to embark, as
they recognize the extent to which land ownership
and how it is distributed and governed becomes
integral to the construction of a democratic,
modern, agrarian society.  Afghans should
therefore expect the next constitution to break
ranks with the past and develop a solid chapter
on land rights.
3. Identifying Institutional Responsibility
However, the building blocks towards such
decision-making are still to be put in place. Each
ministry's vision - to the extent
that a vision exists - currently
focuses on its own sectoral
interests. No single ministry
has taken on land tenure issues
or offered a concrete
institutional framework
219 See Fitzpatrick 2002 and the plethora of papers on different situations he refers to at www.unhcr.ch/refworld/pubs/ and
www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs.
220 As evidenced in the establishment of a Rule of Law Team within UNAMA.
221 The fact that nearly a decade after the ending of apartheid in South Africa, for example, the government is still unable
to find a satisfactory way forward to restore the land rights of 14 million residents in the ex-homelands, is salutary. The
questions that are proving most difficult to answer are simply these: restore land to whom exactly, on what terms, and
sustained through what kind of system, and with what impact upon those to whom the land is not restored? These have
raised yet more complex matters, such as the relationship of chiefs with their subjects with respect to land ownership,
contrary norms among customary and European-derived systems, the different history of occupants in the area, some being
indigenous and others forcibly settled in those areas. While far removed from the difficulties being faced in Afghanistan,
the echoes of commonality are ominously familiar.
While returning people to their
homes should be a priority, it may
prove futile if it merely
regenerates the problems of the
past.
Issues Paper Series
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 685. Locating Restitution Within Reconciliation
In practical terms, the above suggests that first,
conventional selection of a cut-off date may not
be sufficient in itself to guide lasting restitution,
particularly where ethnic differences are involved.
Second, it is apparent that the restitution process
itself may be better reconstructed as a process
of reconciliation, within which contesting parties
are able to bring their concerns to the table with
a view to resolving these once and for all. The
impossibility of honouring all interests will become
apparent to all those involved. Compromises will
be become more obviously necessary. In some
cases, the classical route of paying compensation
to those whose rights cannot be met through
restitution will be workable. So far Afghanistan's
budget plans provide no such line item, and yet
it could prove to be one of the most valuable
expenditures. Third, experiences elsewhere also
suggest that the building of detailed pathways
and parameters to land conflict resolution is
crucial, and could provide the substance of new
and improved law.
More general tenure development issues would
in addition come into better focus through such
an integrated restitution and reconstruction
approach. A simple example is the need for greater
clarity in the way in which potential arable lands
are defined vis-à-vis pasture, and the need to
develop more efficient ownership norms for
pastureland.  This links directly with a broader
need for clear policy-making, such as in deciding
how far investment in the expansion of the arable
and pastoral sectors will be balanced.
6. Moving Beyond the Farm
A related issue is the need to clarify the distinction
between local-public and national-public
properties, particularly as they affect the interface
of land rights of settled and mobile peoples. How
to structure and tenure local public lands, or
commons, is an issue that many nations are
to their homes should be a priority, it will prove
futile if this only serves to regenerate the problems
of the past. While this seems common sense,
opportunistic interventions have repeated
themselves around the world, failing to solve the
fundamental land conflicts that contributed (or
even caused) displacement or instability in the
first place. Instead, a new layer of "wrongful"
occupation may result which promises that conflict
will surely re-emerge.
Examples of this may be seen in Kosovo and
Bosnia, but the case of East Timor is particularly
instructive for Afghanistan.222 Initially, the UN
Transitional Authority in East Timor assumed that
its main task was to help those who owned
property prior to the civil war in 1999 to reoccupy
their homes and lands. Interim, unlawful
occupation of houses posed the largest problem,
particularly as some of the occupants had sold
the land to others. In practice, older land
grievances were reignited, with as many as five
claimants demanding the same land: the current
occupant who paid for the property in 2000/01,
the occupant prior to the civil war in 1999,
indigenous interests displaced through colonial
occupation and holders of titles issued in both
the Portuguese and Indonesian eras.223
In such situations, governments (and lawyers and
law) must decide how each level of "legal"
acquisition should be regarded. The unravelling
of what is (often ethnically) discriminatory history
is a messy but ultimately essential element of
effective restitution. In the process, new
administrations are in addition forced to make
fundamental decisions as to the kind of society
to be reconstructed, such as what constitutes
"equity," whose rights or interests are to be "more
equal" than others. This takes land tenure
development well beyond the remedial steps
originally envisaged as necessary. This is tiresome,
difficult - and involves fundamental political
decisions. But it can hardly be avoided if real
progress is to be made.224
222 As described by Fitzpatrick 2002.
223 See Fitzpatrick op. cit. An attempt to avoid similar issues of overlapping rights led the Rwandan government to limit
restitution rights to more recent refugees. But in promising land from its own resources, the Rwandan government has
not permitted the conversion of most of its game parks and forests to settlement areas, with drastic environmental effects
[Government of Rwanda 2002].
224 It might be noted here that restitution developments are found much closer to home, in many of the states of the former
Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe; e.g. in Estonia, Bulgaria, Albania. Versions of restitution and redistribution operate
in Armenia, Georgia, Moldavia and some parts of Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan. However in all these states, the restitution
is largely from state to people, or from collectives to individual owners, essentially privatisation processes, and very
different from those being looked to in Afghanistan.
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Afghanistan, many countries
have seen local commons
appropriated by national
governments on the assumption
that they are un-owned lands,
or too broadly owned to be
viewed as private property.
Today, however, there is a declining emphasis
on individualisation as the only route through
which private property may be expressed, and
growing awareness of the enormous potential of
group-owned properties. This is manifesting in
two related developments, 1) adjustments in the
function of the state by reducing its property-
owning roles wherever possible and particularly
at local levels; and 2) acknowledging a new respect
for customary norms of land ownership, including
customary mechanisms for holding property like
swamps, pasture and forests in common.225 Two
main results have been the provision of new
tenure norms to allow for group-owned private
property,226 and clearer and more formal
arrangements to allow different (e.g. seasonal)
interests in the same land to co-exist. There is
much in these developments that could prove
useful to the handling of pasture tenure in
Afghanistan, and at the same time, help move
conceptions as to distinctions in government,
public and common land further forward.
7. Taking Community-Based Approaches
Seriously
This brings us to the core of a likely way forward:
to create institutional
approaches to land conflict
resolution and tenure
management that build upon
community-based development
initiatives. A commitment to
community-based approaches
is broadly hinted at in emerging
policy documents, but so far
shows little evidence of being
seriously pursued. Instead, the
government's fallback position
is trickle-down financing and
institution building; this not
only makes nonsense of
bottom-up approaches, but
also helps to preclude their
evolution. There are host of
reasons that may explain this:
the brief experience of the new administration;
the very real manpower/capacity disability in the
central administration and its provincial and
district arms; a preference to wait for the outcome
and directives of a constitutional jirga prior to
developing locally-elected government institutions;
an understandable distaste for the regimes of
many un-appointed warlords at the local level;
and fear of provoking more disorder. Or it may
simply be the case that the expressed commitment
to community-based approaches is but an echo
of an international aid mantra, without absorption
of the implications for how business is best done
in bottom-up development. In any event, the
central state is preoccupied with establishing its
own authority within the country as part of the
commitment to restoring order. Encouraging local
level governance is not high on the agenda, even
though this could provide one route to more
secure local conditions, not least because it
involves ordinary Afghans in the peace-building
initiative as actors rather than beneficiaries. Even
in settled times, states often have difficulty
knowing when to let go, when the burden of
decision making would be more fruitfully shared
with the ordinary citizenry and dealt with by
them at the periphery.
The handling of tenure
problems so far reflects this
difficulty.227 That communities
do exist and have the capacity
to govern their land relations
cannot be doubted. This is a
fact demonstrated on an
ongoing basis, particularly by
non-government agencies,
which often have no
225 Forests, and their ownership, are proving to be a main arena of practical developments. See FAO 2002 and Alden Wily 2001.
226 That is “commonhold,” in contrast to individual forms, such as conventionally implied in freehold and leasehold. See Alden
Wily 2001 for an exposition of the case in reference to African commons. See the digital library on commons development
http://dlc/dlib/indiana.edu.
227 Periodic armed intervention to enforce government land decisions (as demonstrated in the  recent involvement in November
2002 of American forces in a land dispute involving Kuchi in Kikara Village near Khost) may have a function, and certainly
reassures a querulous population that the central state may have teeth.  In reality, however, even these interventions
may need more force to be sustained, and at the end of the day require the kind of reconciliation at the local level
suggested above.
There is a need to clarify the
distinction between local-public
and national-public properties,
particularly as they affect the
interface of land rights of settled
and mobile peoples.
It may simply be the case that
the expressed commitment to
community-based approaches is
but an echo of an international
aid mantra, without absorption
of the implications for how
business is best done in bottom-
up development.
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community members. The challenge they seem
to face is less about local capacity to organise
and act than enabling local decision-making to
occur in more inclusive environments. It is still
the case, for example, that women remain largely
invisible in local-level shura. Ensuring that the
poor and very poor (sometimes the majority in a
community) are represented also remains a
challenge. Notably, the general experience of
NGOs in Afghanistan at this time is that
incremental progress can be made — at the local
level and within the context of practical
developments.228
It is therefore timely to consider piloting practical
dispute resolution at the local level, with a view
to resolving the cases
themselves, and also
accumulating norms that may,
in turn, fashion workable policy
and law. Such "learning by
doing" could lead to
community-based tenure
management systems.
Helpfully, Afghan society appears to already have
a socio-spatial basis in manteqa that could be a
viable spatial framework. manteqa — meaning
area or location — usually refers to a cluster of
related village communities that work together,
make decisions or operate in some way as a single
unit. Members of a manteqa know the social and
territorial limits of the unit. These areas and their
populations are workable as operational units to
the extent that a range of social linkages and
events already define its natural boundaries.
Within this manageable context, the full range
of local property issues could be addressed,
including land tenure administration itself.
8. Keeping Equity on the
Rural Land Agenda
Also at issue are the troubling
questions of fair distribution
of arable land. Realistically,
new Afghan administrations
are unlikely to be able to avoid
this issue any more than those
have before them. Hopes that
the problems of landlessness will go away or sort
themselves out through market forces, growth
and urbanisation are optimistic. This is especially
so given that involuntary landlessness shows signs
of increasing rather than declining. The fact that
landlessness has become even more tied to
destitution adds to the urgency for governance
systems to address, rather than avoid, the
situation. And whatever decisions about land
tenure policy are made, they are likely to impact
and govern land distribution as well.
9. Learning From the Past
A main objective of this preliminary review has
been to discover how land relations have been
managed in the past in Afghanistan. As was
discussed in previous chapters,
issues of equity have been at
the heart of decision-making
over the last 30 or so years,
alongside the equally crucial
management of arable-pastoral
and inter-ethnic land relations.
There is nothing novel about
a modern government deciding or being forced
to tackle how agricultural land is distributed.229
The Afghan experience tells us, however, that
lessons of local history need to be learned:  that
the forced redistribution of land is unlikely to be
a lasting solution and could contribute to war and
instability, even where the beneficiaries are the
majority. What is less certain is how far formal
encouragement towards equity, in the form of
compulsory but indirect measures, may be an
acceptable route.
Previous attempts of the latter have been seen
in President Daoud's use of land ownership ceilings
and the compulsory sale of the
excess to the state, alongside
progressive taxation on the
basis of farm size. Neither
strategy had the opportunity
to be fully tested, so the jury
is still out as to how effective
they would be if large
landholdings emerged as being
considerably fewer in number
than originally assumed.
228 Based on discussions with CARE, the Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAAR) and the Afghanistan Development
Association (ADA).
229 This has preoccupied governments as far apart as Japan, Philippines, Mexico and South Africa. See The World Bank 1975,
Binswanger & Deininger 1995, World Bank 2002.
The forced redistribution of land
is unlikely to be a lasting solution
and could contribute to war and
instability, even where the
beneficiaries are the majority.
Hopes that the problems of
landlessness will go away or sort
themselves out through market
forces, growth and urbanisation
are optimistic. This is especially
so given that involuntary
landlessness shows signs of
increasing rather than declining.
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suggest, however, that neither ceilings (as long
as the excess will be paid for), nor progressive
land taxation, were an anathema to those most
affected (the larger landholders). Other typical
strategies, such as the banning of informal sector
money lending for farming to limit chronic
indebtedness, confronted important structural as
well as policy problems. There have also been
(mild) efforts to limit land hoarding by, for
example, requiring properties that remain
underdeveloped after distribution to revert to
government (a strategy which remains policy
today). All these strategies deserve further
examination, and particularly those that relate
to taxation. Widespread taxation, at some level,
will have to be restarted as
part of state development and
support.
As observed above, Afghanistan
has not been alone in facing
inter-tribal, agro-pastoral or
internally over-stratified land
relations, within which a substantial number of
citizens live in poverty and dependency on others.
During the 1960s-1970s, for example, when reforms
were taking place in Afghanistan, many other
states around the world were involved in similar
exercises.230 Much may be learned from these
experiences.231 Since then, particularly beginning
in the 1990s, there has been a new wave of land
reform worldwide that is trying to find more
fruitful ways forward.232 The current wave of
reform involves more than 50 countries.233
10. Equity For Growth, Not Instead of Growth
Today, land reform worldwide is less driven by
redistribution objectives as it was in the past.234
What is driving current policy formation is an
interest in making land more easily and securely
available to foreign investors.235 However, issues
of distribution inevitably arise, and routes towards
more equal holdings in the agricultural sector, or
at least actions to minimise further polarisation
in the amount of land owned, ultimately become
quite prominent.236 This may be illustrated in
the menu of actions being pursued today, such
as introduction of laws to protect mortgagors
from unfair foreclosure; promotion of credit access
without using land as collateral and risking land
loss; protection of the rights
of family members from
eviction and forced land sales;
restrictions on the
transferability of land in
general, save through listed
market procedures; imposition
of land ceilings and stronger
development conditions to limit growth in large
estates, land hoarding and speculation;
development of land workers' rights charters,
protecting access to farmland and their housing;
rental restrictions; and introduction of regulations
prescribing how crop shares are determined and
implemented. As in the past, promotion of
cooperatives and other forms of farmer
associations to facilitate market access are also
quite prominent.237
230 Iran’s White Revolution is the closest example in the region. The land reforms of Japan, Taiwan and Korea are generally
considered the most successful (The World Bank 2002). Other reforms were underway in this period in Bolivia, Mexico,
Chile, Brazil, Guatemala, Ecuador, China, Cuba, Philippines and Kenya. Regrettably there are few comprehensive overviews,
but see World Bank 2002 for a useful bibliography of mainly country studies.
231 For example, many countries have experimented with imposition of ceilings, still a norm in Africa (see Alden Wily & Mbaya
op. cit.) and less successful in Asia (Korea, Japan, Philippines, see World Bank 2002).  India’s experience is particularly
useful in respect of limiting mortgaging and more general tenancy reforms (Appu 1997).
232 This is supposedly the intention, for example, of The World Bank’s recent effort to bring together a state- of-the-art
analysis of land tenure policy (World Bank 2002). For the World Bank’s own shifting positions as a lead donor and a main
supporter of agrarian tenure reforms, see The World Bank 1975, Binswanger & Deininger op cit. and The World Bank 2002.
233 Readers may find the land policy section on the World Bank’s website (www.worldbank.org/landpolicy) a useful shortcut
for finding many Bank and non-Bank papers on international land policies.  Of particular note are the resources under the
heading “Regional Workshops on Land Issues,” which include hundreds of up-to-date descriptions and 33 country status
papers.
234 Save where it is integral to restitution as is the case in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia in Africa, and in most Central
and Eastern European countries, following the ending of communism/collective agriculture. Hungary and Romania have
made more specific efforts to redistribute land more evenly at the same time as restoring ownership.
235 See, for example, the case of Africa in Alden Wily 2001.
236 Perhaps there is no clearer indicator of the extent to which equity remains in the land tenure development equation than
in the naming of the current World Bank policy development, - “Land Policy for pro-poor growth and development.” [The
World Bank 2002].
237 The World Bank 2002.
What is driving current policy
formation is an interest in making
land more easily and securely
available to foreign investors.
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tenure development strategies yet offered by the
ATA, as expressed within the
draft NDF. Broadly, this follo-
wed the advice given by the
Asian Development Bank towards
establishment of a "nationwide
registry" to "allow for the use
of land as collateral for
entrepreneurial activities."240
The use of farmland as
collateral may be addressed
first. The need for credit in
farming cannot be disputed.
The use of the farm as the basis of that credit
may be queried. This is particularly so where the
credit gained through using the farm as collateral
results not in the improvement of the productive
asset and livelihood, but has a widespread effect
of pushing at least the very poor into sometimes
irrevocable destitution and landlessness. In such
circumstances, planners have a duty to find more
effective means through which poorer farmers
may access credit. These days, more and more
banks are less willing than in the past to offer
loans on this basis, holding the use of a poor
family's primary source of survival and shelter
(farm and housing) as collateral as unsafe (as well
as  morally questionable).241 Even with respect
to larger properties, restrictions on foreclosure
are now common.242 Restricting informal money
lending has also been shown to have its limits as
in the case of the usury decree of 1978. The need
to promote the availability of reliable, equitable
and repayable credit schemes
in rural areas, would seem to
be a more useful policy
direction than seeking to
improve the credit-worthiness
of the small farm.243
Research drawn together by
The World Bank also shows that
small landowners have almost
never benefited from the
11. Keeping an Eye on the Land Security Needs
of Women
There are also significant
innovations in land policy and
the evolution of a range of
concrete actions coming from
previously unlikely sectors, such
as from domestic land
relations, and particularly
related to the land rights of
women.238 These are most
prominent where women are
acknowledged as the major
force of agricultural
production, the case in most African, Asian and
Latin American states.239 The argument is simple:
there is no incentive for labour - in this case
women's labour - to increase or modernise
production without part-ownership of the means
of production. Receiving a share in the fruits of
production (in the family standard of living) is
not enough for serious investment by women in
the farm. This kind of argument might not resonate
with Afghan women where their role in farming
or livestock maintenance is generally uncalculated
and constrained by socio-cultural norms that
prevent them being visibly active on the farm. It
is too early to suggest direct reforms in rural
gender land relations. Nonetheless, the new
administration should be aware that improvement
in the land security of women could present one
of the important routes eventually towards
improved land relations overall and to be vigilant
in providing support in this area as needs arise.
Currently, these appear to
centre upon assuring widows
of their land rights.
12. Putting Registration in
Perspective
Finally, it is necessary to
consider the matter of
registration and entitlement,
238 For example, from new requirements that land sales may not take place without the written permission of spouses, from
stronger gender proportional representation in applications for settlement places, from laws that prevent the sale of land
on which spouses and children are dependent, provisions for co-ownership of primary houses and farms, etc. See FAO 2002,
Alden Wily & Mbaya op. cit.
239 Agarwal 1994, Yngstrom 2002, Ovonji-Odida et al. 2000.
240 GoA 2002a.
241 Alden Wily & Mbaya op. cit., The World Bank 2002.
242 Foreclosure, as conventionally understood, has been eliminated in most British commonwealth law countries, for example.
243 Several NGOs are apparently successfully developing fair credit extension programmes as part of their development effort.
One is ACTED, which operates credit for house building and farm re-cultivation in Parwan Province.
The need to promote the avail-
ability of reliable, equitable and
repayable credit schemes in rural
areas, would seem to be a more
useful policy direction than
seeking to improve the credit-
worthiness of the small farm.
There is no incentive for labour
- in this case women’s labour - to
increase or modernise production
without part-ownership of the
means of production. Receiving
a share in the fruits of production
(in the family standard of living)
is not enough for serious
investment by women in the farm.
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 73
Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in AfghanistanOther problems associated with conventional
registration and entitlement programmes that
limit their efficacy as a means of enhancing tenure
security.250 These are :
1. Significant land rights are usually lost in the
registration process. This has been because
classical registration has encouraged (and
sometimes enforced) individualisation of
commons and the elimination of seasonal or
other secondary rights from the registration.
This has proven especially detrimental to the
poor, who often share land access to swamps,
forests and pastures. A related trend has been
the dispossession of all but the privileged
household head, through the registration of
an individual in the register and on the
certificate of title. Women and family
members have been the most affected.
2. Registration exercises as a whole tend to
focus on arable rural lands, placing pastoral
rights in a yet weaker position.
3.  Where registration has been used as a tax
register, there is widespread deceit as to
number of plots owned and especially their
estimated size. In this respect, identification
of owners and their registration based upon
already mapped plots has had enormous
advantages, given that unclaimed plots
become registered as belonging to the state.
4. All too often, registers themselves cease to
have meaning, where title deeds are rarely
issued or collected and where transactions
take place outside of the register. Often
the register gets massively out of date and
the picture it provides becomes increasingly
removed from reality. The less the register
may be relied upon the less legitimate it
becomes. Its fundamental claim to represent
a reliable source of ownership is seriously
damaged.
credit-supply effect of holding a land title, though
there is just as much evidence that larger
landowners have.244 There is also the question
as to what extent possessing land titles should
be a requirement for lending. In conditions where
registers have proved less than reliable as evidence
of current ownership, a document that provides
testimony from local leaders and neighbours to
the effect that the occupant is the owner of the
property may be more persuasive.
There are many related questions and problems
about the utility and cost-effectiveness of
registration as a route to tenure security.245
Registration programmes are rarely ever
completed. Titling is still underway in many first-
world states, and where it has been launched in
developing countries, it is moving even more
slowly.246  For example, the much-admired titling
programme of Thailand has continued for 30
years,247 and after 50 years of titling in Kenya,
more than half the land area has still not been
registered.248 Costs run into the billions.
Time delays and costs are worst where the register
is cadastrally-based, that is when each parcel of
land is identified by named area location and plot
number as well as tied to map references.  This
is to indisputably link the register and the deed
of title. The assumption is that the exact
boundaries of a farm cannot be safely determined
without mapped references. However, this ignores
local reality, where the determination of mapped
boundaries will generally be a matter of local
testimony (unless the owner holds a Geographical
Positioning System (GPS) and is able to relocate
the boundary through taking new readings). As a
result, clear distinction is beginning to be drawn
between the importance of recorded land
interests, and the adoption of heavily bureaucratic
and costly centralised systems, especially those
that are based upon mapping.249
244 The World Bank 2002.
245 The literature on this is enormous. The issues are fairly well covered among the collected papers of regional workshops
on land policy matters held under the leadership of the World Bank in 2001/02.  Refer again to www.worldbank.org/landpolicy/
and also The World Bank 2002.
246 Less than 10 percent of the world’s farmed area is titled. Under one percent of the African continent is yet subject to
surveyed entitlement [Augustinus 2003].
247 Haldrup 2002.
248 Alden Wily & Mbaya op. cit.
249 De Soto’s work is considered seminal on the relevance of recordation and entitlement in enabling peasant farmers to turn
their land into live capital, but emphasising the need for the systems to be cheap, simple and accessible [De Soto 2000].
250 See Alden Wily & Mbaya op. cit., The World Bank 2002.
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cadastre has rendered it inaccessible,
expensive and not well used.
6. The registers themselves have often been
corrupted. Illegal changes are made and false
deeds are produced that contradict the record
of the register.
The Afghan case
Most of the above resonates with Afghanistan's
own experience. During the national registration
programme launched in the 1960s, the government
was unable to complete registration even after
years of significant time, financial and manpower
investment. At the time, fewer than half of Afghan
farmers had their farms registered, and through
population growth, inheritance and transactions,
the proportion of registered holdings will be less
today. The conventional focus on arable — as
opposed to pastoral — land entitlement and the
registration of pasture as simply "government
land" helped to widen the already prominent
inequities in land ownership. How far the poor
and very poor were excluded as owners, is not
known. Many of those who had mortgaged their
land may have found that their creditors were
noted as the owners of the farm.
However, some modifications that the Afghan
government was able to make to its registration
effort in the 1960s are more positive. These
included abandoning the establishment of a
cadastral-based register in order to reduce costs
and to speed up the process, the abandonment
of early plans to issue a title deed for each
registered property and to instead make
documentation the responsibility of the occupant,
and the decentralisation of the register to the
provincial level.
These changes seemed sensible. The need for
each owned land parcel to be precisely surveyed,
mapped and its coordinates recorded is largely
unnecessary in Afghanistan. Most farm boundaries
are visible, stable and permanently marked, and
those that are less well marked, such as rain-fed
farms, are known by those to whom it matters —
the owner, neighbours and community members
who may be called upon to determine whether
or not the boundary has been moved.251 The
utility to owners of receiving certificates that
describe their land in terms of coordinates is also
dubious;252 re-locating boundaries through this
means generally requires a surveyor. With new
and speedy use of GPS for this task, the accepted
range of inaccuracy of several metres may render
the readings useless where farms include only a
handful of jeribs, or where it is precisely within
the space of a few metres that an ownership
dispute exists. Falling back on traditional
descriptions of boundaries and using neighbours
and local leaders as witnesses seems
commonsense. What is lost is accuracy in the
measured size of the plot, but this is relevant to
taxation only where the bands of tax grades are
so close that a difference of one jerib makes a
difference to the tax amount owed. Such taxation
policy is in itself a questionable strategy, given
that it doubles the amount of calculations and
impacts the smaller rather than larger landholder.
Making the register more accessible
The land register in Afghanistan is not a single
document, but a compilation of 5,502 distinct
books of ownership and taxation. Three copies
of these books were made. One copy remained,
and still remains, under tight security in Kabul.
Like many land registers, it is unsullied by the
multitudes of transactions (including disposition
to heirs) affecting the properties that the books
record. This means that the register has died; it
is not a live and active record of exactly what
has happened to each property. Those listed as
owners may not be the current owners. The whole
purpose of registration is defeated.
This may also be the case with the second and
third copies of the register. One set was sent to
the 17 geodesy & cartography offices in the
provinces, many of which were destroyed during
the Soviet occupation and more recent fighting.
A third set was sent to the provinces. Some appear
to have ended up in the provincial or district land
matters office under the Ministry of Agriculture.
Others are held in provincial law offices (arms of
the Ministry of Justice). Still others appear to be
available to the provincial courts. None of the
registers seem to have been updated.
251 De Soto suggested with respect to cases in South America that were similarly afflicted by over-attention to expensive and
unsustainable survey mechanisms, “Listen to the barking dogs — if they know where the boundaries are you can assume
local knowledge” [De Soto op. cit.].
252 See Alden Wily & Mbaya op. cit. for a comment on this experience in a number of African states.
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records.
Recordation lessons
The strategic lessons to be learned here seems
to be that recordation procedures not only need
to be kept simple, cheap and rooted in common
sense - but also local. Accessibility and
accountability to owners themselves is paramount,
and arguably a sure way to ensure integrity in
land records. Community-based tenure
management deserves to be explored. Such an
approach could build on what already exists in
terms of land records from different sources.
Records of current ownership could be built up,
based not upon expensive mapping and survey
but upon recorded testimony and description of
plots. As long as the system is local and locally
managed, it should be relatively easy for all
transactions to be recorded. The extent to which
transactions are recorded may be held as the
ultimate test of the utility of the records. In such
a system, the task of
government would become the
provision of clear technical
guidance, support and
monitoring. This would
highlight the wider need to
rethink the future role of the
state in governance overall. Permitting and
assisting communities to develop such rational
working land ownership administration systems
would contribute significantly to the meaning of
"democratic governance."
Where the courts have acquired, by default, a
host of non-judicial functions in such areas, they
could discard their administration function and
regain their proper function as independent
centres of dispute resolution.
Principles for Moving Forward
Determining how to move forward in the matter
of land rights management must be a priority of
the ATA. The main finding of this preliminary
study has been that attending to land tenure
matters will be time and money well invested,
and may well prove to be one of the more
important stepping stones to lasting peace.
Based on the analysis put forth in this paper,
there are several simple working principles that
may guide the way forward:
Nonetheless, it is in the archives of the courts
that an astounding body of transaction records
do exist. How well these records are ordered is
unclear, but the very fact that court officials are
able to retrieve substantial documents of land
transactions makes it unwise to assume that the
"register" is unusable. How far such records have
lost their integrity (such as by recording false
deeds) is also not known, but such fraud clearly
exists. Nor again is it clear how many registered
landholders have formally recorded changes in
land ownership. Finally, it needs to be
remembered that the majority of farmers did not
have their farmland registered at all. Transaction
by informal and customary means almost certainly
remains dominant for these people and for many
of those whose land is recorded in registers.
A deeply entrenched history of recordation
While questions may reasonably be asked about
the utility (and cost-efficiency) of adopting a
mapped approach to
registration, or even issuing
original certificates of title
against that registration, this
does not necessarily detract
from the usefulness of written
records of land ownership.
Recording land grants, rights and transactions in
Afghanistan dates back to the 1880s. The recording
of rights operates in all tenure systems, including
customary, civil/Shariat and state based laws.
These systems share the practice of using witnesses
— neighbours and local notables — as a way of
evidencing property that was accepted into state
law in the form of Taliban edicts. Even where
people do not record transactions in writing —
largely the poor — the utility of written
documentation appears to be widely
acknowledged. Transactions that have been
implemented more informally, such as those
involving witnesses, appear to have legitimacy.
Such transactions are known and may be referred
to again. This may even help to boost the
legitimacy of official documentation in areas
where the integrity of the register and related
transactions have been compromised by misuse,
including the wrongful or coerced issue of false
deeds by local leaders. When the accuracy of the
register is thus itself threatened, such testimony
Recordation procedures not only
need to be kept simple, cheap
and rooted in common sense – but
also local.
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The ATA has already adopted an incremental
approach to progress in a number of areas; land
tenure should not be an exception. Developing
land policy on a national level will be impossible
in the current environment, as will focusing on
a single issue, or single front. Dealing directly
with a range of real issues on the ground, and at
a local level, will be an effective catalyst for
larger-scale change.
2.  Explore "learning by doing"
There are many issues associated with land
ownership about which it will be hard to find
policy consensus at this time. There are still
others that cannot be determined through policy
development alone. Learning by doing through
concrete, pilot approaches that address local land
relation issues in the field would help identify
the appropriate levels and frameworks for working
out land administration and dispute resolution.
In addition, pilot programmes could explore the
extent to which unformed and inequitable
community-based systems may be usefully
transformed into working land management
institutions.
3.  Build on what exists
The need to avoid reinventing the wheel or
adopting high-cost approaches to improving tenure
security is essential. Again, through pilot
approaches in specific areas, it will be possible
for the ATA, or delegated agencies, to better
explore the nature of land ownership, the extent
to which transaction recordation exists or is still
taking place, the extent to which the information
in original registers is still valid and the usability
and relevance of more informal documentation
of transactions held in village, district and
provincial offices. Such exercises would do a great
deal to inform decision makers about how to
sustain (or not) land ownership registration.  It
would also help policy makers avoid the recurrent
temptation to make big decisions on such
important (and potentially expensive) systems
development without research, practical
information and guidance.
4.  Develop principles of land policy and law
In the interim, there should be a coordinated
effort towards developing principles and objectives
governing the management of land ownership
(policy) and creating carefully considered
legislation (land law). Tinkering with the provisions
of previous administrations, while serviceable to
an extent, will quickly prove insufficient and may
even misdirect, or make impossible, the adoption
of more workable approaches in the future.
Though there may be political preference to avoid
discussion of land tenure issues as part of the
constitutional process, this cannot be avoided.
Taking prompt action to provide well-considered
options to the constitution makers would be
advisable.
5.  Establish an institutional focus
A prerequisite to all the above is a clear and
comprehensive policy-making process, as well as
an institutional foundation for such decisions to
be implemented and sustained. A commission
approach might be necessary in order to
encompass the different interests of different
ministries and actors. While there may be
reluctance to establish yet another independent
commission, a more simply constituted working
group could be created in the first instance, to
map out the kind of issues which need to be
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As highlighted by this preliminary review, there
is still far too much about land tenure in
Afghanistan that is not known.  The need for
further investigation, including collation of existing
knowledge, is considerable. Investigation and
analysis can help guide strategic planning, pilot
programmes and implementation. The AREU has
already taken action to imbue its investigations
into rural livelihoods with mechanisms to track
information about both historical and current
land holding assets of its 600 or so respondents.
A deeper examination of land relations,
particularly of sharecropping and land mortgaging
in strategically selected communities, would add
significantly to understanding transitions at this
stage.253 The territorial history and character of
pastoral hudood also deserves closer examination,
as this could have important implications for
internal pastoral land relations, particularly as
they relate to the pasture rights of settled peoples,
and link directly with the need to rethink how
pasture land is tenured. This research could be
usefully linked and coordinated with the Kuchi
Vulnerability Working Group within MRRD
mentioned earlier. So too could an appropriate
reference group involving key government
ministries be established to gain a better
understanding of the nature of current land
conflicts in priority areas. Taking into account
the emerging difficulties being faced by returnees,
partnership with UNHCR in some of these areas
would be crucial.
Finally, the Geodesy & Cartography Department,
in partnership with AIMS should embark on the
more concrete task of computerising the
information contained in the 5,502 registers as
quickly as possible.  This would happen in parallel
to pilot practical examination of registered and
other documented information suggested above.
Such a listing of original owners could well prove
to be a viable foundation, particularly where
changes in ownership may have largely occurred
within the descendant family. Even if the existing
registers are discarded altogether, the information
they contain represents a very important historical
record as to how land was distributed prior to
the war and conflict of the last 25 years -
something that has yet to be properly analysed.
253 Ideas mentioned here are elaborated in a research concept note that may be requested from AREU.
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1. Introduction
The purpose of the Afghanistan Research and
Evaluation Unit (AREU) is to conduct quality
action-oriented research that will inform policy
and improve practice in order to increase the
accountability and impact of humanitarian and
development programmes for Afghans.
Fundamental to the purpose of the AREU is the
belief that its work should make a difference to
the lives of Afghans and it seeks, therefore, not
just to produce reports but also to be part of a
process of change that will significantly improve
the quality, impact and accountability of assistance
efforts. As part of this effort to produce positive
change, AREU is producing a series of issues papers
to inform policy makers and practitioners and to
stimulate debate on critical topics relating to the
reconstruction and development of Afghanistan.
2. Specific Objectives of the Lands Issues Paper
The Afghanistan Transitional Administration's
National Development Framework (2002) has the
following ambitions with respect to land:
'Access to land is regulated through Islamic
and customary law. There is a need for a
program to produce nationwide land registry
and to settle disputes between individuals
and groups on land. Such a registry would
allow for the use of land as collateral for
entrepreneurial activities' (p.35)
The recent Multi-Donor Comprehensive Needs
Assessment for the Natural Resources and
Agricultural sector had effectively nothing to say
about land issues. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that access to land has been deeply transformed
over the last 25 years of chronic conflict and that
the effects of drought have been to increase the
mortgaging of land assets. The issue of access to
land is likely to be major issue with respect to
the returning refugee population. Yet concerns
about land and understanding about rights,
ownership and access to land are minimal. The
report of Nathan Associates and Louis Berg (1991),
essentially a compilation of existing
documentation, is the most recent documentation
that has been found.
Land should be a central issue in building
understanding about the asset base of rural
livelihoods, not least because of the economic
role that growth in the agricultural sector is seen
to contribute to recovery processes. However at
present land issues and understanding of just how
land relations work and have been transformed
over the last 25 years is not being addressed.
3. Terms of Reference
The specific tasks of the consultancy are as
follows:
• Review relevant documents and interview
key informants in the Afghanistan Transitional
Administration, the assistance community
(multilateral and bilateral donors, UN agencies
and NGOs), and Afghan communities.  The
consultant will need to spend some time in
Kabul city, but will also need to make one or
two trips to other regions of Afghanistan
(security permitting).
• Write a land issues paper that can be published
in monograph form (approx. 40 pages) in an
easily accessible style for practitioners.  The
paper must begin with an executive summary
not exceeding 3-4 pages written in a form
that is publishable as a separate briefing
paper.  The purpose of the land issues paper
will be to review the current understanding
and knowledge with respect to land as an
asset within the livelihoods of rural
Afghanistan, identify the key policy issues
that are likely to arise in relation to these,
and, if appropriate, make recommendations
for policy makers and practitioners.
• Present the key findings of the issues paper
at a seminar in Kabul (prior to finalizing the
paper).
• Prepare a concept note for a more in-depth
research proposal to build understanding of
key land related issues.
4.  Duration
The consultancy will for 30 working days between
mid-September and end of October 2002. The
finalized issues paper and research concept note
must be submitted by October 31st, 2002.
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Davis, Don, FAO, Jalalabad
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Ghazni Province: Mohammed Sami, Mohammed
Dbaidullah Yousuf,, Ahmmed Jon, Abdul Satar,
Achmmed Kaka
Hamid, Abdul, Agricultural Manager, Nerkh
District, Wardak Province
Halim, Mohammed, Extension Manager, Wardak
Province
Ihrari, Khawja Attah Mohammad, Deputy Governor,
Parwan Province
Junas, Mohammed, Hortculturalist,  ADA, Bidmoskh
Village, Hujamari District, Ghazni Province
Karimi, Mohammed Asif,  Zonal Director for South
West Afghanistan, ADA
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Table 1 provides the breakdown by land type
classically used in Afghanistan. Table 2 provides
more detailed categorisation of arable land. This
was the schema first developed for tax purposes
in 1965 and since modified by different
administrations and most recently, the Taliban.
The country is also commonly divided into 11,
discrete agro-ecological zones, not provided here.
These combine distinctions of terrain, climate,
altitude, rainfall and soils, and broadly relate to
distinctions in farming systems and productivity.254
Appendix C: Land Types and Classification of Arable Lands
Table 1: Land Cover Categories and Area in 1993
Table 2: Classification of Arable Lands
254 For example, the Southern Mountains, Western Stony Desert and Badakhshan. Aside from tinkering to pay more attention
to administrative boundaries, accessibility and levels of food vulnerability on the other (e.g.WFP’s 34 food economy
zones), these zones are still used, most recently in a FAO crop and food supply survey (see Maletta 2002).
Sources: Figures 8 & 13 in FAO 1999.
Land Cover Area (Ha.) Percent of
Total Land Area
1 Urban 29,494 0.05
2 Orchards: Fruit Trees, Vineyards, Gardens 94,217 0.1
3 Agricultural Land - Irrigated 3,207,790 5.0
A Intensively cultivated (2 crops) 1,559,654 2.4
B Intensively cultivated (1-2 crops) 1,648,136 2.6
C Occasionally cultivated every 2-3 yrs
4 Agricultural Land - Rain-fed 4,517,714 7.0
5 Pistachio Forests 1,337,582 2.1
6 Natural Forests
7 Rangeland 29,176,732 45.2
8 Barren Land 24,067,016 37.3
9 Marsh Land 417,563 0.6
10 Water Bodies 248,187 0.4
11 Snow Covered Areas 1,463,101 2.3
64,559,396 100
CLASS DESCRIPTION CURRENT CLASSES
1965, 1976 (Edict No. 57 of 2000)
Gardens Irrigated orchard and gardens Grade I
Agricultural Land - Irrigated, wheat followed by rice Grade II
Grade I
Agricultural Land - Irrigated, wheat followed by other crops
Grade II
Agricultural Land - Irrigated, once a year only,  Grade III (50+% irrigated)
Grade III mostly wheat
Agricultural Land - Irrigated, every other year, Grade IV (15+% irrigated)
Grade IV fallow in betweenLand Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan
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Agricultural Land - Irrigated, every 2 or more years,
Grade V fallow in between
Agricultural Land - Rain-fed, irrigated in spring only,  Grade V (less than 15% irrigated
Grade VI mostly wheat Also Rain-fed cultivated every 
2nd year
Agricultural Land - Rain-fed, in flat-lying areas, wheat, Grade VI Rain-fed cultivated
Grade VII melon etc. after 2 years
Agricultural Land - Rain-fed, in sloping areas,  Grade VII Rain-fed cultivated
Grade VIII mostly wheat after 3 or more years
Sources: 1965 Survey & Statistics Law, 1976 Land Reform Law, 1978 Land Reform Decree, 1999 Land
EdictIssues Paper Series
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Appendix D: An Overview of Rural Landholding Data
1960s
A village survey in Parwan Province in 1961 showed
that there were a total of 922 plots shared among
250 land owners. Significantly, whilst this provides
an average of 3.65 plots each and an average
total holding of 1.42 jeribs of land (under one
acre), the mean size of farms owned was only
0.525 jeribs. The range of farm size was from 0.2
jeribs to 30.25 jeribs.
In 1964 the Ministry of Planning produced data
on a sample of 413 villages that showed that 60.5
percent of land was farmed by owner-occupiers;
13.8 percent of farmland was farmed with the
involvement of sharecroppers; 5.5 percent of the
land was under mortgage and 20.2 percent of the
farmland was under 'other arrangements' [GoA
1964].255
The 1967 Survey of Progress reported that "the
vast majority" of farmers own less than one ha.
of irrigated land and than only 2.2 percent of
farmers own more - but that these together hold
42 percent of the total cultivated land, suggesting
gross inequity in holdings [The World Bank 1978].
In 1968, the Central Survey Office reported that
only 27% fully owned their land. Most were crop
share tenants (47%), renters (8%) or part-owner
operators (17%) [GoA 1968].
1970s
In 1970 the government undertook surveys in
seven provinces covering 796 households [GoA
1971]. Differences among provinces were
significant. Landlessness for example ranged from
13 percent in Parwan to 49 percent in Kandahar.
Landlords, renting out their land or hiring workers,
ranged from one percent in Parwan to 23 percent
in Nangarhar. Smallholders farming their own
land nonetheless dominated. They constituted a
proportion ranging from 37 percent of farmers in
Kandahar to 86 percent of farmers in Parwan. A
table collating 25 pages of data is reproduced
below. An important finding of the survey was
that sharecroppers, renters and workers were
essentially landless farmers; that is, there was
little to no evidence that they owned more than
their household plots and sometimes not even
those constructions.
In October 1971, Whiting and Hughes published
a report based upon interviews with 723 farmers
in all provinces, with a focus on irrigated
agriculture. This found that 61 percent of farmers
owned and farmed mainly their own land; 11
percent rented out the greater proportion or all
their land ('landlords') and 28 percent were
landless, farming others' land through rent of
sharecropping arrangements. The majority (69
percent) hired no labour, 19 percent hired one
255 In 1973 Dupree reproduces this data (but without source cited). The category of ‘Other’ remained unexplained; it may
have referred to absentee landlords or it may have referred to lands that were under a complex of landlord/tenant or
landowner/sharecropper arrangements.





Agricultural worker 76 9.5
796 100
Table 1:  Land Ownership in 1970
Source: GoA 1971Issues Paper Series
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labourer and all landlords and a few others (12
percent) hired more than one permanent labourer.
Afghan Agriculture in Figures was published by
Government in 1978 and produced a comprehensive
picture of agriculture at the time. In 1975 the
total population of Afghanistan was just over
fifteen million people with a projected growth
rate of 2.5 percent. In 1968, 72 percent of the
population was rural and depended upon
agriculture. A total of 1,307,170 landowners were
identified. Together, they and their tenants,
workers or sharecroppers cultivated around four
million hectares, of which 2.5 million ha was
irrigated. The average farm size was 3.5 ha in
1976. Some 14,340 households were members of
126 cooperatives in 1978 with seven new
cooperatives established in 1979.256
Despite the fact that the registration survey had
been operating for ten years and had by then
covered 45 percent of landholders, distribution
of ownership was not indicated. One sample study
of 225 wheat farms recorded that only 27 percent
were owner-operated. Owners farmed 17 percent
with workers. Most farms (47 percent) were
cultivated by crop-sharing tenants. Eight percent
of farms were rented. One percent was farmed
through a mixture of renting and sharecropping
[GoA 1978].
Information on farm size and ownership in Nangarhar
Province in 1964 showed that the average size of
farm was 24.2 jeribs (4 ha.) and that 58.5 percent
of farmers owned at least some land, if not always
enough. The remainder were tenants, working for
landowners or leasing land [ibid].
A larger sample drawn from the richer provinces
of Kunduz and Baghlan provinces in 1972-73
showed that 78 percent of farming families owned
some land. Another six percent were part-owners.
Sixteen percent were landless tenants, renting
in land or sharecropping. Among landowners,
farm size was unevenly distributed. Around one
third had less than five acres, one third between
five and 12.5 acres, and another third with more
than this amount [GoA 1978]. Prompted by the
current drive for land redistribution, the Kabul
Times published this picture of skewed land
ownership.
Drawing upon work by Vladimir Glukhoded of the
USSR Academy of Sciences in 1981 and Afghan
Agriculture in Figures cited above, Emadi produced
the following stark summary for the year 1978.
This asserted that 70 percent of farmers were
landless at one extreme and six percent of farmers
owned 10 percent of the land area at the other.
The remaining 24 percent of peasants owned
seven percent of the land area. The accuracy of
this data is disputed by some; Rubin, also partly
using Glukhoded's work indicates around 35
percent of the rural population were landless at
that time (Rubin 1997). This is more consistent
with another survey (Mukherjee) reported by
Rubin which suggested around 30 percent were
landless. Nonetheless, the figures do tally with
the implications of data presented by Government
in 1978, which suggested that the vast majority
or rural dwellers were landless or owned too little
land to live on [GoA 1978].257
256 Information variously extracted from Tables 1, 2,20,23,106,135,141 GoA, 1978.
257 Reference is made here to the famous Table 23 in Afghan Agriculture in Figures, which does not directly explain the
relation of the farm population of 10,839,870 persons in 1967-1968 to the indicated number of land owners (1,307,170).
Many have since interpreted this as meaning that only 1.3 million of 10.8 million rural dwellers were landowners (12
percent).
Land Holding Size No. Landowners Percent
(Households)
2.02 -   4.05 Ha 1,084,8241 83
4.05-    10.12 Ha 156,842 12
10.12-  20.9 Ha 65,351 5
1,307,017 100
Table 2:  Distribution of Landholdings among Landowners 1978
Source: Reproduced from Emadi 1997.Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan
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1980s
In contrast, results from the Agricultural Survey
of Afghanistan carried out ten years later (1988-
1989) showed that on a national basis only 18
percent of those who were farming owned no
land at all [SCA 1990]. The sample was substantial
at around 30,000 households in all provinces. The
average size of farms owned overall was 5
hectares. Sharecroppers, either full or part-time
(some working on their own farms as well), made
up another 17 percent of farmers. Tenants, also
either full or part-time (again some working on
their farms as well), made up another 4 percent.
Caretakers, such as for absentee landlords made
up only 1.5 percent of farmers. Those who owned
land and only farmed their own land represented
the majority - 78 percent of farmers interviewed.
Given the diversity among provinces, analysis of
the survey data in ranges is probably more
meaningful:
Among landowners -
• Between 62 and 99 percent of farmers only
farmed their own land [owner-occupiers] and
the average size of their farms ranged from
4.1 jeribs to 240 jeribs;
• Between 0 and 35 percent of farmers both
farmed their own land and sharecropped other
land and the average size of their total farm
(although not all owned by them) ranged from
4.6 jeribs to 135 jeribs;
• Between 0 and 14 percent of farmers both
farmed their own land and rented other land
and the average size of their total holding
(although not all owned by them) ranged from
5 jeribs to 66 jeribs.
Among the landless -
• Between 0 and 34 percent of farmers were
only sharecroppers and the average size of
the land they had access to ranged from 3.3
jeribs to 112.5 jeribs;
• Between 0 and 12 percent of farmers were
only tenants and the land they accessed
ranged from 3 jeribs to 100 jeribs;
1990s
A later survey by the Swedish Committee of
Afghanistan showed that 87 percent of farmers
in Nejrab District in Kapisa province owned at
least some part of the irrigated land they farmed.
Only 40 percent of farmers owned all the land
they cultivated (1991). The remaining 60 percent
either rented or sharecropped part or all of the
land they farmed [SCA 1992b]. Farm size among
small, medium and large landowners was not
highly variant, most farmers cultivating between
3-6 jeribs of irrigated land As well as not knowing
the ownership pattern in respect of rain-fed land,
the sample was very small (61 farmers).
The picture for Shulgara District in Balkh Province
in 1991 was more complete - but the sample yet
smaller. Eighty-four percent of farmers owned
rain-fed land and 55 percent owned irrigated
land. Sixty-nine percent of the total available
land was cultivated by the owner and 31 percent
cultivated under sharecropping arrangements.
Sharecroppers owned less than 18 percent of the
total land area but were the vast majority. Overall,
80 percent of farmers owned less than 50 percent
of the land area [SCA 1992a].
A survey conducted in Mehterlam District in
Laghman Province in 1991 showed that 68
percent were owners and 22 percent landless,
mostly living by sharecropping others' land. Five
percent of owner-occupiers had their land under
mortgage [SCA 1992c].
The 1991 survey in Qarabagh District in Ghazni
Province (sample 95 farmers) showed 82 percent
of farmers owned land and 17 percent were
landless, again gaining access to land through
sharecropping [SCA 1992e].
The picture in Maydan Sha District in Wardak
province in 1991 was different with 100 percent
of farmers owning at least some land (sample of
98 families). Four percent additionally rented in
other land in 1991 and one percent sharecropped.
Three percent of farmers had the farm under
mortgage, and which in all cases had involved
the surrender of ownership until the loan was
repaid [SCA 1992d].
The high rate of landholding is less surprising in
Nad Ali District in Hilmand province, where most
of the land has been distributed through various
government schemes. There all but one farmer
interviewed owned irrigated land and 68 percent
of them had additional labour in the form of
sharecroppers. Five percent of farmers rented
out land. Only one third of farmers farmed only
their own land [SCA 1992f]. Most farmers thereforeIssues Paper Series
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were both owners and sharecroppers at the same
time.
Some fragmentary information is available through
more recent surveys. In 1997 the NGO DACAAR
carried out surveys in two villages in Ghazni and
Laghman Provinces. Respectively 36 percent and
16 percent of households in the village owned no
land at all. Distribution among the landed was
very uneven with respectively 11 percent and 22
percent of households owning around 60 percent
of the total farmland in the village [Klinnert
1997a, 1997b]. Another study produced the
following picture in 1999 for around 1,500
households in Paktya, Wardak and Badghis -
More than half (57 percent) rented land from
others. Thirty-five percent of all households
had no land at all. Only 15 percent rented
less than half of the land they were cultivating
from others. Of those with no land, five
households (21 percent) did not engage in
any agricultural activity at all, because of
age, infirmity and, in one case, because the
household could not find land to rent. Four
percent of the sample rented land out to
others [Allen 1999; 8].
Reviewing studies in 1998, the WFP VAM
preliminary assessment of food economies
concluded that distribution of landholding is
uneven but 'most egalitarian in the east and centre
of the country where less than 40 percent of farm
households cultivate less than the average for
their province' (average holding size was 1.4 ha
or 3.5 acres). At the other extreme, over 70
percent of farm households cultivate less than
the provincial average in the north east and in
the river valleys of Herat and Kandahar' [Clarke
& Seaman 1998].
2000s
A study undertaken by the Strategic Monitoring
Unit (now AREU) in Badakhshan in 2001 provides
up-to-date information on nearly 9,000 households.
Whilst the reliability of this data is no stronger
than for other large scale surveys (or indeed for
the smaller surveys), the result are interesting
as drawn together in the following table. The
diversity is wide, with proportions of landless
households very high in two districts and high in
four others. In only one district was landlessness
not a problem. Most of those indicated in the
tenant and sharecropper categories are either
landless or small landowners [SMU 2001].
District %  % Small % Medium % Large % %
landless landowners landowners landowners tenants sharecroppers
Argu 53 15 19 13 0 26
Baharak 40 32 26 2 0 10
Darayam 13 25 55 6 0 38
Eshkashem 7 15 43 35 0 15
Jurm 35 20 43 2 0 2
Keronmanjan 21 17 32 30 26 0
Keshem 59 15 18 9 13 10
Ragh 25 20 36 18 10 36
Shar-I-Buz. 2 44 19 35 0 10
Shegnan 9 57 21 14 46 6
Shohadda 25 47 27 1 0 22
Teshkan 42 7 27 24 0 33
Wakhan 47 27 18 9 0 19
Yaftal 25 9 51 15 0 19
Yamgan 20 31 8 1 0 1
Table 3: A Provincial Case - Badakhshan in 2001
Source: compilation of data extracted from Table 1 in SMU 2001.Farms in Sample Average Size (ha.) Percent Farms Percent Farm Area
Total 4,966 6.79 100 100
Below 1 ha. 1,180 0.47 23.76 1.65
1-1.99 ha. 768 1.32 15.47 3.01
2-4.99 ha. 1,200 3.03 24.16 10.78
5 -9.99 ha. 803 6.83 16.17 16.26
10-49 ha. 935 18.01 18.83 49.91
50 -99 ha. 63 66.19 1.27 12.36
100+ ha. 17 119.84 0.34 6.04
distributed (see Table 4 below) and from which
farm ownership may to an extent be inferred.
Thus, if it is assumed for the moment that each
farm has a farmer then at once it is clear that
land ownership remains in 2002 as polarised as it
has ever been (quite aside from those with no
land at all). Less than two percent of farmers
own or farm 18.4 percent of the total farmland
in the country. Conversely, twenty four percent
of farmers together farm less than two percent
of the farmland area. Two-thirds of all farmers
share under 16 percent of the farmland area.
Had the landless been identified and incorporated
in the statistics, the picture would have been
even more strongly polarised.
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Pending the release of Vulnerability Assessment
Data by the World Food Programme/UNDP, the
most up-to-date survey of land ownership is found
in a crop and food supply survey conducted by
FAO/WFP during May-June 2002 [Maletta 2002].
Data on nearly 5,000 farms in 540 villages were
collected. The average farm size overall was
found to be a surprising 6.79 ha., ranging from
an average of 1.12 ha. in the east to 12 ha. in
the north.258 Problematically, the study did not
investigate ownership patterns and seems to
assume that each farm is discretely owned and
farmed, rather than sharecropped or rented. Nor
is there any information on those who have no
land at all. Still, the survey provides a
comprehensive picture as to how farm sizes are
Table 4: A National Picture of the Distribution of Farming Areas in 2002
Source: Reproduction of Table 1 in Maletta 2002 for FAO.
258 It is not clear from the Preliminary Report whether all farmland was included or just cereal lands (the focus of the survey).
There is no information on how farm sizes were gauged.Period Court Total Cases Land Cases Percent Type of Land Cases Percent
March -  Supreme 1,035 255 24.6 Sale & Purchase 156 61.1
May 2002 Court Water 76 29.8
Rent & Mortgage 22 8.6
Gardens/boundaries 1 0.4
Primary & 2,315 224 9.6 Sale & Purchase 118 52.4
Provincial Water 46 20.5
Court Rent & Mortgage 50 22.3
Gardens/boundaries 10 4.46
June- Supreme 832 195 23.7 Sale & Purchase 116 59.48
Aug 2002 Court Water 66 33.8
Rent & Mortgage 13 6.6
Primary & 118 24 20.3 Sale & Purchase 15 62.5
Provincial Water 7 29.16
Courts Rent & Mortgage 2 8.3
Current Primary & 212 27 12.7 Sale & Purchase 4 14.8
Sept. Provincial Water 12 44.4
2002 Courts Garden/boundary 11 40.7
Total 4,512 725 16
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Appendix E: Land Cases In The Supreme Court
Table 1:  Compilation of Cases March-October 2002
Source: Research & Statistics Dept of Supreme Court & Civil Rights Division of Supreme Court
PROVINCE NO. PROVINCE NO.
Kunar 6 Kunduz 4
Tarkhar 3 Heart 4
Hilmand 2 Badakhshan 2
Balkh 4 Jowzjan 3
Ghazni 10 Baghlan 8
Parwan 7 Laghman 5
Khost 1 Wardak 3
Paktya 15 Kabul  15
Logar 4 Faryab 11
Nangarhar 14 Kunduz 5
Samangan 2 Paghman 1
Bagdhis 1 Farah 2
TABLE 2:  LAND CASES PENDING IN THE SUPREME COURT BY AREA
Source: Research & Statistics Dept of Supreme Court & Civil Rights Division of Supreme CourtLand Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan
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The following list is incomplete. Dates are in the
solar Islamic calendar used in Afghanistan. The
exception is the dates during the Taliban period,
which used the lunar calendar. Gregorian dates
are in brackets. Because the Islamic year is March
to February, it is likely that some of the Gregorian
dates are incorrect, by six months, which could
make the correct year either one before or one
after.259
There are also inconsistencies with spelling.
Thawr, Thor and Thour are variously used for
example to mean the same month. Whichever
spelling is given in the law is retained.
Under Zahir Shah Administration 1933-1973
Law for Appropriation of Property for the
Public Welfare in Afghanistan, 1314 (1935)
Law for the Sale of Land Under Dams and
Rivers, 1318 (1939)
Law for Settling Ownership and Tax Matters,
and the Price of Water for Lands Below the
Arghanab and Kajakai Dams, 6 Hoot 1344
(1965)
Land Survey and Statistics Law 31 Jawsa 1344
(1965)
Law of Pasture Land 1970
Under Daoud's Administration 1973-1978
The Civil Law of the Republic of Afghanistan
1974
No. 311 of August 6 1975, Law Regarding Land
Reform, Issue No. 10 Serial No. 311, 15
Zemarai 1354 (1975)
Law on Progressive Taxation Decree No. 367
of 26 Jawza 1355 (1976) Gazette No. 338,
Issue 7 of 15 Changash 1355
Law Concerning Land Survey and Registration
of Settlement Survey Law Decree No. 718 of
30/5/1355 (1976) Gazette Issue 346 and also
Issue No. 12 Serial No. 347 of 1355
After the "Saur" Revolution 1978-1979
Decree No. 6 of the Revolutionary Council on
Land (Limiting Loans & Mortgages & Cancelling
Debts) Extraordinary Issue of Gazette, Serial
No. 402, 22 Changash 1357 (1978)
Decree No. 8 of the Revolutionary Council
Regarding Land, 9 Qaws 1357 (November 18
1978)
Decree (unnumbered) of the Chairman of
Revolutionary Council Regarding the Start of
Land Distribution to Eligible Applicants in
Gazette No. 420, Issue 23, 15 Hoot 1357 (5
April 1978)
Regulation on Land Reform in the Warm
Provinces Gazette Issue 420
Land Matters, Issue No. 416 January 6 1979
Second Decree on Distribution of Land Gazette
No. 422, 31.2.1358 (21 May 1979)
Law on Compensation and Selling Kabul City's
Detailed project Lands based On the Master
Plan of 1357, Gazette Issue No. 3 Serial No.
426, 15 Thawr 1358 (1979)
Decree of Chairman of Revolutionary Council
Regarding Land Distribution to the Eligible
Applicants, Gazette No. 4, Serial No. 427, 31
Thawr 1358 (1979)
Issue No. 426 May 5 1979 Concerning
Acquisition and Sale of Land
Issue No. 427 21 May 1979 Concerning the
Distribution of Land to Beneficiaries
Regulation on Land Reform in the North of
Afghanistan Gazette Issue 427
Decree No. 2 on Land of Revolutionary Council
in Gazette Issue No.4 Serial No. 427 of 31
Thowr 1358 (1979)
Issue No. 430 7 July 1979 concerning
constitution of cooperatives, arranging of
residence, regulation of project residence
Issue No. 438 6 November 1979 Order under
Land Law
Issue No. 438 6 November 1979 Concerning
Decree No. 8 on Land
Issue No. 348 6 November 1979 Concerning
Land Taxation
Law of Farmland Reform, Gazette Issue No.
15 Serial No. 438 15 Agrab 1358 (1979)
Regulation No. 2 under Decree No. 8
Concerning Land Reform in Gazette issue No.
Appendix F: Afghan State Land Laws
259 Afghan months generally begin around 21st of the western month, so no direct translation of months can be made. Hamal
is March 21-April 20; Saur is April 21-May 21; Jawza is May 22-June 21; Saratan is June22-July 22; Assad is July 23-August
22; Sunbula is August 23-22 September; Mizan is September 23-October 22; Agrab is October 22-21 November; Qous is
November 22-21 December; Jaddi is December 22-20 January; Dalwi is January 21-19 February; Hoot is February 20-20
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15 as above (1979)
Law on Land Taxation, in Gazette Issue No.
15 as above (1979)
Law for the Regulation of Land Distribution
Gazette Issue 438
Law on Land Tax Gazette Issue 483
Issue No. 489 6 September 1979 Land Decree
Soviet Period 1980-1989
Issue No. 502 19 February 1982 Taxation and
Income
Issue No. 514 22 August 1982 The Law of
Acquisition and Sale of Land
Issue No. 517 7 October 1982 Land Regulation
Annex I to Edict No. 8 of Land Reform of 1978
Gazette Issue 517
Issue No. 521 6 December 1982 Concerning
Taxes and Income
Decree No. 8 of Revolutionary Council on
Land Issues Gazette 550 29.11.1362 (18
February 1984)
Two Amendments to No. 8 Gazette Issue 550
Regulation on Land Gazette Issue 550
Regulation No 1 under Decree No. 8 Gazette
Issue 550
Regulation No. 2 of Decree No. 8 Gazette
Issue 550
Decree on the Exemption of Debts of Farmers
from Land Issues Gazette Issue 562, 31.4.1363
(22 July 1985)
Ratification No. 147 Regarding Approval of
Regulation on Distribution of Residential
Houses, Government Houses and Plots of Land
in Kabul City Gazette Issue No. 14, Serial No.
593, 30 Mizan 1364 (1985)
Decree of Council of Ministers Regarding
Approval of Regulation of the Provincial
Department of Agriculture and Land Reform,
Gazette Issue No. 18 Serial No. 597 30 Qaws
1364 (1985)
Ratification No. 90 Regarding Adjustment of
Some Articles and Appendix of Regulation
Concerning Distribution of Government
Residential Houses and Land in Kabul City
Extraordinary Issue of Gazette, No. 613 22
Asad 1365 (1986)
Decree No. 81 dated 30.2.1366 Regarding
Approval of Land Compensation Law,
Extraordinary Issue Gazette 10, Serial No.
639 of 10 Saratan 1366 (1987)
Ratification No. 224 dated 19.08.1366
Regarding Adjustment to Article 2 of
Regulation on Urban Projects for the 25 Year
Plan of Kabul City, Gazette No. 19 Serial No.
656, 15 Jadi 1366 (1987)
Ratification No. 244 dated 26.08.1366
Regarding Regulation on Land Leases Gazette
No. 22 Serial No. 659 30 Dalwa 1366 Regulation
on Land Rents Gazette Issue 659 (1987)
Decree of Revolutionary Council for Exemption
of Returnees from Land For Returnees,.
Gazette Issue 637, 14.3.1366 (4 June 1988)
Decree of Revolutionary Council on the
Exemption of Land, Shops, and Other Taxation
of Returnees Gazette Issue 632, 25.1.1366
(14 April 1988)
Decree of Revolutionary Council on the
Exemption from Penalty Relating to Land
Issues Like Fertilizer, Agricultural Machinery
and Seeds from Previous Years. Gazette Issue
632, 25.1.1366 (14 April 1988)
Decree on Distribution of Land for Returnees.
Gazette Issue 643, 12.5.1366 (2 August 1988)
Decree No. 237 dated 24.02. 1367 Concerning
the Law of Cadastral Survey in Gazette No.
12 Serial No. 674 of 31 Sunbula 1367 (1988)
Decree No. 332 dated 06.04.1367 Regarding
Law on Land Taxation, Gazette No. 14 Serial
No. 676, 29 Mizan 1367 (1988)
Law on Private Investment for Irrigation of
Virgin Lands Gazette Issue 700
Najibullah Period 1989-1992
Decree on Selling of Apartments. Gazette
Issue 668, 31.3 1367 (21 June 1989)
Decree on exemption of Tax penalty on
Farmers and The Owner of the Land, Gazette
Issue 679, 15.9.1367 (6 December 1989)
Decree on the Return of Properties of the
Returnees, Which are Under the Control of
Government, Gazette Issue 715, 15.2.1369
(5 May 1991)
Decree to Return Houses, Apartments, which
are Under the Control of Government to the
Owners, Gazette Issue 725, 1.7.1369 (23
October 1991)
Mujaheddin & Rabbani Period 1992-1996
Decree on Prevention of Possession of Others'
Property Without Any Reason Gazette Issue
767, 31.5.1372 (22 August 1993)
Land Law Gazette Issue 769
Decree on Cancellation of Law for Arranging
Land Relations Gazette Issue 771, 15.8.1373
(6 November 1994)
Decree on Changing Grazing Areas to
Agricultural Land Gazette Issue 771, 15.8.1373
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Taliban Period 1996 - 2001
Decree on State Lands Gazette Issue 783
1.1.1376 (21 March 1997)
Decree No. 108 dated 19.05.1419 Regarding
Non-Intervention in Survey and Cadastral Maps
in Extraordinary Issue as above (1420)
Decree No. 26 About Land dated 13.04.1420
Regarding Properties Extraordinary Issue
Gazette Series No. 788
Decree No. 20 dated 15.06.1420 Regarding
Cancelling Individual Plans on Government
Properties and Avoiding the Destruction of
Public Properties and Assets in Extraordinary
Issue of Gazette as above (1420) (1999)
Decree No. 21 dated 05.06.1420 Regarding
the Properties that have been Surveyed but
not Yet Settled, in Extraordinary Issue of
Gazette as above (1420) (1999)
Decree No. 38 on Land
Decree on Compensation for Land in Gazette
Issue 794
Regulation for the Survey of Land for Housing,
Factories in Kabul City in Gazette Issue 794
of 2000
Decree No. 57 on Land in Gazette Issue No.
795 (2000)
Decree on Land Regulation Gazette Issue 795
(2000)
Decree on Pasture Land and Maraha in Gazette
Issue 795 (2000)
Decree on Tribal Forests in Gazette Issue 795
(2000)
Decree on Protection of Property
Amendment to Edict 26 Gazette Issue 797
(2001)
Amendment to Edict 38 Gazette Issue 797 (1
article amended) (2001)
Amendment to Edict 38 Gazette Issue 788 (1
article amended) (2001)
Regulation of for the Distribution and Selling
of Government Apartments in Gazette Issue
798 (2001)
Karzai Period 2001 -2002
Decree No. 66 of January 26 2002 Abolishing
All Decrees and Legal Documents Issued and
Enacted before December 20 2001260
Decree No. 99 dated 4.2.1381 Prohibition on
Distribution of Government Unutilized and
Intact Lands (not yet gazetted)
Decree on Domestic and Foreign Private
Investment in Afghanistan No. 134 in Gazette
No. 803 2002, 2 Sumbula 1381 (2002)
Decree No. 136 on Establishment of a Special
Property Claims Court, 13.6.1381 (not yet
gazetted)
Decree of the President of the Afghan Interim
Administration on Dignified Return of Refugees
of 13.03.1380 (2001)
Draft Edict 2002 Concerning Government Land
1381
258 A misleading title; no laws were abolished by this decree; each existing law has to be scrutinised and determination made
to repeal or amend the standing law.1923 (First) Constitution
April 9, 1923 - The Constitution of Afghanistan
[Nizamnama-e-Assasi-Daulat-e-Aliya-e-Afghanistan
Hamal 20, 1302] Promulgated by King Amanullah
[1919-1929] with a significant Constitutional
Amendment January 28 1925 [Dalwa 8, 1303]
Article 19
In Afghanistan, everyone's real and personal
property in his possession is protected. If real
property of a citizen is required by the
Government for a public purpose, then in
accordance with provisions of a special law,
first the price of the property shall be paid
and then it may be expropriated.
Article 21
Land disputes will be decided in accordance
with both Shariat and the general civil and
criminal state law codes.
Article 22
Expropriation without compensation of
property (and forced labour) may be
undertaken in times of war
Article 26




Afghanistan 1310] The Constitution of the High
State of Afghanistan, Promulgated  under King
Nadir Khan (1929-1933)
Article 15
Secured property as previously (see Article
19 of 1923)
Article 16
Restricted entry to houses and land without
an order under Shariat or state law.
Article 17
Confiscation of property prohibited 'except
for those who stay abroad and indulge in
movements and propaganda against the
government of Afghanistan' (except in a state
of emergency Article 115)
Article 26
"Nothing shall be taken from any body in
violation of laws."
1964 (Third) Constitution
Promulgated under King Zahir Shah (1933-1973)
Under Article 26
Retained the role of public interest as able
to interfere with private rights.
"Indebtedness of one to another cannot cause
deprivation of curtailment of the liberty of
the debtor. The ways and means of recovering
debt shall be specified in the law."
"Every Afghan is entitled to travel within the
territory of his State and settle anywhere
except in areas prohibited by the law'.
Article 28
"A person's residence is inviolable. No one,
including the State can enter or search a
residence without the permission of the
resident or on the orders of a competent
court and in accordance with the conditions
and procedures specified by the law."  (except
in a state of emergency Article 115)
Article 29
"Property is inviolable. No one's property can
be confiscated except in accordance with the
provision of the law and the decision of a
competent court." (except in a declared state
of emergency Article 115)
"Expropriation is allowed only for securing
public interest, against an advance equitable
compensation in accordance with the
provisions of the law."
"No-one shall be prohibited from acquiring
property and exercising the right of ownership
of the same, within the limitations of the
law. The way of utilising property shall be
regulated and guided by the law, for securing
the public interest."
"Investigations and declarations of a person's
property may only be made in accordance
with the provisions of the law."
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Appendix G: Property Clauses in Afghan Constitutions"Foreign States and nationals are not entitled
to own immovable property in Afghanistan.
Subject to the approval of government,
immovable property may be sold to the
diplomatic missions of foreign states on a
reciprocal basis and also to international
organisations of which the State of Afghanistan
is a member."
Article 37
"The main purpose of laws designed to
systematise labour is to reach a stage where
the rights and interests of all categories of
labourers are protected, suitable conditions
of work are provided and the relations
between the workers and employers organised
on a just and progress manner."
1977 (Fourth) Constitution
In the name of Allah, The Compassionate, The
Merciful February 27, 1977 (Hoot 5, 1355).  First




"To institute constant, profound and basic
economic and social changes based on the
principles and values enshrined in this
Constitution to secure the interests of the
majority of the people of Afghanistan."
Article 8
"To eliminate exploitation in all its forms and
manifestations."
Under Chapter Two Economic Principles
Article 13
"Resources such as mines, forests, and energy
large industries, communications, important
air and surface transport ...are part of the
nation's property and their administration
shall belong to the State."
Article 14
"Limits on agricultural property shall be
determined and fixed by the Land Reform
Law."
Article 15
"Private property and enterprises, based on
the principle of non-exploitation, shall be
regulated by Law."
Article 16
"Cooperatives, and production and
consumption cooperative companies, with
the participation of the people therein, shall
be encouraged, protected and guided by the
Government, in accordance with the provisions
of the law, to ensure the interests of the
majority of the people."
Article 19
"Taxes shall be collected on the basis of social
justice in accordance with the provisions of
the law."
Article 32
Retained the 1964 clause on indebtedness
(see above)
Article 33
Retained the 1964 clause of freedom of
movement and settlement (see above)
Article 35
Retained the 1964 clause (Art. 28) on
inviolability of one's house but added that,
"The ways of utilising property shall be
regulated and guided by the law for the
purpose of ensuring the interests of the
public."
Article 36
No person's property shall be confiscated
without the provision of the law and the
decision of a competent court.
The expropriation of private property is
permitted only by virtue of the law for the
purpose of ensuring the interest of the public
and in exchange for just compensation.
No person shall be prohibited from acquiring
property and exercising the right of ownership
therein, except within the limits of the law.
 The ways of utilising property shall be
regulated and guided by the law for the
purpose of ensuring the interests of the public.
Article 41
"... The main purpose of the laws ... is to
reach the stage in which the rights and
interests of all toilers, farmers, workers and
traders are protected, suitable working
conditions provided, and which relations
between the worker and the employer are
regulated on a just and progressive basis."
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Constitutional Subject Laws under Khalqi
Presidents Noor Mohammad Taraki & Hafizullah
Amin
• May 9, 1978 Basic Lines of the Revolutionary
Duties of the Government of Democratic
Republic of Afghanistan;
• May 14, 1978 Decree No. 3 Legal Procedures
of State;
• March 27, 1979 Law for High Council for the
Defence of the Homeland & Law for Regulating
the Duties of the Revolutionary Council and
the Government and Legislative Procedure.
1980 (Fifth) Constitution
Interim Constitution of Afghanistan Fundamental
Principles of the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan Promulgated under President Karmal
(1979-1986)
Article 17
Ownership exists in the Democratic Republic
of Afghanistan in the form of public property,
which is shared by all, cooperative and private
ownership. The state preserves and protects
all forms of ownership. Underground
resources, other national resources, energy
resources, banks, insurance organisations,
major means of production in heavy industries,
communications installations and radio and
television stations belong to the state. People's
property enjoys special protection.
Article 19
The government respects and guarantees
ownership of the peasants and other land
holders over land according to the provisions
of law. The government will adopt measures
to implement democratic changes in
agriculture in the interest of vast masses of
peasants with their active participation.
Article 20
The government will guarantee for the nomads
tribes and livestock breeders vast
opportunities to use pastures free of charge
on an equitable basis and guarantees for the
nomads the right of unhindered passage over
national territories.
Article 22
The government will preserve and protect
private ownership according to law. Using
private property contrary to the interests of
society and people is not permitted.
The government guarantees private property
of Afghan nationals obtained through legal
means. Inheritance rights in connection with
private property will be defined and
guaranteed by law. Expropriation of property
against payment in accord with social justice
and law is permissible.
1987 (Sixth) Constitution of Afghanistan
The Constitution of Afghanistan In the name of
Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful
Promulgated under President Najibullah (1986-
1992)
Comprises 149 Articles in Thirteen Chapters
Retained the content of Articles 17, 19, 20
and 22 above (under different numbers). In
addition -
Article 29
"The hereditary right to property shall be
guaranteed by law on the basis of Islamic
Shariat"
Article 30
"Expropriation is only allowed in public interest
and against just and prior compensation in
accordance with the law. Confiscation of
property is not allowed without the sanction
of the law and the decision of a court."
Article 59
"The citizens of Afghanistan have the right to
travel and free choice of settlement and
residence in the country."
1990 (Seventh) Constitution
In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the
Merciful [Only slightly amended version of
1987 Constitution]Promulgated under
President Najibullah (1986-1992)
A revision of the 1987 law; abolished five or
six articles of 1987, not affecting property.
1992-1996 (Eighth) and Draft Constitution of
Afghanistan
The Draft Constitution of Afghanistan 1992
of the Islamic State of Afghanistan
In the name of Allah, the Compassionate, the
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Drafted by the Mujaheddin under Rabbani
(1992-1996)
Article 48
The State respects and supports independence
and dignity of mankind - personal status, life,
property and residence are immune from
encroachment.
Article 65
The economic system of the Islamic State of
Afghanistan is based on the principles of
personal property, public property and state
property.
Article 67
Keeping in view the larger interests of the
country and principles of the Shariat,
underground resources and mines, forests
and unclaimed pastures, basic sources of
power, historical relics, installation of
telecommunications, big dams, ports, lines
of communication, big industries, radio and
television will be determined in separate
laws.
Investment by the private sector in the
exploitation of forests, pastures, sources of
power and business in communication
appliances, is legally permitted.
Article 71
The State will extend financial and technical
facilities, in order to develop agriculture with
a stress on increase of agricultural products
and cattle farming, to tillers and landowners
under the laws.
It will also create congenial conditions for
building mechanised and agricultural farms
- in the private sector as well as in the form
of companies, and reclamation of arid land.
Article 73
In Afghanistan, foreign nationals are not
entitled to hold landed properties. Sale of
land to diplomatic missions of foreign countries
is allowed, subject to the agreement of the
government, on the basis of bilateral relations
and to international agencies of which the
Islamic State of Afghanistan is a member.
Article 74
The State supports all kinds of legal ownership
in the public sector as well as in the private
sector. Every legal owner is entitled to the
outcome of his profession or work.
Legal assets of a person are immune from
intervention.
Confiscation of properties is subject to legal
orders according to verdicts of the courts.
Procurement under the law will take effect
only in security or public interest and after
due compensation has been paid.
1996-2001 Principles of the Islamic Emirate
Hanafi Shariat: Islamic Jurisprudence becomes
"the Constitution"
• Specific principles articulated in statements
and edicts included -
• Establishment of a pure Islamic state
• Islam to be the religion of the State and the
government and the people
• Shariat alone to be the law and to be enforced
through Shariat courts
• Hejab to be ensured for women
• A religious Police Force to operate
• An Islamic Army to be formed
• The state economy to be transformed into
an Islamic economy.
2001. Reapplication of the 1964 Constitution
Without Articles on Monarchy, Executive,
Legislature, through Bonn Agreement 5
December 2001, pending drafting of a new
Constitution, to be effected by end 2003.
In October 1999, the UN Security Council
passed Resolution 1267 imposing economic
sanctions on Afghanistan for offering sanctuary
to Osama Bin Laden. Additional sanctions
were imposed in December 200 because of
the Taliban's continuing support for terrorism
and poppy cultivation. After September 11
2001, six Security Council resolutions have
been passed.
Resolution 1383 of December 2001 echoed
the terms of the Bonn Agreement signed on
5 December 2001.The Bonn Agreement
established an Interim Authority, charged,
inter alia, with convening an emergency Loya
Jirga within six months to decide upon a
Transitional Authority 'to lead Afghanistan
until such time as a fully representative
government can be elected through free and
fair elections to be held no later than June
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Authority are to establish a Constitutional
Commission, a Civil Service Commission, a
Judicial Commission and a Central Bank of
Afghanistan.
Under the Bonn Agreement, the legal
framework and judicial system was to be
founded upon the 1964 Constitution "to the
extent that its provisions are not inconsistent
with those contained in this agreement, and
with the exception of those provisions relating
to the monarchy and to the executive and
legislative bodies provided in the Constitution"
(Clause II 1i). At the same time, 'existing laws
and regulations are to apply' provided they
are not inconsistent this the Bonn Agreement,
international legal obligations to which
Afghanistan is party or 'with those applicable
provisions contained in the Constitution of
1964, provided that the Interim Authority
shall have the power to repeal or amend
those laws and regulations' (II 1ii).
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A Master Plan was developed for Kabul city in
1974. The Master Plan allocated 16,830 ha. of
the total area (32,400 ha.) area for housing.
Implementation of its centrepiece, the
demarcation of around 100,000 plots to provide
for construction of 600,000 apartments, began in
1978. Less than 3,000 apartments were built,
mainly during 1979-1989. Nonetheless, 70 percent
of applicants at the time did receive housing or
more often, plots on which to construct houses,
on a payment by instalment basis. Plots of around
8,000 ha. were distributed.
From 1990, the capacity of the municipality to
provide housing, water, sewerage, electricity,
roads and public amenities fell to almost zero
and self-help construction flourished. Rarely did
these houses meet the specifications of the Master
Plan. Nor were occupation/ construction
undertaken through legal means. Many of these
houses are of unstable construction or fall within
the designated green belts and hilly areas of the
city. Around 6,000 houses fall within this category;
either being illegally sited, illegally constructed
and/or occupied.
In addition, many of these occupants have
purchased these apartments or houses on the
basis of fake documentation. In addition, an
estimated 600 older private properties have been
wrongfully given to and/or inhabited by especially
Taliban and post-Taliban commanders, some as
recently as one year ago. During the communist
period, compensation was generally paid when
authorities took private property although at less
than open market rates. When mujaheddin or
Taliban leaders appropriated property they rarely
paid compensation although sometimes this was
planned but not executed before the authorities
lost power.
The municipality is dealing with these problems
through, first, the creation of a joint commission
to address claims for restitution of housing on a
case-by-case basis. This commission comprises
representatives from the municipality, the office
of the Kabul governor, the Ministry of Justice,
the Primary Court of Kabul and the criminal
department of the Ministry of Interior, and is
located in the Police Department of the
Municipality. It is not a full-time commission. On
investigation, the rightful owner of the property
is identified and the land handed back to that
owner, his children or representative. Often the
rightful owner is still the municipality. Current
occupants including those who occupied, bought
or been sold properties under illegal circumstances
will be evicted but may apply for allocation of
other housing. Appeal to the Kabul Primary Court
may also be made when agreement cannot be
reached.
Second, rather than destroying the houses of
those who have constructed homes in unscheduled
areas of the city or on land which has not formally
been sold to them, the municipality plans to re-
launch low-cost housing construction on the
remaining 1,000 ha. of total housing land (16,830
ha.) available within the city limits and to expand
the city limits towards the north (Shomali). The
municipality also proposes to purchase some of
the private one-storey houses within the 6,000
ha. private housing areas and construct high-rise
apartments. It estimates that around 250,000
apartments are currently needed. Those living in
unstable or poorly sited areas such as on the
hillside greenbelts with receive first offer of
housing, which they may purchase at subsidized
rates and on payment by instalment. Their houses
will then be destroyed, following payment of
compensation where the construction was
undertaken with official approval and/or on
documented payment. To pay for new housing
and related road and other service developments,
the municipality proposes to invite foreign
investors to undertaken building on a commercial
basis, alongside provision of low-cost housing
schemes suitable for those with less means.
However no donor and no investor have yet been
forthcoming. Meanwhile, according to the deputy
mayor in charge of properties on the Kabul City
Council, "Kabul fills weekly with more returnees
looking for housing or finding their own homes
destroyed or occupied and without the means to
build their own houses."  The invasion of foreign
personnel has inflated prices to levels that are
unaffordable to Afghans. Officials in the Mayor's
office are grateful for the assistance being
provided by the German government in urban
water, street lighting and road development but
resent the high proportion of foreign money being
used to support the internal community instead
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of Afghans struggling to find a permanent home
in their city. "We have seen this before. An
invading group comes in claiming to be our
saviours, then before long we see they are just
helping themselves. The question is how long it
will take the people to become angry all over
again," the deputy mayor said.
Source: Discussion with Sayed Noor Aga Hedayati,
Deputy Mayor for Kabul City for Properties.Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan
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ITEM JERIB Ha.
Total Tax Units Covered 5,502
Total Plots Surveyed 1,333,731
Total Land Owners Identified 584,816
Total Jeribs Surveyed: 25,975,618 5,195,124
Private Land Surveyed: 10,432,511 2,086,502
                 Irrigated Land  6,840,189 136,804
                 Rain-fed Land  3,592,322 718,465
Government Land Surveyed: 2,502,887 855,269
                  Irrigated Land 968,306 193,661
                  Rain-fed Land 1,534,581 306,916
Non-Agricultural Land Surveyed: 13,040,220 2,608,044
                  Pasture 8,322,708 1,664,541
                  Barren/Desert 4,717,512 943,502
Appendix I: Registered Farmland in Afghanistan
TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF SURVEY & REGISTRATION OF LANDS 1966-1978
Sources: Drawn from data provided by Geodesy & Cartography Dept. October 2002
PROVINCE ESTIMATED SURVEYED  AREA NOT
AGRICULTURAL AREA 1966-1975 SURVEYED IN
LAND IN HECTARES IN JERIBS JERIBS
KABUL 150000 1220736 279264
PARWAN 100000 427292 572708
LOGAR 60000 38162 501838
GHAZNI 400000 634384 3365616
WARDAK 80000 18826 61174
PAKTYA 140000 79084 1320916
BAMYAN 140000 10494 1389452
NANGARHAR 119000 179166 1010834
KUNAR 30000 59192 240808
LAGHMAN 20000 50818 149182
KANDAHAR 310000 2916806 183194
URUZGAN 160000 185024 1414976
ZABUL 100000 48503 51497
HILMAND 230000 1853394 404606
NIMROZ 148200 1482484 -
FARAH 300000 456914 2543086
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HERAT 650000 570566 79434
BADGHIS 500000 16219 483781
GHOR 500000 114872 4885128
KUNDUZ 260000 1208374 1391026
BAGHLAN 340000 528144 2871856
TAKHAR 316600 1421514 1744486
BADAKHSHAN 500000 141382 358618
BALKH 511200 4635408 476592
JOZJAN 400000 352524 3647476
SAMANGAN 300000 465812 2534188
FARYAB 600000 435238 5564762
TOTAL 7,365,000 ha. 25499012 jeribs 46879034 jeribs
[5,099,802 ha.] [9,375,806 ha.]
Source: Geodesy & Cartography Department October 2002.
Note: This data seems to have been hastily collated, so it may not be wholly accurate in some cases.Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan
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Land Appropriation Law for Public Welfare 1935
[18 Agrab 1314]
Summary
This law provided for the state to appropriate
private lands for public purpose. Public purpose
was defined as for roads, bazaars, water
development, mosques, military installations,
factories hospitals, homes for the poor,
sanatoriums, orphanages, government offices,
water reservoirs for fighting fires, other
construction and developments for public needs
and 'all other developments that benefit the
public in general' [Article 2]. The district council
must approve the purpose [Article 3]. Plans for
using the property must be prepared prior to
appropriation [Article 4]. Two to four experts will
evaluate the property [Article 4]. The price to
be paid will be set at present day values [Article
4]. The owner may protest the price or other
aspects of the appropriation, up to the Minister.
Payment had to be made to the owner, in the
presence of a judge [Article 9]. If the property
is not used for the purpose intended, then the
owner may buy the property back and at the price
it was sold to him [Article 11]. If a tenant is on
the property then he shall be compensated in
accordance with current regulations and customs
[Article 13]. The value of improvements and inputs
such as seeds and labour that have been put into
the property that year will be included in the
purchase price paid by government [Article 14].
Land Survey and Statistics Law 1965
[31 Jawsa 1344]
Summary
This law comprised 70 Articles with the aim to
"acquire land statistics of the country, to maintain
land register and to organize tax affairs." (Article
1) This was primarily to be through the issue and
completion of tax declaration forms. These were
to be distributed free to all landowners, and
completed in quadruplicate, attested by witnesses
and by the chief of the village, returned to the
declaration office and which would issue a receipt
[Articles 1-4].
Interestingly, provision was made for communal
property also to be registered [Article 5(f)].
Chapter three provided for the cadastral survey
department to be set up and to conduct surveys
of "all useable land in Afghanistan whether it is
of private or public ownership." [Article 13] The
cadastral survey was to ascertain and mark the
lot boundary lines and to determine the area of
each parcel or lot. [Article 15] Record of this
would cancel all prior documents relating to the
land. [Article 15] The cadastral survey was to set
boundary marks to facilitate relocation of the
property boundary lines. [Article 16] and cadastral
maps would be prepared and each lot given a
number and located on the map [Article 17].
Information about the lots and their claimants
would be made public "for at least three days"
[Article 19]. Where no disputes arise, certificates
of title will be printed and issued to the registered
owner 90 days after the issuance of the decree
of registration. [Article 20] "No certificate of title
shall be delivered to the lot claimant where there
exist boundary disputes until adjudicative decision
has been rendered by the land registration court."
[Article 20]
"The land statistics deputy shall prepare a land
registration system for the parcels surveyed.
Landowners shall provide all necessary information
as to their rights of ownership to the land and
their rights of water supply, its limitations, or
modes of conveyance, to the land statistics office."
[Article 21]
Failure to register ownership will render the land
to the government. [Article 26]
Critical institutions: the land statistics office, to
which applications for information, or change of
details are made, the land registration court to
hear disputes as to boundaries or other matters
at any time. A property clearance department
under the Ministry of Finance was also to be
established and its mobile committee charged
with identifying excess holdings. [Chapter Four]
"The possession of a legal certificate of ownership,
legal settlement, legal document or its equivalent
shall be deemed as evidence of ownership. [Article
32] Somewhat loose definition, clarified in Article
43 as able to be defined and registered on the
basis of the following :
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• all royal decrees as to the sales or awards in
favour of the landowner which prove private
ownership;
• the orders issued from the prime ministry as
to the sale of lands;
• all legal deeds of ownership;
• affidavits of common usage; and
• all documents which pertain to rights of
irrigation waters, land tax receipts, tax list,
etc.
A condition for usability of most of the above is
that ten villagers or close neighbours vouch for
the validity of the document [Article 43].
Jerib defined as 1936 square metres [Article 46].
Chapter Five provided for redistribution. "All
excess land will be determined after the property
undergoes survey and the area possessed over
and above the allowable land for private
ownership, after being considered by the
Committee of Assessors, will be declared excess
land." [Article 47] The amount that is considered
"excess" is not directly stated but in later clauses
referred to as 50 jeribs of irrigated land [25 acres]
100 jeribs of partly irrigated land with one crop
[50 acres] and 150 jeribs of rain-fed land [75
acres] [Articles 55, 60].
"The owner may determine from which of his land
the excess shall be taken." [Article 51]
Also, the potential for large holdings to be broken
down into smaller plots holdings is provided:
"Whenever the Committee of Assessors comes
across any inherited property which has not been
apportioned yet, the matter will be directed to
the Court for legal apportionment, and then the
Committee will deal with each of the heirs
separately." [Article 52]
Government lands are defined as including:
• lands developed by Government and registered
as its own;
• wastelands not registered as private or
government land;
• moquofa lands, lands given by government
or persons for some special of charitable
purpose; to be dealt with as "specialised
properties." [Article 54]
Possession: Article 55 provides that if a person
has occupied wasteland continuously for 20 years
he shall be awarded the ownership, after proved
by verbal testimony of ten prominent persons in
the village and the village chief, and if has no
other land or garden in excess of 50 jeribs,
inclusive of this land.
Government land may be sold following the Manual
for Nomadic Tribes. [Article 56] Reclamation of
wastelands is encouraged, with permission of
government, and re-claimer may gain a certificate
of title. [Article 57] Land allocated to nomads,
banished persons or settlers may not be sold for
20 years. [Article 62]
Pasture
Pasture is defined. Article 63 says that, "Lands
situated on hills or in valleys or deserts etc which
have been grazing fields in the past will remain
pasture land. Provincial governors shall direct
the delimitation and survey of pastureland within
their respective jurisdictions after which survey
returns shall be forwarded to the provincial land
offices and a copy thereof will be forwarded to
the Ministry of Finance. Provincial governors are
enjoined to administer and to supervise
pasturelands." [Article 63]
And that, "The conversion of pasture land for
agricultural purposes is prohibited..."[Article 64]
"Pasture lands are open to the public, provided,
however that pasture land allocations from
governmental agencies heretofore granted shall
be recognised and respected. No pastureland shall
pass into private ownership. Grazing rights
(licences) are not transferable by the licensees.
Pastureland shall not be utilised other than for
grazing purposes." [Article 65] "Government
departments are not authorised to permit the
tillage of pasture land for revenue purposes or
to convert the same into agricultural land." [Article
67]
Law of Pasture Land 1970
Summary
The above articles were later built into a separate
Law of Pasture Lands 19 Hoot 1349 (1970). This
forbade purchase, sale or lease of pastures
[Articles 6-7] and confirmed the right of persons
with official documents to use the pasture [Article
15]. New rights to use the pastures can be acquired
through a decision made by the administrative
council of each province and the endorsement
thereof by the Ministry of Agriculture and irrigation
[Article 16].Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan
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Land Reform Law 1975 [15 Assad 1354]
Summary
This law comprises 44 Articles and came into
effect on 15 Assad 1355 (1976). The law established
ceilings [Article 2]:
• 100 jeribs of two crop, irrigated land [20 ha.]
• 100 jeribs of orchards [20 ha.]
• 150 jeribs of one crop irrigated land [30 ha.]
• 200 jeribs of rain-fed dry land [40 ha.]
Companies and private agricultural societies were
permitted to have more land as long as it was
arid and made cultivable [Article 3]. Heirs have
one year to transfer inherited surplus land to
another person prior to acquisition by the state
[Article 3].
Government acquisition of surplus land was to be
on the basis of compensation, to be paid over 25
years, along with two percent interest. [Article
10] In addition, improvements to the property
will be paid for ("trees, buildings 'and other
paraphernalia'"). [Article 5] Any land not covered
by proprietorship documents was to be considered
state property. [Article 7]
Land to the Landless - on Payment
Redistribution by government was to be to landless
Afghans with priority to the farmer of the land
(sharecropper, tenant, worker), landless nomads,
other farmers and land labourers and graduates
of agricultural and husbandry schools. [Articles
12-13] New owners were to be given temporary
ownership documents pending payment for the
land. [Article 16] The new owner was given four
months to take possession of the land and duty
bound to exploit the plot. Failure to cultivate for
six months would also result in restoration to
government. [Article 42] No subdivision was
permitted. The owner would forfeit the land if
he took a job. [Article 18] Payment by the new
owner of the land could take place in instalments
and could be carried on by descendants, at rates
of three percent interest to cover administrative
costs. [Articles 16 & 22] Land received was not
to be transferred or mortgaged until fully paid
for. [Article 37]
Implementation
A special council of ministers was to be established
to devise guidelines, draft regulations etc. [Articles
23-25] A reform office was to be established under
the finance ministry to implement the law. [Article
26] A Special High Court on Land Reform was to
be formed to deal with disputes and its decision
was to be final. [Article 28]
Land Tax Law 1975
[No. 338 Saturday Saratan 1355]
Summary
This law is made on the basis of Order No. 367
from the Prime Ministry 26 Jalzal 1355 [1976]
Chapter 1: General
Article 1
The purpose of this law is to bring order to land
taxation.
Article 3
To charge tax is the right of government.
Article 4
All registered land will be classified in accordance
with Table 1. Therefore, all farmland will be
located within three classes and seven degrees.
Article 5
Owners may transfer land only when no land tax
is outstanding.
Chapter 2: Recognition and Receiving Tax
Chapter 3: Privileges and Exemptions
Article 17
An owner with two jeribs or less of Class I land
is exempt from paying tax.
A person who works land of five jeribs or less is
exempt from tax.
Land Category Area in Jeribs Amount that will be tax-exempt
I 5 or less 2
II 6 or less 2 + 100 square meters
III 7 + 1 beswa* 3
IV 12 + 10 beswa 5
V 25 or less 10
VI 33 + 10 beswa or less 13 + 10 beswa
VII 50 or less 20
* Beswa is one twentieth of a jerib or 100 square meters.
Table 1Issues Paper Series
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Article 18
State lands or property of municipality do not
need to pay tax.
Article 19
There will be a 20 percent discount for cooperative
members who own five or less jeribs and a 10
percent discount for those who own 10 jeribs or
less. This discount will only apply for as long as
the owner is a cooperative member.
Article 20
Lands that have been distributed in accordance
with the Law on Land Reform, and also dry land
that has been sold in order to develop agriculture,
will be tax exempt for three years.
Article 21
Farmland affected by natural disasters are exempt
until rehabilitated or for three years. An extension
may be applied for.
Article 22
If the harvest is affected for reasons of natural
problems then the taxation will be reduced or
cancelled for as long as the owner can give
convincing reasons as to why he is unable to pay.
Reduction will be in accordance with the extent
of evidential damage.
Chapter 4: Criminal Orders
[Not translated]
Chapter 5: Miscellaneous Orders
[Not translated]
Article 26
All landowners including those who in accordance
with this law are enjoying exemptions, if they
have any taxation due before this date, must pay
before the end of Dalwa 1355. Otherwise they
will be fined.
Article 27
The tax-paying body has to inform the concerned
authorities if there are any changes in the
classification of his land for these purposes:
(i)  if the class of the land has dropped down
and the period and the basis of taxation will
be the new classification;
(ii) and if the degree has gone up, in that case,
the new level of taxation will be taken from
the fourth year from the date it has risen;
and
(iii) the Ministry of Finance has the authority to
determine changes in the degree of lands.
Article 28
If every member of a family has his or her own
land, the tax due will be assessed based on the
total area.
Article 29
The Ministry of Finance is responsible for preparing
and implementing the orders of land taxation in
accordance with this law.
Article 30
All previous laws on taxation are hereby repealed.
This law will commence on the date of this
gazette.
The Land Reform Decree, No. 8 of 1978
Chapter One: General Orders
Article 1
This order is given based on the aim of the People's
Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the superior
goals of the great revolution of (Thour) for the
purpose of practically implementing Orders I and
II of basic and revolutionary duties of the
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and for other
purposes, such as:
• To abolish the feudal and ex-feudal relations
for the country's social and economic system;
• To generalise and deepen the relationship
between labourers and farmers to empower
the unity of the people of Afghanistan and
make a society free of class distinctions and
exploitation;
• Increasing the agricultural productivity to
provide adequate and varied food types, raw




Family: comprises husband, wife and children of
under 18 years of age ...a person who is 18 years
old or above but not married is considered a
family in respect of land distribution
Landless farmer: a person who does not own
private land and works on someone else's land
based on a previously signed agreementLand Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan
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Farmer who owns inadequate land: person who
directly works on the land and owns less than
five jeribs of 5th grade land [rain-fed]
Agricultural worker/labourer: person who does
not own land but does some agricultural or related
activities on the land, based on an agreement
and who receives salary in goods or money
Owner: person who legally occupies his land and
has a legal document for this;
Nomad with lowest financial ability: this refers
to a person whose sole income source is doing a
shepherd's job
Plot: the land that is occupied by one or more
persons holding in common ... gardens and
vineyards are counted separately from the lands
that are not used for gardens and vineyards even
when they are owned by the same person
Area of farmland: one or several plots of land
that are fully or partly owned by one person and
which are located as one plot or many plots in
one or many villages or districts or provinces
Excess land: that part of one's farmland that is
more than the permitted amount to be owned in
accordance with this edict.
Article 3
No family must occupy more than 30 jeribs [6
ha.] of the first grade land or equivalent to that
amount.
Article 4
No one is allowed to mortgage, lease or sell lands
that are considered more than the quorum, excess
and other lands that are to be distributed in
accordance with the clauses of this edict.
Chapter Two:  Regulation of Irrigation
Article 5
Water distribution must be done fairly in order
to make best use of water resources.
Article 6
The capacity of annual water flow in a channel
or other source of irrigation is to be fixed by the
Ministries of Water and Power and Agriculture
and accordingly to the capacity the annual amount
of water that is give to each jerib of land in a
fair manner.
Article 7
Repairing of water taps and other irrigation
structures must take place based on the protocol
signed between the area's irrigation reconstruction
department and either the farmer or cooperative.
Chapter Three: Land Distribution
Article 8
Land that is, according to this law to be distributed
to eligible applicants is as follows:
• more than the quorum of permitted land to
be held; and
• land that is gifted to the government.
Article 9
The Department of Land Reform will take
possession of lands that are excess of the quorum
and without giving payment.
Article 10
Land is divided into three categories and seven
grades. To adjust these with the first grade the
following co-efficient is to be observed.
FIRST CATEGORY
First grade garden, vineyard, two-season irrigated
I: 1.00
Second grade two-season irrigated: 0.85
SECOND CATEGORY
Third grade one-season irrigated 50%+ :0.40
THIRD CATEGORY
Fourth and fifth grade rain-fed land cultivated
every second year: 0.20
Sixth grade rain-fed land cultivated after every
two years: 0.10
Article 11
The measurement unit is jerib, equivalent to
2,000 square metres or one fifth of one hectare.
Half a jerib or less is not counted when measuring
the area of farmland, but more than half a jerib
is counted as one jerib.
Article 12
One plot of any grade is distributed without any
charge to the eligible applicant and his family
according to the following:
• Garden and vineyard (first grade): 5 jeribs
• Two seasonal irrigated (second grade): 6 jeribs
• One seasonal irrigated (third grade): 8 jeribs
• One seasonal irrigated (fourth grade): 12 jeribsIssues Paper Series
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• Rain-fed land (fifth grade): 25 jeribs
• Rain-fed (sixth grade): 33 jeribs
• Rain-fed (seventh grade): 50 jeribs.
Land distributed to farmers who own inadequate
land must not exceed five (5) jeribs including his
previous land.
Article 13
One plot of land that includes two grades or more
must be converted to five jeribs of the first grade
based on the coefficients provided above and
then the excess distributed to eligible applicants.
Article 14
Lands must be distributed to the first grade
eligible applicants without observing the lottery.
Article 15
Observing the priority, land must be distributed
next to applicants of the second grade, then, if
land remains, to the third and fourth grade and
if distributable land still remains, the fifth and
sixth grade applicants get the land, based on the
lottery system. Priority among farmers who own
inadequate land goes to those who own the
smallest piece and those who are living nearest
to the distributable land.
Article 16
Lottery is to be done in public by the responsible
commission and when the majority of applicants
are present. The plot number that coincides with
the applicant's name will be distributed to him
in accordance with specified regulations.
Article 17
Structures and equipment belonging to the land
which are occupied and distributed to eligible
applicants or cooperatives, will be bought by the
Agricultural Development Bank for a reasonable
price and paid for in instalments over ten years,
and then sold to the applicants, cooperatives or
government farms. The Bank will receive the
money from applicants, cooperatives or
government over ten years under specified
conditions.
Article 18
Land belonging to government and government
organisations are not affected by this order.
Article 19
Every family or member of a cooperative may
develop and then occupy up to 30 jeribs of barren
land equivalent to the first grade, following
agreement with the Department of Land Reform.
Article 20
Excessive sub-division of farmland into small
pieces that reduce the value of agriculture and
harvest is prohibited and will be regulated.
Article 21
Government will specify areas of agriculture,
pasture and forest observing their economic
efficiency and environmental status.
Article 22
The date of land distribution to eligible applicants
in different regions of the country will be
announced through different orders of the
chairman of the revolutionary council, through
radio, press or television.
Chapter Four:  The Eligible Applicant and His
Responsibilities
Article 23
The following are requisite attributes of persons
considered eligible applicants for redistributed
land:
• Afghan nationality;
• 18 years of age or above;
• landless farmer or farmer owning inadequate
land, agriculture worker or vulnerable nomad;
• having no income source other than the money
received from working the land or as a
labourer;
• a person who promises that he or his family
members will develop the land and look after
it; and
• a person who must not be the heir of a
deceased owner, or if he is, must cancel his
position in writing.
Article 24
Prioritisation for eligible applicants is as follows:
FIRST-GRADE APPLICANTS:
• Landless farmers who are working on
distributable land; and
• Landless farmers or the farmer who owns
inadequate land whose land was occupied by
the government for a public use;
SECOND-GRADE APPLICANTS:
Landless farmers or agricultural worker of the
village where there is distributable land;Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan
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THIRD-GRADE APPLICANTS:
Farmers who own inadequate land in a village
where there is distributable lands that have
remained from a previous distribution to applicants
of grade one and grade two persons;
FOURTH GRADE APPLICANTS:
Landless farmers of a village where there is
distributable land and vulnerable nomad who
resides in that village (usually for one part of the
year);
FIFTH GRADE APPLICANTS:
Landless farmers or agricultural worker of the
province where there is distributable land; and
SIXTH GRADE APPLICANTS:
Landless farmers or nomads of other provinces
wherever distributable land is available.
Article 25
Eligible applicants have the following obligations:
• The applicant must complete the form and
submit it to the appropriate commission within
three months from the issuing date of this
edict;
• The applicant must report the specifications
of the land on which he works along with full
information as to its owner;
• The applicant is responsible for occupying
distributed land and developing it within three
months of it being distributed to him;
• The applicant must have direct contact with
the Department of Land Regulation of the
area and the Department of Land Matters;
• The applicant must take part in the
identification and numbering of distributable
land in his area;
• The applicant must pay the loan from the
Agricultural Development Bank as specified
in regulations; and
• The applicant must pay land tax on time.
Chapter Five:  Administration
Article 26
Commissions for solving disputes arising out of
implementing the orders of this edict will be
established at district and provincial levels.
Decisions of these special commissions at provincial
level will be final.
Article 27
Organisation, duties, powers and responsibilities
of the people's special committees regarding the
implementation of programmes are specified by
regulation.
Chapter Six: Distribution of Inherited Lands
Article 28
If the occupant dies, his family members must
develop his land
If the members of the family are either women
or young children who cannot work on the land,
they may give the land to a farmer to work on or
may lease the land until such time as one member
of the family is able to work the land.
Article 29
• Areas of more than 30 jeribs of first-grade
land or equivalent, which are the property
of the deceased, are considered more than
the permitted amount of land (quorum).
• The heirs may divide the land among
themselves provided that the portion for each
heir is not less than five jeribs of the first-
grade land or its equivalent
• If one or more heir does not receive land
because of shortage of land, they may apply
to receive distributable land.
Article 30
Heirs must not distribute excess land among
themselves.
Chapter Seven: Penalties and Orders
Article 31
• If a person does not register his land without
a legitimate excuse, his land will be considered
to belong to government.
• If a person gives more than 20 percent
information about his land which is incorrect,
then he will have the same amount taken
from him and that land will become the
property of government.
Article 32
Persons who destroy structures or equipment on
distributable land must pay three times more
than the real price of what has been destroyed
and those persons will also be put under
investigation.
Article 33
Violators of any order in this edict will be
sentenced to imprisonment for periods from one
month to three years.Issues Paper Series
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A Land Law of 1993
Decree of the President of Islamic State of
Afghanistan No. 182 of 02.08.1373 Regarding the
Cessation of Converting Pasture Lands to
Agricultural Lands
The following clauses are approved for making
better use of pastures, in order to feed and cherish
animals and developing the quality and quantity
of animal production that is one of the basic
elements of the country's national economy:
(1)  No one can convert areas of pasture to
farmland for his personal use.
(2) Violators of this order will be dealt with and
punished.
(3)  Governors of the provinces and especially the
governor of Kunduz are responsible to secure
and look after pastures in accordance with
this law.
(4)  This edict is in effect after being signed and
must be published in the official Gazette and
other print media.
(5) After this decree comes into effect, all
documents contrary to this decree are
cancelled.
Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani
President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan.
Chapter Eight:  Miscellaneous
Article 34
Occupiers must cultivate land in accordance with
instructions from the Ministry of Agriculture as
to what is appropriate for that land type.
Article 35
If the Commission of Land Reform observes that
during an operation a person has occupied th4e
land of another but does not hold a legal document
and it is found to be correct on investigation then
all but 10 jeribs of first-grade land will be taken
over as government property.
Article 36
The Afghan Fertilizer Company or other companies
will open branches in areas where land reform
has been undertaken and will provide loans,
distribution of seeds, equipment and other items
as appropriate to their business.
Article 37
If a person loses a characteristic mentioned in
Article 23 then his land will revert to government
and be distributed to another eligible applicant.
Article 38
Government may specify regulations to further
the implementation of this edict.
Article 39
After this edict is in effect, the Land Reform Law
of 1354 and articles of any other law that is
contrary to this law is cancelled.Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan
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LAW ON LAND 1996
Taliban Decree No. 837 dated 28.3.1375 [1996]
The opinion of the Supreme Leader regarding
government land in respect of the seeking of
detailed advice on a legal or religious matter,
based on Shariat, following the opinion of a
central council of scholars, is approved for
implementation.
(1) Those pieces of public lands that were given
to any person after the Saur Revolution
including during Rabbani's time (1978-1996)
or by any local power, without the issue of
documents, without going through the correct
legal process, and the person who received
the land has not occupied the land, until the
issuance of new orders, this land remains
under the control of the government.
(2) Those government lands that have been given
to a person by Rabbani or local powers with
the issue of legal documents and the person
has occupied the land, that land will remain
under lease to the occupier until further
orders.
(3) Those government lands that people have
occupied without having any legal or real
documents must be given through public
lease.
LAW ON LAND UNDER DECREE NO. 57 Taliban
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Ministry of Justice
Issue No. 795, 2000261
This law is presented along with other agricultural
sector laws in Gazette No. 795. Other subjects
under this volume of mainly agricultural laws and
which together fall under Decree No. 57 of 2000,
include the following -
Forests, nature protection, plant disaster
prevention, veterinary services, hunting and
wildlife protection, pasture and public lands,
organisation of agriculture and livestock activities,
plant disaster prevention services, import and
distribution of veterinary drugs, rules for the
department of agricultural cooperatives, rules
for the staff of the institute of agricultural
monitoring, rule for salary distribution to tractor
and combine harvester staff, charter of agricultural
activities of parastatals, charter of the parastatal
for improved seed production, order of the
supreme leader concerning working restrictions
for women in local and international NGOs, order
of the supreme leader regarding the prevention
of poppy cultivation, second order on the same,
message from the supreme leader regarding the
prohibition of opium cultivation [sic], order of
the supreme leader regarding posting and
employment of Taliban, mujaheddin and others,
order of the supreme leader regarding punctuality
of workers, order of the supreme leader regarding
taboos on unlawful activities during the war,
order of the supreme leader concerning stopping
machines after the call for prayers in the evening,
order regarding not accepting foreign attorney-
ship letters, order regarding the punishment for
aggressors, forgers, liars, etc. and order prohibiting
service by government officers to persons who
have trimmed their beards.
The Land Decree comprises twelve chapters as
follows:
CHAPTER 1: General Orders
CHAPTER 2: Documents Relating to Land
Ownership
CHAPTER 3: Categorising Land
CHAPTER 4: Redistribution of Taken Lands to
their Original Owners
CHAPTER 5: Eligible Applicants
CHAPTER 6: Land Distribution
CHAPTER 7: Land Transfer
CHAPTER 8: Leases
CHAPTER 9: Religious lands [Waqfi] and Public
Lands [Maraa]
CHAPTER 10: Distribution of Agricultural and Non
agricultural lands
CHAPTER 11: Penalties
CHAPTER 12: Final Provisions
An informal translation of certain chapters follows.
Chapter Two: Documents Containing the Legal
Right of Ownership
Article 4
Documents representing or demonstrating rights
of land ownership include:
Appendix K: Translation of Selected Current Land Laws
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(1) Document in accordance with Shariat as issued
by a court for the purchase, ownership, gift,
distribution, exchange of land, surrender
letter, correction letter, and the document
of the final decision of a court based on the
issue of an ownership document, and which
will be valid under the following conditions:
(a) where there is an original copy in the
court. Documents that are not registered
in the court will be considered legal only
after approval of the court;
(b) where there are documents demonstrating
a right where there is no evidence against
its legitimacy; and
(c) land where there is a valid taxation
certificate.
(2) Purchase documents issued by order of the
emirate and the prime ministry will be valid
under the following conditions:
• Where the document has been issued by
the correct authorised body or
department;
• Where the land is registered under the
taxation department.
(3) Tax paying documents are valid under the
following conditions;
* As set out in (2) above;
* Where the land is noted in the original
book of registration and taxation;
(4) Documents of haqaba [water rights] are valid
under the following conditions;
• where there is no evidence against their
legitimacy;
• where the land is shown in the registration
book of ownership and taxation;
(5) Urfee [customary] documents will be valid
under the following conditions;
the seller of the land must have the
appropriate document acknowledging sale;
the customary document should have been
prepared before the 15th of Asad 1354 [1975]
and the buyer should have filled the
declaration form and after approval by the
neighbouring landowners, submitted the
document to the concerned department
before the year 1357 [1978].
In areas where the declaration form had not
been distributed prior to 1357 or it was
distributed but the registration book has been
fully destroyed, if there is no dispute
concerning the ownership of the land and the
purchase and occupation of the land is
recognised as valid by the neighbours and the
area's state department, then the document
will be accepted as valid.
(6) Formal documents of land will be recognised
under the following conditions:
The basic document of the land indicating
the legal right should be available;
The document must be sent to the concerned
authority after completing the process;
The document must be shown as registered
in the book of ownership and taxation;
There must be no contrary legal claim on the
land.
Legal land document (qabala Shariat) will be
recognised under the following conditions:
• The document must have been prepared
by the appropriate court after completion
of the legal registration process; and
• The document must be shown to be
registered in the book of ownership and
taxation.
Article 5
Documents that are not registered in the book of
ownership and taxation do not necessarily render
them illegitimate under Article 4. Documents
under the third part of that article are excepted.
Any kind of flour mill or other structure or
agricultural equipment fixed on the land must be
put in the legal document of the land and
registered in the book of ownership and taxation.
Article 6
Documents demonstrating land ownership under
this law will be sent to the concerned court after
completion of the legal process by the concerned
person and the court will convert the Shariat
document into a legal state law document.
Article 7
A person who has land in many different areas
may gain his land document from the local court
where the land is situated after completion of
the appropriate formalities from the concerned
areas and specifying the total area of his land.
Article 8
The flourmills, traditional grinding machine, and
other agricultural structures that are not moveable
and are located in a person's farmland and are
known as his property, must be put on his land
documents and registered in the original book of
registration and taxation.Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan
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Article 9
The farmer who does not have a legal document
for his land and his land is not registered in the
ownership book of the government, if no one
claims that land and there is sign of structures
and agricultural activity, and the neighbours and
the local state authorities approve his occupation,
then the land may be known as his property.
If the emirate (government) is able to present
the documents showing that the above person's
occupation is illegitimate and this claim has not
been challenged by the passage of time and the
land is now known as the property of the emirate,
then in this case the following actions will be
taken;
If the land is 10 jeribs or less of first grade land
or its equivalent, it will remain with the farmer
and if the land is more than 10 jeribs of first
grade land, then the land will be sold to the
farmer at current market prices and this amount
may be paid in annual instalments over five years.
Article 10
Concerning an excessive holding, action as set
out in Article 9 will be taken.
Article 11
The following actions will be taken in respect of
those persons who have been resettled and who
have received land from government before this
law came into effect:
(1) If a resettled person or his children who has
paid all instalments due on the land, then he
will receive a document of ownership;
(2) If some instalments have been paid, then the
outstanding amount will be recalculated at
present day values and on its payment the
document will be issued;
(3) If the settler has paid none of the amount
due, the price will be fixed in accordance
with present day values and once paid, the
document of ownership will be issued;
(4) If the settler or his children because of some
local problems or difficulties has been forced
to leave the land and returns and no
government structure was in the interim built
on that land, and when his previous occupancy
is recognised by the neighbours and at least
five reliable people of the area, then the
authorities may give him the right of
occupancy and when payment on all due
instalments has been made at present day
values, and issue a document of ownership;
and if on part of this land a state building
was constructed, then the remaining part will
be given to the claimant and the part where
the building stands will be taken by the
government and will compensate him for the
loss if payment had been made. If the entire
land has been built on by government, then
the compensation will relate to the entire
estate.
Article 12
Those persons who have received land from
government have not paid for the land, will
receive only the occupation certificate and will
not be considered owners of the land. After
payment of the due amount they will receive
ownership documents.
Article 13
If the person loses his ownership documents then
another document will be issued.
Chapter Three: Classifying Land
Article 14
The Department of Land Classification of the
Ministry of Agriculture will be charge of technical
and administrative management of land.
The following departments have a common
responsibility in this regard:
• The High Court
• Ministry of Finance
• Ministry of Water and Power
• Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock
• Department of Survey and Mapping
• And the local concerned authorities.
Practical work will be carried out by the
classification missions in the area.
Article 15
The classification mission will perform in the
following manner: etc.
Article 16
The Commission for Clarification has the following
powers and responsibilities:
• Categorising farmland areas, distribution of
documents and distribution of land to eligible
applicants;
• Specifying farmland areas, distribution of
documents and lands to eligible applicants;
• Specifying the limits/area, grade and share
of water for lands;Issues Paper Series
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• Defining the differences and boundaries among
people's property, government property,
common lands, religious lands and barren
lands;
• Preparing documents for court and transfer
of disputes to authorised courts
• Registration of land areas and legal
documents;
• Sending the legal document for registration
to the property register and tax office in the
area;
• Delivering legal documents to owners;
• Restoring previously distributed lands (after
7th of Thour 1357) according to Shariat to its
owner, representative or heir/s; and
• Sending reports on activities to the
Department of Land Matters in the concerned
provincial and central offices.
Article 17
The Cadastral Department has the following
duties:
• Providing information about registered maps,
results of the cadastre and listing of probable
owners;
• Measuring and drawing of land parcels by
sketches;
• Determining land boundaries;
• Adjusting local measuring units to the jerib
system; and
• Undertaking necessary duties to identify
parcels on maps.
Article 18
Representatives of agriculture, water regulation
and taxation are responsible for defining the
grade, water share and tax class of properties.
Article 19
An owner or his legal representative must
cooperate with the clarification committee until
its work is complete.
Article 20
In order to carry out regional operations of
clarification, commissions are to be established
as follows:
• the governor will serve as chairman;
• the director of agriculture will serve as deputy
chairman;
• the accountant, chief of irrigation department,
chief of studies and land mapping and the
security commander of the city will be
members;
• chief of the land regulation department will
serve as secretary; and
• the commission must meet monthly or more
as necessary.
Article 21
A commission for regulating land issues is
established in Kabul to assist regional offices. Its
composition will be:
• the minister of agriculture and livestock will
be chairman;
• the deputy chairman will be the head of land
regulation;
• the members will include the director in
charge of information in the ministry of
agriculture, director of water regulation,
director of mapping and registration
(cadastre), director of income/benefit of
the Ministry of Finance; and
• the commission will meet quarterly or more.
Article 22
If it is known and proven during clarification of
boundaries that the land is different from
documentation, the committee will investigate
and make a decision on the matter.
Article 23
Government will compensate private owners for
land appropriated for public use.
If all or part of a persons land falls within land
belonging to a resettled eligible applicant who
has paid all due instalments for the land, then
government will compensate the applicant.
If the resettled person or eligible applicant has
paid a part of due instalments on the land, action
will be to taken to exchange that part.
Article 24
Land included in a project that was converted to
structures or residential housing before
clarification, will not be clarified by the
clarification commission and will be purchased
by the concerne4d department from the owner
or his heirs who can demonstrate legal documents
for that property.
Article 25
Disputes that cannot be solved by the clarification
commission will be sent to the court.
Article 26
The area of a deceased owner's land must be
legally distributed among heirs by the court in
the area.
Article 27
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b y the name of an elder of the village or someone
else may seek clarification of his right and
documents be issued as follows:
* Preparation of a description of the area of
land, boundaries and water shares, excluding
the person who occupies the land;
* Signatures and fingerprints of every occupier
to be taken; and
* Where land is owned by different individuals,
this must be indicated when re-registration
and clarification is undertaken.
Article 28
If the document of several owners in common is
undivided, then each person's portion equivalent
to the area in the ownership document or
equivalent in tax documents will be specified in
separate parts but if other participants do not
agree the matter will be referred to the court.
The occupied land beyond the commonly held
area as specified in the document will be
considered excess and action will be taken in
accordance with this law.
Article 29
Land that was registered in the name of a person
for tax payment, an agricultural purpose, or
lifelong responsibility and the person has paid
tax for at least 40 years, will be recognised as
his property.
Article 30
In areas where tax documents or other documents
have been destroyed and there are no copies in
the capital, will be clarified through Shariat.
Chapter Four: Redistribution of Taken Lands to
Farmers
Article 31
Lands which were occupied forcefully from their
owners or their children in accordance with the
communist regime following the 7th day of Thaor
1357 (1978) will be addressed through the following
actions:
(1) If the land has not been distributed, after
going through the process of claim and has
the documents, after these are reviewed and
approved, the land will be returned to the
claimant, his children or his representative;
(2) If the land was distributed and the owner
comes and claims the land, then the price of
the land at present day values will be taken
from the person who has taken the land and
given to the previous owner; if no agreement
can be reached between the two parties then
the land will be given to the previous owner,
or if he is dead, to his children, or his
representatives, and if the previous owner
claims all the harvests produced during the
past years, then the harvests will be returned
to the previous owner;
(3) The third part of this article is an exception.
If the taken land has been distributed to
organisation or government agricultural
farmlands and structures have been built on
the land, then the organisation which has
buildings on this land will have to pay the
price of this land at present day values and
that will be given to the previous owner, or
in accordance with the value of comparable
neighbouring lands. Also, this value must be
paid in one instalment. The assessment of
the value of the land will not include the
value of the buildings or developments on
the land; and
(4) If the taken land comes under a city master
plan, the organisation that will build on it
will have to compensate the original owner.
Article 32
If the land was distributed to a person and he or
his children has given or sold the land to another
person contrary to the documented agreements
at the time, the following actions will be taken:
(1) If the distributed land was transferred to
another person and no non-agricultural
changes have been made, then the land will
be given to its real owner and those who have
bought the land will receive their money from
the person who sold the land to them;
(2) If structures were built on the land, provided
the previous owner agrees, the price will be
paid by the one who constructed the buildings
to the previous owner; if the previous or real
owner does not agree and the value of the
building is equal to the land, the building
must be evacuated and given to the original
owner;
(3) If the shape of the land was changed in a
way that decreased the value of the land,
the current occupant will have to return the
land along with the amount of value lost.
Article 33
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exchanged with someone else's land, the following
actions will be taken:
(1) If there is no change in the agricultural
character of both lands, the lands will be
returned to their real owners;
(2) If after exchanging, the exchanged lands were
distributed to others, the exchanged lands
will be returned to their real owners; and
(3) If structures have been built on the exchanged
lands or the person whose land was exchanged
with others' land changes the land or transfers
it, then the original owner of the land has
the right to choose either to take the land or
the value of the land.
Article 34
If a persons in accordance with the law is
recognised as the owner of the land but he is
absent and because of his absence restitution of
the land is not possible, then to secure his property
or his right, the authorised court will appoint a
legal professional consulting with the department
of land issues of the Ministry of Agriculture will
act responsibly to secure the property of the
absent person.
Article 35
If the property of the government or the property
of the people based on the laws of that time
contrary to Islamic Shariat were distributed to
the people or the lands were occupied by the
people informally, the following actions will be
taken regarding this issue:
• If the property is private property, it will be
returned to the real owner, his children or
his representatives;
• If it is state property, or if it is private property
but the owner has no deserving children, the
land will be go to the state; and
• Regarding sub-article number one and two,
the person whose land was occupied illegally
does not have any right to claim any
degradation or losses to the land.
Chapter Five: Eligible Applicants
Article 36
A person having the following attributes is eligible
to receive land:
• a citizen;
• 18 years of age or above;
• a farmer who has no land or insufficient land
to farm;
• a farm worker;
• a retired state worker; and
• a nomad.
The person should promise that he or any male
member of his family will look after the land and
work on the land.
Article 37
Prioritisation of applicants will be undertaken by
three elders and the village leader, the mullah,
and the commission.
Article 38
The legitimate applicant, after his legitimacy has
been established, must first fill the form and
return the form within fifteen days to the
commission. After receiving the land he must
commence work on the farm. He must pay the
value of the land, in instalments if wished. He
must pay tax on time.
Article 39
The legitimate applicant having the characteristics
under Article 36 will be prioritised as follows:
(1) [a] the farmer who has no land and who has
a large family;
[b] the farmer who has no land and whose
land was appropriated by government;
(2) the landless farmer or labourer living in an
area where land is available for distribution;
(3) the farmer with insufficient land and the
retired state worker who has served the
government for at least 25 years and instead
of his pension he will receive land. In this
case, fourteen years of his service under the
communist regime will not be counted.
(4) The vulnerable nomad who usually stays part
of the year in a village where there is land
to be distributed and other nomads.
Article 40
Vulnerable tribes, communities and nomads who
are taken from one place to another place and
settled there by the government must complete
their documents evidencing that they no longer
have land in the former location in the concerned
court of the area. The Department of Land Matters
will recognise them as the fourth category of
deserving applicants. If there is land in the area
where they are to be resettled, they will be given
it.
Ministries of Agriculture and Livestock, Water and
Power, Education, Public Health, Communication
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responsible for carrying out their duties in respect
of these people.
Article 41
In case the eligible applicant dies the following
actions will be taken concerning the distributed
land:
(1) The heirs of the deceased person may work
on the land after finishing paying due
instalments; After payment of the due
instalments the heirs have the right to divide
the land among themselves or to transfer the
land to someone else.
(2) If the heirs are underage or all female or they
have a health problem, they may give the
land to a farmer or worker to work on it, or
may lease the land.
(3) If the eligible applicant or his heirs do not
want to work the distributed land, after this
law comes into effect, they may return the
land to the government and be repaid
instalments paid.
Article 42
Eligible applicants who are married or who are
responsible for a family have higher priority that
those who are single who are in the same
classification of applicants.
Chapter Six: Land Distribution
Article 43
Provided there is no need to establish farm or
any project on them, the following lands may be
distributed:
(1) gifted lands to the Islamic Emirate, only when
not gifted for a specific purpose
(2) state agricultural lands and waste lands that
have recently been made ready for
agriculture.
Article 44
(1) Lands will be distributed to the eligible
applicants when requested by the Ministry of
Agriculture and Livestock and with the
approval of the Supreme Leader. Payments
of a fair price will be made in instalments
over a ten-year period and until the
instalments are completed the applicant will
have the land on approval.
(2) The price of the land, considering the price
in the local area and the time of distribution
will be fixed by the High Commission
appointed by the Supreme Leader.
(3) The specified time for due instalments after
this law is in effect will be one year.
Article 45
The law is divided into three classes and seven
grades for the purposes of clearing the documents
specifying ownership and distribution of the land.
While changing the grades to grade one the
following calculations will apply:
(1) Grade I: gardens, orchards, vineyards or two-
season irrigated land x 100
Grade II: two season-irrigated land x 0.85
[two crops per year]
(2) Grade III: one-season irrigated land where 50
percent or more is annually irrigated x 0.67
Grade IV: one-season irrigated where 15-50
percent is annually irrigated x 0.40
(3) Grade V: one-season irrigated land where less
than 15 percent is cultivated and irrigated
and also rain-fed lands that are cultivated
every other year x 0.20
Grade VI: Rain-fed land that is cultivated
after every two years x 0.15
Grade VII: Rain-fed land that is cultivated
after more than two years x 0.10.
Article 46
The unit for measuring land is jerib which is 2,000
square metres or one fifth of one hectare. To
calculate the area of land for distribution the
area less than one half a jerib or less than that
is not calculated. More than half a jerib will be
counted as one jerib.
Article 47
Distribution to ineligible applicants of any of the
grades of land will be done as follows:
Grade I (garden, vineyard, orchard) two hectares
equivalent to 10 jeribs;
Grade II (two season irrigated) 12 jeribs;
Grade III (one season irrigated) 15 jeribs;
Grade IV (one season irrigated) 25 jeribs;
Grade V (one season irrigated and rain-fed) 50
jeribs;
Grade VI (rain-fed cultivated every two years) 66
jeribs; and
Grade VII (rain-fed cultivated every three or more
years) 100 jeribs.
Article 48
The average annual income or benefit of the land
of one jerib of land will be specified differently
according to the area or regions by agriculture
and irrigation departments or the department of
mapping and land registration and the body which
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Article 49
If the number of the applicants is more than the
land available in every grade, the grade will be
distributed based on lots in public.
Article 50
(1) The small and scattered remaining pieces of
land will be distributed first to the
neighbouring farm workers who have
inadequate land, secondly to the neighbouring
land owners, or to those who have the least
land in the area, sold at present day values.
In this case, the buyer will have to pay the
money in one instalment.
(2) If the owners mentioned in sub-article do not
want to buy the land, the land will be sold
at public auction.
Article 51
The Ministry of Water and Power gives agricultural
projects to the Department of Land Matters
provided that there is no need to establish a state
agricultural farm on it.
Chapter Seven: Land Transfer and Development
Article 52
Eligible applicants, resettled persons have the
right to transfer their land after payment of all
due instalments, and after obtaining legal
documents. Heirs may also transfer land after
subdivision is specified.
Article 53
Permanent transfer of land for structures and
immovable equipment must be effected under
legal Shariat documents.
Article 54
Land transfer is to take place in a local court
through the Department of Land Regulation and
Organisation. Registration of land transfer in the
Department of Tax is to be effected without
charge. The local court will receive some of the
property as transfer tax.
Article 55
Any changes to a property in grading it or in its
quantity will be registered.
Article 56
Transfer of government land to other departments
will take place through the Department of Land
regulation of the Ministry of Agriculture and
Livestock, after approval from the Supreme
Leader.
Article 57
Persons who hold land in different areas may
exchange land with government provided that
land is not under a farmland project of
government.
Article 58
Land exchange between two people is to be done
by legal document in the local court.
Article 59
The following actions will be taken in respect of
farm land distributed during the communist regime
(from 7th of Thour 1357 to 8th of Thour 1371) to
cooperatives, organisations and private companies:
• If the body is operative, it must pay the cost
for the land according to present-day values
• If the body is not operative government will
take the land without compensation.
Article 60
Land transfer that takes place contrary to this
law is not accepted.
Chapter Nine: Area of Maraa (Public Lands) and
Waqfi (Religious Lands)
Article 84
Maraa is publicly owned property. Neither an
individual nor government may occupy this land
but rights to its use may be obtained through
Shariat provisions.  Maraa is kept unoccupied for
public requirements such as pasture graveyards,
dumps etc.
Article 85
Where a person has occupied maraa, even if the
occupation is of longstanding, if it is proven to
be maraa, then the land will be taken from him.
Article 86
The property or land that becomes waqfi is no
longer recognised as private property.
Selling, gifting, giving for occupation or inheriting
of waqfi property or land is not permitted.
A property which has been given for waqfi for a
specific purpose must be used only for that
purpose.
Chapter Ten: Distribution of Virgin Lands and
Barren Lands That Are Ready for Cultivation
Article 87
(1) No one is permitted to occupy virgin or barren
land except with permission of the supreme
leader.Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan
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(2) If a person has occupied barren land and does
not have a letter of permission from the
supreme leader then he is not known as the
owner.
(3) Distribution of virgin and barren land will be
undertaken by the department of land affairs
of the Ministry of Agriculture after approval
of the supreme leader.
(4) Virgin and barren lands will be sold to the
user at a fair price, based on agreement
between the Department of Land Matters and
the buyer. The previous occupant will have
priority to purchase.
(5) An evaluation commission will be established
with representatives from different ministries
including the Cadastre Department and will
fix the price of the land. The Department of
Land Matters may review the price fixed. The
price will be approved by the Board of
Ministers and finally by the supreme leader.
(6) Payment for the land must be in five
instalments within five years of the date of
distribution.
Article 88
(1) The lands that are designated for distribution
must be the property of the government,
either barren or virgin and they should not
be under any plan like the city master plan,
or plans for pasture and mineral development.
Private lands are not allowed to be distributed.
(2) Evaluation of virgin and barren lands by the
profession commission consisting of the
representatives mentioned in sub-article 3 of
Article 87 of this law before distribution will
be undertaken for the following purposes:
(a) to asses whether the land is useable for
construction or agriculture;
(b) to conduct the concerned area's survey;
(c) to find and specify the water resources
and deep wells in terms of underground
and surface water;
(d) to ensure that the neighbouring land
interests are protected for development
of the land in terms of water rights and
other important issues; and
(e) to reconstruct and construct water dams
and channels for irrigating the area.
Article 89
Specifying the criteria for distribution of virgin
and barren lands for establishing agricultural
farms by private and joint companies using
agricultural machinery is to be carried out as
follows:
• To individuals up to 20 ha.;
• To agricultural companies up to 100 ha.; and
• To joint companies up to 500 ha.
Article 90
The applicant for virgin or barren land must submit
a letter to the Department of Land Matters in the
capital or provinces. The application letter must
be assessed by the Commission of Assessment and
Transaction and handed to the Central
Department.
Article 90
The applicant for barren or virgin land must submit
a letter to the Department of Land Matters. The
letter will be evaluated by the Provincial
Commission of Assessment and Transaction and
then handed over to the Central Department of
Land Matters. The time limit for considering
applications of land up to 500 ha. is three years.
Article 91
As soon as the farmer starts work on the land, he
will be issued an interim document. After payment
of instalments, the user will be issued a legal
Shariat document for his land.
If it is proven that the user has not continued to
develop the land in accordance with the
agreement, the land will revert to government
and the interim document cancelled. Previously
paid instalments will be returned to the user.
Article 92
The user is exempt from paying tax from his first
harvest for five years.
Article 93
Ministries of Agriculture and Livestock, Water and
Power, Mines and Industries, the Agricultural
Development Bank and other concerned
Departments have the following duties:
• Surveying farms;
• Reconstruction and renovation of dams and
channels that are government's responsibility;
• Providing credit for irrigation development
and other developments in accordance with
Shariat and banking law;
• Helping provision of machinery, seeds,
improved animals, drugs for animals, etc.;
• Providing technical advice; and
• Assisting marketingIssues Paper Series
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Articles 94 -96 Not Translated
Article 94 provides for the distribution of virgin
and barren lands, to be effected through
preparation of three copies of agreements.
Article 95 provides for the monitoring of
development of virgin and barren lands.
Article 96 provides guidance on production in
annual development plans.
Article 97 makes users responsible for developing
the lands following directions on crop production
Article 98
Channels belonging to private properties must be
bought by the user at present day values.
Article 99
The transfer and sale of virgin and barren lands
is possible after obtaining legal documents based
on Shariat. In the case of death, the heirs may
take over responsibilities and secure legal
documentation for the land.
Article 100
If the Department of Land Matters is unable to
solve disputes regarding rehabilitation of virgin
and barren lands, then the cases must be referred
to the courts.
LAW ON PASTURE AND MARAA (Public Lands)
Under Decree 57 of Gazette Issue No. 795 of
2000
Article 2
(1) All types of land including hills, deserts,
mountains, riverbeds, forests that have places
where grass grows and supports animals are
known as pasture.
(2) Pasture falls into two classes: (a) private
pasture, which includes maraa (local public
land)
(b) public pasture, including barren lands
(mawaat), in accordance with sub Article 9
of Article 2 of Law of Land Regulation, and
land on the edges of cities and villages.
Article 3
(1) Pasture may only be used for feeding animals.
(2) Private pasture may be used by residents of
the adjacent communities.
(3) Public pasture may be used by anyone.
Chapter Two: About Private Pasture
Article 4
(1) If a person or government is unable to prove
ownership over a private pasture, they may
not occupy it as an owner.
(2) Residents of an area may use the pasture for
feeding their animals in accordance with this
law.
(3) The right of using pasture cannot be bought
or sold.
Article 5
(1) The area of pasture must be specified, marked
and registered, based on Shariat by a
Commission.
(2) If the pasture area had not been previously
described before this law comes into effect,
then the council of ministers must appoint a
commission for implementing sub-article 1
of this article in every province.
Article 6
Buying, selling and leasing pasture is prohibited.
Article 7
Areas of private pasture are not to be sold or
leased for expansion of agricultural activities or
any other purposes.
Government development projects for public
utility are exempted from this order.
Article 8
The Council of Ministers may pay compensation
for farmlands, private springs, channels that are
located in or around pasture which is useful for
public purpose.
Chapter Three: Public Pasture
Article 9
The mawaat pasture (barren lands) is for public
use, and its purchase, sale, or lease may only be
undertaken with the permission of the supreme
leader.
Article 10
The grazing of goats and camels in pasture found
within forests is prohibited in the public interest.
Article 11
The Council of Ministers may take necessary
actions in order to secure and improve the pasture.Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan
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Chapter Four Miscellaneous (not translated)
LAWS RELEVANT TO LAND PASSED BY THE
TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY 2002
Decree of the President of the Afghan Interim
Administration Ref No. (297) Date: 13, 03, 1380
on the Dignified Return of Refugees
The Afghan Interim Administration, confident
that the Bonn Agreement on Afghanistan dated
14.09.1380 (5 December 2001) has laid down the
foundation for lasting peace, stability and social
and economic progress in Afghanistan, safeguards
the right and freedom of all returnees, observes
the freedom of returnees to establish residence,
to participate in the process of reconstruction,
consolidation of peace, democracy and social
development, AIA guarantees their safe and
dignified return, expresses its gratitude and
thankfulness to the countries that have given
them refuge in the very difficult and hard days
Afghanistan experienced, and expects that in
conformity with the principle of voluntary
repatriation, Afghans will be given the opportunity
to decide freely to return to their country, and
declares the following:
Article 1.  Returning Afghan nationals, who were
compelled to leave the country and found refuge
in Iran, Pakistan and other countries of the world,
will be warmly welcomed without any form of
intimidation or discrimination.
Article 2. Returnees shall not be subject to
harassment, intimidation, discrimination or
persecution for reasons of race, religion,
nationality and membership of a particular social
group, political opinion or gender, and will be
protected by the State.
Article 3.  All returnees, irrespective of their
political affiliations, are exempted from
prosecution for all (with the exception of individual
criminal accusations) criminal offenses committed
up to 01.10.1380 (22 December 2001), prior to,
or in exile against the internal and external
security of the country, according to enacted
laws.
Article 4. The provisions of Article 3 of this decree
will not apply to those returnees who have
committed acts constituting a crime against peace
or humanity, or a war crime, as defined in
international instruments, or to acts contrary to
the purpose and principles of the United Nations.
Article 5. The recovery of movable and immovable
properties such as land, houses, markets, shops,
sarai, apartments and etc. will be effected through
relevant legal organs.
Article 6. All returnees will be guaranteed the
same human rights and fundamental freedoms
enjoyed by other citizens.
Article 7. The implementation of the provisions
of this decree is the responsibility of the Ministry
of Repatriation; law and order organs are obliged
to assist the Ministry of Repatriation in this task.
Article 8. UNHCR and other relevant international
agencies will be allowed to monitor the treatment
of returnees to ensure these meet recognized
humanitarian law and human rights standards,
and to ensure that commitments contained in
this decree are implemented.
Article 9. This decree is valid as of 1.10.1380 (22
December 2001) and will be printed in the Official
Gazette.
Hamid Karzai,
President, Afghan Interim Administration
Decree No 66 Date 16-11-1380 Decree on the
abolishing of all decrees and legal documents
enacted before 22 Dec 2002
Since the work of Interim Administration of
Afghanistan is based on Bonn Agreement and 1964
constitution and it has been emphasised that all
laws and regulation of Afghan Interim
Administration should be consistent with 1964
constitution. For the purpose of achieving this
objective the following articles are approved.
Article 1
All Laws, decrees and private constitutions, which
are inconsistence with 1964 constitution and Bon
agreement, are abolished.
Article 2
Ministry of Justice has been assigned to study and
review all legal document which were enacted
before 1 -10-1380 with the help of each relevant
ministry expertise, this study should be in the
light of Bonn agreement and 1964 constitution,Issues Paper Series
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the inconsistent provisions must be abolished and
may bring new amendments, addition and
cancellation, bearing in mind the new situation
needs, Ministry of Justice should propose these
changes to the cabinet for approval
Article 3
All Ministries are responsible to cooperate with
the justice ministry program for study the
procedure of work in relation to legal documents
Article 4
This decree is in force after its signature and will
be published in the official gazette
Hamid Karzai, President of Afghan Interim
Administration
Decree on the Establishment of Land and
Property Disputes Court No. 136 of 200t
Circular Letter No. 4035 dated 19.6. 1381262
Decree No. 136 dated 13.6.1381 of President of
Islamic Transitional Administration of Afghanistan
contains the following:
Based on the need for studying complaints of our
refugee and displaced compatriots, who want to
obtain their properties, a special court has been
established according to the following Articles
within the structure of Supreme Court:
Article 1
In this decree, ownership includes land, residential
houses, apartments, shops, commercial
warehouses and other real estate.
Article 2
Solving disputes of properties is limited on
possession, which has taken place in the absence
of the owner from 7 Saur 1357 (27 April 1978)
until the establishment of Interim Administration.
Article 3
This court is unique and centralised. If it is needed
its delegation travel to various provinces in order
to study the relevant cases, assigning this
delegation takes place with the proposal of chief
judge of the special court and approval of the
chief justice.
Article 4
This court shall have three judges.
Article 5
Relevant cases to the Special Court of Property
Dispute is investigated by the Dispute Resolution
Commission before being studied in the court;
and the special court issues its judgment after
receiving the view of commission as experts and
juries.
Article 6
Investigation of property dispute cases will be
performed by the direct request of individual's
real person and body corporate or referred by
relevant governmental departments.
Article 7
The decision of the court is final and must be
observed. Parties to the dispute cannot appeal
against the court decision. The reviewing of the
court judgment is the responsibility of President
of the Afghanistan Transitional Administration.
Article 8
The chiefs of police in Kabul and provinces are
responsible for the enforcement of the court
judgments.
Article 9
Distinction of forged documents is the
responsibility of this court and forgery cases are
referred to competence authority for further
follow-up and prosecution.
Article 10
Governmental departments are responsible for
the implementation of this decree.
Article 11
Personnel for the structure and budget of this
court are submitted by the supreme court and
will be approved by the President of the
Afghanistan Transitional Administration.
Article 12
Special courts on property disputes are active
until disputes on property exist.
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documents are valid will be held to be government
lands.
[Same as Taliban 1999 law]
Article 2
Those lands which have been under the control
of the government for more than 37 years and on
which the government has made developments
will be held to be government lands and no
individual claims for those lands will be heard.
[Article 2 of the Taliban 1999 law had 35 years]
Article 3
Whether destroyed or intact, karezes and water
canals which are not under proven private
ownership will be held to be government lands,
including those lands which are irrigated from
those karezes and water canals.
[Same as Taliban 1999 law]
Article 4
Housing land in urban areas which has been
allocated for the purpose of house construction
by the municipalities and where the time limit
has expired and no construction has taken place
for any legal reason, shall be returned to the
government.
[Same as Taliban 1999 law but with this additional
sub-clause 4 (2):
If the properties mentioned in sub-article 1 have
been given as compensation to the owner, then
they will remain with the owner even though he
has not developed the land.
Article 5
1  All those lands which before the enforcement
of this edict for which compensation was paid
in accordance with the law may not be subject
to individual claims.
[Same as Taliban 1999 law]
2  Those lands before this Edict for which
compensation was paid and upon which public
works such as roads, housing etc. have been
implemented but for which documents are
not held by Government will in general be
taken as government lands and no further
investigation is permitted, even where Shariat
documents testifying to the contrary are in
the hands of individuals.
[Same as the Taliban 1999 law]
3  All those lands for which compensation was
paid prior to this Edict but for which
documents have been lost from government
Article 13
This decree is effective after its signature and
must be published in the official gazette.
Hamid Karzai
President of Islamic Transitional administration
of Afghanistan
The decree is sent to you for your proper action.
Mawlawi Fazwal Karim Hadi Shinwari
Chief Justice
An Excerpt from the Law of Domestic and
Foreign Private Investment Decree No. 134 of
2nd Sumbula 1381 (2002) in Official Gazette
803 2002
Article 14
Foreign investors may lease land for short, medium
and long-term periods, in terms of 10 years, 20
years and 30 years. Lease of the land is tied to
the starting of the investment project. The
investment commission in convincing situations
may extend the above-mentioned periods.
Article 23
Compensation to foreign and domestic investment
is permitted only when public interest is involved.
In this instance the government pays the fair price
for it according to present-day values or through
the estimation of a reliable international
evaluation agency before the compensation takes
place.
Article 24
The investors may take the money received in
compensation out of the country without paying
tax on this income.
DRAFT EDICT ON LAND 1999 with notes in italics
comparing the content with that of the Taliban
Edict No. 26 of 13.4.1420 (1999)
For the purpose of adopting a comprehensive
approach to the issues of land and in order to
solve the problems of land issues between
government and individuals in an orderly and
consistent manner.
Part One: Government Lands
Article 1
All those lands for which no compensation has
been paid but which have been previously
registered as government land and for whichIssues Paper Series
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offices, will be held to be government land
if there are witnesses who may testify to the
fact, even where government has not
developed the property, and no individual
claims based upon Shariat documents may be
heard.
[Same as the Taliban 1999 law]
Article 6
All those lands which according to Shariat prove
the right of government may be taken as
government land.
[Same as the Taliban 1999 law]
Part Two: About Maraa Properties (Public Land):
Pastures (Charagha & Malchar) and Unused
Lands (Matroka)263
Article 7
Maraa is that kind of lands for which there is no
proof of ownership by either government or
individuals [Same as Taliban 1999 law but with
the following added sub-article (2):
If a man with a loud voice stands at the last
house of the village and shouts, the last point
at which he may be heard marks the beginning
of maraa. This clause has been dropped in the
draft Karzai edict.
Article 8
(1) Maraa is counted as public land for which
neither government nor individuals may bring
under their ownership, unless provided for
by a law.
(2) Maraa is to be used for public purposes such
as pasture, graveyards etc. and are to be
reserved for use by villagers.264
[Same as Taliban 1999 law]
Article 9
If any person has exercised ownership for a
substantial period over land that is proved to be
maraa then that   land shall be taken from him.
[Same as Taliban 1999 law]
Article 10: Private Land
(1) Private properties are those lands for which
private ownership is demonstrated in Shariat
or state law.
(2) Shariat property may be proved by the
evidence of legal documents, history of use,
the evidence of witnesses and by
developments that have been undertaken on
the land.
[Same as Taliban 1999 law]
Article 11: Waqfi
Waqfi means those private assets that are given
to God for common good.
[Same as Taliban 1999 law]
Article 12
(1) Upon donating land for waqfi, this land will
be no longer be considered as private
property.
(2) Waqfi land may not be sold, rented,
mortgaged, gifted or inherited.
(3) Land given as waqfi and the income from that
land will be used for the purpose for which
it was given.
[Same as Taliban 1999 law]
Article 13: Mawaat [wasteland, dry land and
desert]
(1)  Desert, mountains, hills, rivers, virgin lands,
barren lands and forests are to be known as
mawaat.
(2) Government land, private land, maraa land
and waqfi lands are excepted from the above.
[same as Taliban 1999 law]
Article 14
(1)  Nobody may bring mawaat land under his
ownership without obtaining the express
permission of the Head of State.
[same as Taliban 1999 law]
(2)  If any person has mawaat land without the
permission of the Head of State, this land
will not be considered to be private property;
occupation does not imply ownership. Only
the Head of State has the authority to approve
occupation.
[Same as Taliban 1999 law]
Article 15
Those lands in sub-article (2) of Article 14 may
be leased through auction. The previous occupant
has priority in award of the lease.
[Same as Taliban 1999 law]
263 Literally means “isolated” or “left behind” or “kept apart.”
264 Maraa could be interpreted as a form of common property, owned by a group or all.Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan
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Miscellaneous
Article 16
A person occupying or using government land will
not be forced to pay tax on that land unless and
until government ownership is proven.
[Same as Taliban 1999 law]
Article 17
(1) Those lands which are the subject of dispute
between government and people will remain
with government until such time as the
appropriate court makes a final decision.
[Same as Taliban 1999 law]
(2) Government may not construct buildings, sink
wells, plant trees or otherwise develop lands
mentioned in sub-article (1).
[Same as Taliban 1999 law]
Article 18
(1) All government properties such as agricultural
farms, plots or apartments, may be rented
or leased through auction.
[Same as Taliban 1999 law]
(2) With the exception of those government
ministries or enterprises which have their
own bank accounts, all revenue derived from
renting or lease of government lands will
accrue to the government account.
[Same as Taliban 1999 law]
Article 19
(1)  All government lands which from 7 Saur 1357
(1978) until the coming into force of this edict
have been distributed to individuals without
issue of documents and where no development
of the land has subsequently been undertaken,
will revert to government property.
[Same as Taliban 1999 law except that the
date is different; it mentions 7 Saur 1357
until 6 Mizan 1375 (1996)
(2) If land referred to in sub-article (1) has been
given to private persons and they have
subsequently developed the property, they
may directly apply to the joint commission
to be set up by each provincial government
to rent that property without public
advertisement.
[Same as Taliban 1999 law]
(3) If properties referred to under sub-article (1)
above are occupied without legal or Shariat
documentation, the land may rent or lease
that land from the joint commission as
identified in sub-article (2).
[Same as Taliban 1999 law but both this
clause not the Taliban clause contradict the
intentions of 19 (1).
(4 ) Developed or occupied lands must be given
to the individuals without lease.
[Same as in Taliban 1999 law]
(5) New occupation and incomplete construction
are strictly forbidden on government land.
[Same as Taliban 1999 law]
Article 20
With respect to government properties that have
been sold to the private sector by municipalities
or other government departments while no written
statement of the transfer is available such
transaction will not be considered legal or
legitimate in accordance with Shariat.
Same but with prior sub-article -
(1) With respect to government properties that
have been sold to the private sector by the
government from 7 Saur 1357 until the time
when this law comes into effect and if such
transactions have been undertaken in an
unfair or unjust manner, the transaction
must be cancelled. In case of cancellation,
a written order by the supreme leader is
required.
Article 21
Any person who leases or rents government lands
must hold the lease personally.
[Same as Taliban 1999 law but with a prior
sentence stating -
Concerning leases, the role of those who were
previously the representatives of relocated people
in Hilmand or other provinces, is now cancelled].
Article 22
(1) No one has the right to occupy forests or water
catchments, dig deep wells, or install water pumps
in them. The encroachers will be punished in
accordance with the law. The government officials
or the ones who misuse their power and occupy
others' lands using weapons must not only return
the land but also undergo punishment in
accordance with the law.
[Same as Taliban 1999 law]Issues Paper Series
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Article 23
(1) There is no new survey and mapping of the
land without written order of the president.
(2) Bringing any change, replacement or
correction to the cadastral map is not
permitted. In case of disobedience the
offender will be dealt with in accordance
with the law.
(3) Giving information to the people about
government properties is not permitted.
(4) The ownership department, the cadastral
department and other departments must
cooperate with the government's judicial
authorities when required and show and
specify the property concerned.
This is a new Article. Article 23 in the Taliban
1999 law says the following: all government farms
in the country must be clarified and each
clarification should result in written statements
by the Supreme Leader]
Article 24
(1) The department of land issues is responsible
for looking after government's properties. In
case of any legal dispute, it should give or
deliver the case to the concerned authorities
to avoid the loss of government's right.
Article 24 of the Taliban 1999 law is as above in
the current Article 23, with the exception of one
sub-Article which reads: No payment is permitted
for preparing site information.
(2) If the judicial authorities of the government
find a property of the government that is
being occupied illegally by other people or
government departments and the concerned
authorities have not acted against this, they
can follow the case and then restore the
property to its rightful owner, in order to
secure public interest.
[Same as Taliban 1999 law but as Article 25]
Article 25
All concerned government departments must
abide by the orders of this decree.
[Same as Taliban 1999 law but as Article 26]
Article 26
After this decree comes into effect, Decree No.
26 dated 13.4.1420 (Arabic year) published in
Gazette Issue No. 788 dated 6.5.1420 will be
repealed [new].Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Afghanistan
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